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INTRODUCTION

Mr. Smith, under the impression that a good lawyer can help
him, comes to you. A door-to-door salesman sold him membership in the "Food Freezer Budget Savings Plan" ($75 per month
for a month's supply of frozen turkey, with a freezer provided for
a slight additional charge).' To Mr. Smith's dismay, the turkey
in the first month's shipment was spoiled. When he requested
cancellation, the freezer plan office informed Mr. Smith that the
company would be willing to cease monthly shipment of the turkey, but it would hold him to his $1,200 contract to purchase the
freezer. You tell Mr. Smith not to worry; a simple telephone call
will probably clear the matter up. The freezer company's lawyer
you contact says that the company will cancel the contract after
all-provided Mr. Smith pays a $200 "penalty." In response to
your vehement argument for Mr. Smith's right to rescission, the
lawyer quietly replies, "It will cost you more than $200 to prove
it."
The unfortunate Mr. Smith may be vulnerable to the
schemes of other swindlers: the landlord charging excessive cleaning deposits,2 the manufacturer refusing to repair its defective
products, 3 the workmen's compensation insurer wrongfully withholding interest on compensation awards,4 and the medical insurer charging premiums that do not take into account federal
medicare payment.' As in the food freezer case, Mr. Smith may
not obtain full legal redress from any of these other swindlers
1. This account is based on the testimony of Philip Schrag, then Chairman of the
Consumers Advisory Council of the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, when
he appeared before a House subcommittee of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee considering consumer protection measures. ClassAction Hearings and Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-43, at 109
(1970). For a more elaborate discussion of Mr. Schrag's experience, see Schrag, Bleak
House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 115 (1969). See
also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971),
discussed at notes 125-29 and accompanying text infra.
2. Bauman v. Islay Investments, 30 Cal. App. 3d 752, 106 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1973).
3. Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973).
See Note, The Products Liability Class Suit: Preventative Relief for the Consumer, 27
S.C.L. REv. 229 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Products Liability Class Suit].
4. Addington v. Industrial Indem. Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 802, 101 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1972).
See notes 156-63 and accompanying text infra.
5. Trowell v. Blue Cross of South Carolina, Civ. No. 4078 (C.P., Richland County,
S.C., June 8,1971). See notes 67-71 and accompanying text infra. See also the certified
class complaint in Appendix C infra.
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since his costs in suing will probably exceed his largest potential
recovery.
Schemes, such as the "Food Freezer Budget Savings Plan,"
are not one-shot operations. Whole neighborhoods are subjected
to the same door-to-door solicitation, so that Mr. Smith may in
fact be representative of a class of similarly aggrieved individuals.
Thus, what appears to be an individual suit with no chance of
success is really a class suit-the solution to Mr. Smith's problem.
Although a class action seems to be the solution, the obstacle
of finding a responsive forum in which to bring the suit still remains. Because of recent United States Supreme Court decisions6

making federal courts less accessible to class suits, the most
viable forum may now be the state court, especially if the state
is one with liberal statutory rules of procedure. On the other
hand, most state courts are unreceptive to the consumer class
action despite potentially liberal statutory procedural rules.7
This, however, is not to say that the states do not have an obliga8
tion to provide a forum accessible to class plaintiffs.
6. Eisen v. Carisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). An underlying premise of
Snyder was an implicit recognition of the sovereignty of the states in the federal system
and the independence of the states' judicial authority. The Snyder Court, quoting Healy
v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934), stated that "[d]ue regard for the rightful independence
of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined." 394 U.S.
at 340. The Court actually feared that, in permitting aggregation of claims, what would
come before the federal courts would simply be many localized controversies involving
exclusively questions of state law. These actions, based on separate and distinct claims,
could more appropriately be tried in state courts. Id. at 341. The Snyder directions are
clear. If these are truly state matters and federal court doors are, for all practical purposes,
closed, the state courts ought to provide opportunities for the redress of consumer grievances.
Unfortunately, in diverting multistate actions to state courts, these Supreme Court
decisions apparently disregarded the jurisdictional obstacles to redress in state courts. The
California Court of Appeals phrased the problem as follows:
The availability of a state remedy will depend on at least four elements: one,
the defendants' vulnerability to the in personam jurisdiction of the forum state;
two, the forum state's policy toward class suits; three, the state court's difficulty
in supervising nonresident class members; four, the state court's view of itself
as a convenient forum. By the time a multistate class suit emerges from these
successive filters, it is obliterated or its choice of forums eliminated or sharply
confined.
Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 117 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (Cal. App. 1974).
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 1005(a) (McKinney 1963). But see Hall v. Coburn
Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
8. Some might argue that providing remedies for consumer grievances should be left
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to the national and state legislatures, not to the courts. Several bills have been introduced
which would give the federal courts jurisdiction over all consumer class actions, regardless
of the absence of diversity, so long as the minimal jurisdictional amount is met. E.g., S.
707, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 16152, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
A different approach incorporates a type of "triggering device;" the courts would
certify class suits against particular practices which proceedings, initiated by the United
States Attorney General or by the Federal Trade Commission, have prohibited. S. 3201,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also Elman, The Regulatory Process:A Personal View,
39 ANTITRUST L.J. 901, 909-12 (1970), in which former FTC Commissioner Elman suggested that a "trade court" be established to assume exclusive jurisdiction over private
class suits.
The recently enacted FTC Improvement Act, Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637,
88 Stat. 2183, reported in 13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7200 (1975), authorizes consumer class actions for breaches of express and implied warranties and for failure to
comply with FTC regulations on warranty standards. Section 110(d) provides that causes
of action under the Act may be brought in both state and federal courts. For the action
to be maintained in federal court, however, the individual claims must be at least $25,
the aggregated amount of controversy must be at least $50,000, and the suit must be
brought by 100 named plaintiffs. The Act thus provides for only limited relief under
additional jurisdictional limitations. See 3 CLASS ACTION REP. 144 (1974).
For a general discussion of the federal consumer statutes and the availability of class
relief under them, see Note, Consumer ClassActions UnderRule 23: Consumer Protection
Causes of Action Available under FederalStatutes, 25 S.C.L. REV. 239 (1973).
The state consumer legislation has also been developing at a rapid pace. See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 66-71 to -71.15 (Cum. Supp. 1973) entitled "The South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act." Under the Act the State Attorney General can recover civil penalties not to exceed $5,000 per violation, or $15,000 for violating a permanent injunction
procured under the Act. Id. § 66-71.10(a) & (b). Regarding private remedies for unfair
trade practices (defined in §§ 66-71.1 to -71.3), the Act provides for the recovery of actual
damages and attorney's fees, id. § 66-71.13(a), or for restitition. Id. § 66-71.4(b). Representative suits, however, are expressly precluded. Id. § 66-71.13(a). The South Carolina
version of the recently enacted UCCC does not expressly preclude class actions. No. 1241,
[1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2879. The federal experience with the Truth in Lending Act,
however, may have foreclosed damage class actions under the South Carolina statute. See
notes 305-26 and accompanying text infra.
Other states have similar statutes dealing generally with unfair trade practices or
deceptive sales schemes, some of which allow consumer class actions. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 45.50.531 (Supp. 1972) (class suit to proceed with state attorney general's approval); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1781, 1782 (1973) (class actions may proceed under the same
conditions of Federal Rule 23); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207(1)(c) (1973) (attorney general
action to recover damages for consumers); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 267 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1973) (restitution suit by state attorney general); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A,
§§ 9(2), 11 (1972) (private and attorney general actions); N.J. REv. STAT. § 56:8-14 (1971)
(relief proper in an action initiated by the State Attorney General, Kugler v. Romain, 110
N.J. Super. 476, 266 A.2d 144 (Ch. Div. 1970)); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-15-1 et seq. (Supp.
1971) (restitution in suit by attorney general and private suit for injunctive relief and
attorney's fees); N.Y. EXEC. LAWS 63-12 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (attorney general provision). Discussion of the state provisions may be found in Biderman, Consumer Class
Actions Under the New Mexico Unfair PracticesAct, 4 N.M.L. REv. 49 (1973); Howell,
Two ProposalsFor Change in Virginia Law-A Class Action Procedureand a Consumer
Fraud Law, 8 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 1 (1973); Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724 (1972); Reed, LegislatingFor the Consumer: An Insider's
Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAc. L.J. 1 (1971); Note, Consumer
Class Actions Under the New Jersey Consumer FraudAct, 26 U. MiAMi L. REv. 450 (1972);
Note, Consumer Class Actions: A Proposalfor Florida, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 58 (1973).
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This note will examine, with respect to the accessibility of
the courts of South Carolina to class actions, the following fundamental question: whether, and under what circumstances, effective group remedies should be available when the basic issues of
law or fact are common to all members of the group but joinder
is impracticable, and the attainment of relief on an individual
basis is difficult, if not impossible. Part I analyzes the policies
underlying the old equity practice and compares them with those
of the more modern class suit. Part II offers a classification of the
South Carolina cases to explain why the courts have allowed
certain actions and have disallowed others. It is proposed that a
South Carolina court will probably certify a modern class suit if
it fits within this classification scheme. Part II suggests, however,
that such a classification scheme is inadequate, notwithstanding
its predictive value, since it excludes an extensive viable category-the consumer class action for damages. Part III explores
several recent California decisions to demonstrate what can be
done within the framework of the basic Field Code provision and
what features of the California system are compatible with South
Carolina law. Finally, Part IV examines post-certification problems that South Carolina courts may have to face.
I1.

A.

SOUTH CAROLINA CLASS

ACTIONS

Origins of the Class Suit in South Carolina

In 1870, the South Carolina legislature enacted a comprehensive code of civil procedure first recommended by David Dudley
Field and adopted by New York in 1848. That code9 included a
class action provision modeled on an old equity practice 0 but
9. S.C. CODE § 142 (1870) [hereinafter referred to as the Field Code].
10. In 1840, Justice Story in his work on equity pleading stated that there were three
exceptions to the rule that all persons, legally or beneficially interested in the subject
matter of a suit, had to appear:
(1) where the question is one of a common or general interest, and one or more
sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole;
(2) where the parties form a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the
rights and interests of the whole;
(3) where the parties are very numerous, and though they have, or may have,
separate and distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court.
J. STORY, EQurrY PLEADINGS 77 (2d ed. 1840). See also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurry
PLEADINGS 97 (1st ed. 1838).
The 1848 New York Code did not include a class provision, but a year after its
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codified as part of the compulsory joinder statute. In 1952, the
South Carolina legislature enacted a new code severing the class
provision from the compulsory joinder section." Reenacted in
1962, the class provision retains the same language of the 1870
version:
When the question is one of a common or general interest to
many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it may
one or more
be impracticable to bring them all before the court,
2
may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.1
adoption the legislature, no doubt spurred by Justice Story's exceptions, amended the
compulsory joinder provision to include the following language:
When the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or
when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.
N.Y. Session Laws ch. 438, § 119 (1849). See Homburger, State Class Actions and the
Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 613 (1971). The Field Code provision has exhibited
a great capacity for endurance. In New York, for example, the provision remained untouched in three general revisions, with the exception of the addition of protective order
provisions in 1963. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1005(b) & (c)(McKinney 1963).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-205 (1952). Severance has also occurred in Arkansas, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and more recently in California. The purpose for this
statutory severance perhaps has been to give the class action device an independent
existence apart from any express condition of the compulsory joinder provision.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-205 (1962). Several states have no class action provision, but
rather a court-created practice modeled on the old equity practice suggested by Justice
Story: Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia.
Other states have retained the Field Code provision with minor revisions: Alabama,
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 128 (1958); Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1962); California, CAL.
CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-105 (1960); Florida,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.220 (1973); Maine, ME. R. CIV. PRO. 23; Maryland, MD. R. CrV. PRO.
209(a); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT § 25-319 (1967); New York, N.Y.R. CIV. PRAc. § 1005(a)
(McKinney 1963); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-i, rule 23 (1970); Oklahoma,
OKLA.STAT. ANN. § 12-232 (1971); Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. § 13.170 (1973); Pennsylvania,
PA. R. Cv. PRo. 2230; South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-205 (1962); Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957).
Other states have provisions based on the pre-1966 federal rule, which made distinctions between "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions. See Homburger, supra note
10, at 626. The trend, however, among the states is to adopt the more modem 1966
amended version of the federal rule. See Note, State Class Action Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 60 IowA L. REv. 93 (1974). South Carolina is no exception. On December
30, 1974, Rep. Irene Rudnick introduced a bill, S.2248, modeled on Federal Rule 23, for
adoption by the South Carolina legislature. See Appendix D infra.
Within the three main categories presented above, there are many variations among
the state class action provisions. For example, the Kansas provision was amended in 1970
to authorize the court, on its own initiative or by motion, to order an individual suit to
proceed as a class action "[wI]here necessary for the protection of a party or absent
persons . . . ." KAN. CIV. PRo. STAT. ANN. § 60-223(c)(1) (Vernon 1963) as amended
(Supp. 1970). This provision, though revolutionary as statutory language goes, is indicative of the degree of judicial control necessary at times to adequately protect present or
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In many Field Code states, there has been much confusion
over the proper operation of the class provision. Since the provision was at one time part of the compulsory joinder statute, several courts have concluded that a class suit could be maintained
only when compulsory joinder is appropriate but the parties are
so numerous that bringing them all before the court is
impracticable. 3 This, of course, is an unnecessarily restrictive
interpretation not found in the historical equity practices.
The disjunctive "or" between the first and second clauses in
the provision has led many courts to conclude that there are two
instances when a class action is maintainable: (1) when there is
a question of common or general interest to many persons, or (2)
when the parties are so numerous it is impracticable to bring
them before the court. 4 Pomeroy, although a contributor to that
absent party claims and obligations. The Kentucky courts, as a court practice, have
turned individual suits into class actions. Rollins v. Board of Drainage Comm'rs, 281 Ky.
771, 136 S.W.2d 1094 (1939); Covington Trust Co. v. Owens, 278 Ky. 695, 129 S.W.2d 186
(1939). South Carolina courts analogously have refused to allow creditors with claims on
limited corporate assets to conduct individual actions, finding such suits detrimental to
absent creditors. The remedy to this defect in parties is actually to join all creditors or to
allow appearing creditors to represent the class of interested parties. Terry v. Martin, 10
S.C. 263 (1878); Terry v. Calnan, 4 S.C. 508 (1873). But see Warren v. Raymond, 17 S.C.
163 (1881).
13. Society Milion Athena, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22
N.E.2d 374 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890
(1937). This interpretation has gone unheeded in other jurisdictions, Daar v. Yellow Cab.
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967), and even New York courts
more recently have openly questioned that interpretation although the usual practice
seems to have been to ignore such an unsound doctrine. Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18
N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
14. See the annotations to § 10-205 presenting exactly this position. In McKenzie v.
L'Amoureaux, 11 Barb. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851), decided two years after the adoption of
the Field Code amendment, the New York Supreme Court held that under the introductory clause there need not be a showing of impracticability of joinder and that the condition of multiplicty was met by the present parties and three absent parties. The court
allowed the action to continue under the first clause on the basis of a question of common
interest in establishing a will and fund by which legacies could be paid, although there
was no showing concerning the impracticability of joinder of the three absent parties. The
court compounded its misleading remarks by dicta to the effect that the representative
plaintiffs interested in establishing the validity of the will could not have maintained a
class suit under the second clause since the absent legatees, each entitled to a separate
legacy, were not "united in interest," (the language of the compulsory joinder provision).
This was the same approach employed by the South Carolina court in Bannister v. Bull,
16 S.C. 220 (1881). See note 17 infra. McKenzie has been extensively cited in many
jurisdictions, including South Carolina. Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 34, 65 S.E. 953,
955 (1909). In Trowell v. Blue Cross of South Carolina, Civ. No. 4078 (C.P., Richland
County, S.C., June 8, 1971), Judge Grimball's order allowing the class suit acknowledged
that a class action would be proper in either of the two circumstances. Court Order at 6.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

particular misconception, admits in his work Code Remedies that
as a practical matter there may be no situation in which numerous parties who are suing representatively would not have some
common interest.'5 Analysis of the provision reveals why that is
so. The only conditions for a representative suit in instance (2)
are the multiplicity of parties and the impracticability of joinder.
Joining class members who have nothing in common, however,
violates even the most liberal joinder statutes. The provision
itself specifies the necessary common element-"a question of
common or general interest"-in instance (1). Likewise, instance
(1) cannot stand alone since such an interpretation would allow
one plaintiff to sue in behalf of two or three-a serious misinterpretation of the policy behind the old equity practice, impracticability of joinder. For a sensible reading of the provision, "or" must
be read as "and."
A recurring problem in class actions is properly defining a
"question of common or general interest of many persons.""8 A
See notes 61-71 and accompanying text infra. Judge Grimball's order thus indicates the
very real threat of misinterpretation implicit in the misplaced "or" of the'original version
of the Field Code class action provision. See Simeone, Class Suits Under the Codes, 7
WEST RES. L. REv. 5, 15 (1955); Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous
Litigants, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 399, 412, 434-35 (1934).
15. J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §286, at 437 (5th ed. 1929). But see Faber v. Faber,
76 S.C. 156, 161, 56 S.E. 677, 679 (1906), quoting J. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 391 (4th
ed. 1900) (emphasis added):
Where the question to be decided is one of common or general interest, to a
number of persons, the action may be brought by or against one for all the
others, even though the partiesare not so numerous that it would be impracticable to join them all as actual plaintiffs or defendants. But on the other hand,
when the parties are not so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court, one or more may sue or be sued for all the others, even though
they have no common or general interest in the questions at issue; and the
necessary facts to bring the case within one or the other of these conditions, must
be averred.
16. Blume, The "Common Questions" Principlein the Code Provisions for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878 (1932). One could easily interpret the phrase, "a
question of common or general interest," to mean either common questions or common
interests or rights. The former interpretation is preferable to the latter, which is an unsound application of the "jural" relationship. See notes 343-47 and accompanying text
infra.
The jural relationship analysis has been roundly criticized. Z. CHAFEE, SOMIE PROBLEMS OF EQUrrY 246 (1956); Kalven & Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunctionof the Class
Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REV. 684, 704 (1941); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 380
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan, Continuing Work]; Advisory Committee Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure,39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory
Committee Note].
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functional approach to the problem-asking whether separate
suits conducted by individual class members would entail repetitive legal or factual questions-may not only identify the common questions in a particular context but may also suggest
whether the underlying policies of a class suit, judicial economy
and efficiency, will be served.
South Carolina has encountered the problems of restrictive
availability under compulsory joinder, the disjunctive "or," and
obscurities in the definition of a common question.17 Analysis of
the South Carolina cases in the context of these historical areas,
however, would only add to the already existing confusion and not
clarify the viability of the consumer class action. Rather than
dwell on those historical problems, this note offers a basic classification scheme to determine what attributes are responsible for
the success of each type of class action. The three general categories of class actions which have been attempted in South Carolina
with varying success are those involving: (1) some prior legal or
organizational bond among the class members, (2) a common
fund in which all the members of the class are interested and (3)
common relief which all the class members are interested in
achieving.
B.

PriorLegal or OrganizationalBond 8
The South Carolina organizational or legal bond decisions

17. Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 65 S.E. 953 (1909); Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C.
220 (1881). Bannister and Whitaker epitomize the obscurity found in the joint and common, several and distinct dichotomy. In Bannister, a tenants in common class suit to
recover land alleged to have been wrongfully held by another, the court indicated that the
class members were not so "united in interest" that plaintiffs actually had to join all
tenants before suing, but that in a suit by one tenant (presumably a class suit), recovery
would only include that named plaintiff's share. Whitaker allowed another tenants in
common class suit to continue as a class action with the recovery to include all lands held
by the defendant. Bannisterwas distinguished as arising in a different procedural context.
If Bannister, however, was still good law, the dissent in Whitaker (Judge Hydrick) was
quite correct; the separate interests of the tenants supported only a partial recovery of
lands held by the defendant. 84 S.C. at 34, 65 S.E. at 955.
That these historical problems do arise in a modem context is evidenced by Schlosser
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 65 Wis. 2d 153, 222 N.W.2d 156 (1974). For an exhaustive list of
those states employing the jural relationship analysis, see Starrs, The Consumer Class
Action-Part II: Considerationsof Procedure, 49 Bos. U.L. Rav. 407 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Starrs].
18. 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.10[1], at 23-2602, -2603 (1974) amply treats
this category indirectly in his discussion of spurious actions:
There was no jural relationship between the members of the class; unlike, for
example, the members of an unincorporated association, they had taken no
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follow an old line of equity cases which refused, in the absence of
independent grounds for jurisdiction, to entertain bills of peace
to avoid a multiplicity of suits unless a bond of privity existed
among the multiple parties."0 The concept of privity, suggesting
a jural relationship among parties, belongs to an area of substantive law that has negligible relevance to solutions of the procedural problems present in multiparty litigation." By measuring
the homogeneity and cohesiveness of the class in terms of
substantive privity or organizational structure, courts are actually searching for a "community of interests" sufficient to jus-.
tify class treatment. This is no different than a search for general,
common, or joint rights as distinguished from several rights.
These labels fail to convey a clear conception of the nature of the
tie which forges an alliance necessary for class treatment. While
consensual relationships, such as common property rights or voluntary associations, may indicate that those individuals before
the court will act in the best interests of all, it is by no means clear
that nonconsensual bonds of unity, created by transactions or
occurrences which affect the entire group in a similar fashion,
could not forge a tie of equal or greater strength.
The prior legal or organizational bond rationale is found in
actions involving specific real or personal property, cotenant
suits," stockholder suits,22 and suits by or against the membership of an unincorporated association.?
In Faber v. Faber,'Aa will gave numerous parties contingent
interests in a parcel of land. Some of the parties were known to
the executor of the estate, while others were unknown and outside
steps to create a legal relationship among themselves. They were not fellow
travelers by agreement. The right or liability of each was distinct. The class was
formed solely by the presence of a common question of law or fact. When a suit
was brought by or against such a class, it was merely an invitation to joinder
See also Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben-Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 349-50
(1948). Cf. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO
L. REv. 433, 459 n.113 (1960).
19. J. POMEROY, EQuITy JURISPRUDENCE §§ 255, 268-69 (4th ed. 1918).
20. See notes 343-47 and accompanying text infra.
21. Caine v. Griffin, 232 S.C. 562, 103 S.E.2d 37 (1958); Wilson v. Gibbes Machinery
Co., 189 S.C. 425, 26 S.E.2d 490 (1939); Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 65 S.E. 953
(1909); Hunt v. Gower, 80 S.C. 80, 61 S.E. 218 (1908); Faber v. Faber, 76 S.C. 156, 56
S.E. 677 (1906).
22. Hernlen v. Vandiver, 145 S.C. 412, 143 S.E. 222 (1928); Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C.
312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913).
23. Stemmermann v. Lilienthal, 54 S.C. 440, 32 S.E. 535 (1899).
24. 76 S.C. 156, 56 S.E. 677 (1907).
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the jurisdiction. The executor, in order to sell the land and reinvest the proceeds for the benefit of the estate, sued the beneficiaries to clear title to the land. In approving the executor's action
of naming a known beneficiary as the representative of the class
of unknown beneficiaries, the court relied on the following section
of Pomeroy's Code Remedies:
The parties thus represented by the plaintiff or defendant may
not be in privity with each other, but there must be some bond
of connection which unites them all with the question at issue
in the action. The test would be to suppose that an action in
which all of the numerous persons were actually made plaintiffs
or defendants, and if it [sic] could be maintained in that form,
then one might sue or be sued on behalf of the others; but if such
an actual joinder would be improper, then the suit by or against
one as a representative would be improper, notwithstanding the
permission contained in this section of the statute.,
Several writers have concluded that a court employing this explanation of the proper occasion for class treatment is essentially
saying that a class action will be proper when actual or permissive
joinder would be proper." The usefulness of the "permissive joinder test" in class litigation depends on how liberally the permissive joinder statute is construed; in South Carolina it has been
narrowly construed. In Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co.,27 the court
invalidated the joinder of a husband and wife who were suing for
wrongful ejectment from a hotel:
25. Id. at 162, 56 S.E. at 679, quoting CODE REMEDIES, supra note 15, § 392. This

section of Pomeroy's work is quoted in a number of class action cases in South Carolina.
Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 33, 65 S.E. 953, 955 (1909); Stemmermann v. Lilienthal,
54 S.C. 440, 445, 32 S.E. 535, 537 (1899).
26. Starrs, supra note 17, at 440. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-202 (1962) specifies who may
be plaintiffs: "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining
the relief demanded may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this
Title." S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-203 (1962) indicates who may be defendants: "Any person
may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the
plaintiff or who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settlement of the
questions involved therein."
South Carolina has expressed a liberal policy statement on permissive joinder. Cf.
Murray Drug Co. v. Harris, 77 S.C. 410, 57 S.E. 1109 (1907). There is, however, no South
Carolina case comparable to Adams v. Albany, 124 Cal. App. 2d 639, 269 P.2d 142 (1954),
in which 78 homeowners sued a real estate developer and others allegedly involved in a
deceptive land sales scheme. The plaintiffs purchased the houses, not built to the advertised specifications, over a period of several months. The court found that the uniform
practices employed were part of a larger fraudulent design, "uniting" the plaintiffs. See
also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
27. 121 S.C. 72, 113 S.E. 474 (1922).
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In order that a joint action may be possible, there must be some
prior bond of legal union between the persons injured-such as
partnership relation-of such a nature that the tort interferes
with it, and by virtue of that very interference produces a wrong
and consequent damage common to all.2
The court pointed out the code's requirement that the causes of
action joined in the same complaint must affect all the parties to
the action. Unless each has a pecuniary interest in the recovery
of the other, "there can be no joint or common damage to both
resulting from a wrong which gives rise to separate and distinct
rights personal to each. 2' 9 Ryder, though a permissive joinder
opinion, is crucial to class action development in South Carolina
since it stands on the identical reasoning South Carolina courts
have consistently used to deny class suits seeking damages when
there is no prior legal or organizational bond among class members.3" Such a rationale makes a consumer class action for damages impossible and stands as a barrier to the development of the
modern class action.
South Carolina courts, not unexpectedly, are receptive to
stockholder class actions since such suits meet the prior bond
1 was an action for an accountrequirement. Hernlen v. Vandiver"
ing and damages brought by depositors, stockholders and creditors of a bank, on behalf of themselves and all those similarly
situated, against the directors of the bank for their alleged mismanagement. The court permitted the suit to be maintained as
a class action since there had been a wrong common to all members of the class, the negligence of the directors. If the court had
gone no further than that, Hernlen would be good support for a
consumer class action, such as a suit by credit card holders
against a department store charging usurious interest rates.
Unfortunately, Hernlen contains the following qualifying statement:
We find in the complaint but a single cause of action with specifications: An effort to bring into the treasury of the corporation,
for the benefit of its depositors and other creditors, and ulti28. Id. at 75, 113 S.E. at 475.

29. Id. at 76, 113 S.E. at 475.
30. See Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973), a recent tort class
action using Ryder to deny class certification, discussed in notes 81-83 and accompanying

text infra.
31. 145 S.C. 412, 143 S.E. 222 (1928).
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mately its stockholders, funds of the bank which, it is alleged,
have been dissipated by the wrongful conduct of the directors
...
[I]t necessarily follows that there are no several rights
attempted to be adjusted in the complaint . . . . The plain
interpretation of the complaint is that the mismanagement and
negligence of the directors, in the various particulars mentioned,
have entailed losses of many thousands of dollars to the bank,
and that a recovery of the damages so inflicted upon the bank
will enure to the benefit of the stockholders, depositors and
general creditors who will be entitled to participate in them. In
other words, it is sought to realize, to the corporation,assets for
distribution among the depositors and general creditors
first,
32
and to the stockholders, should a balance remain.

The court did not see the wrong as inflicted on the individual
plaintiffs, but on the entity in which the plaintiffs had interest.
33
In a consumer action, such as a usury suit by credit card holders,
there would be no wrong to an entity; the wrong would be to the
plaintiffs individually.
Black v. Simpson,3 a suit by stockholders of a corporation
against the director and general manager for fraudulent acquisition of control, is additional qualified authority for the class action in South Carolina. In allowing the joinder of the stockholders, the court emphasized the trust relationship that existed between corporate management and stockholders: "[I]t seems to
me clear. . . that the plaintiffs as cestui que trustent may maintain a joint action against the common trustee for an accounting
of the profits made by him in breach of his trust at their expense
...
M' The court mentioned Hellams v. Switzer,31 where the

court denied joinder of 10 property holders in a single action for
32. Id. at 437, 143 S.E. at 230 (court's emphasis). If this were a pure derivative suit,
the concept of a corporate right common to all shareholders would be appropriate. The
term "derivative action," however, may not accurately describe Hernlen. The court simply manufactured an intermediate step, directing the funds first to the bank which would
distribute them to the interest holders. Actually, the interests were separate and unique
and the court maintained the concept of corporate right to justify group recovery. See note
37 infra. On the other hand, it may be plausible to view Hernlen as a derivative suit. Since
there are no separate statutes for derivative and stockholder class suits, corporate suits
and the more general class action use the same class action statute. Reading Hernlen as
a derivative suit weakens its authority in the class action context, since derivative suits
are sui generis.
33. E.g., Howell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (C.P., Florence County, S.C., April 10,
1968).
34. 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913).
35. Id, at 315-16, 77 S.E. at 1025.
36. 24 S.C. 39 (1885).
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injunctive relief and damages resulting from the defendant's
damming an adjacent watercourse. Significantly, the court distinguished Hellams as a case lacking a common interest, such as
a trust relationship common to all plaintiffs; thus, the claimants
in Hellams had suffered distinct and separate damages. The
Black court, therefore, promptly shut the door, which it had tentatively opened, to class actions in making a prior bond (the trust
relationship common to all the plaintiffs) a prerequisite to the
maintenance of a class suit."
C. Common Fund3s
Cases justifying representative suits on the basis of a common fund allude to a specific fund, such as premiums received
by mutual life insurance companies, in which all of the plaintiffs
are interested. 9 Not only does a particular group receive the
funds, but contributors to the fund also have "joint and undivided" interests; when something affects the collected monies,
37. The dissent, in Black, viewed the suit as a class action, but would have denied it
for its failure to meet a permissive joinder test:
[Tihe plaintiffs brought the suit on behalf of themselves and all others who
would come in under the proceedings ....
. . .There must be some interest. Here there is none. They claimed no
interest in the corporate property. . . . This was a suit on 22 contracts, made
with 22 different people, at different times. . . . The plaintiffs are not associated in any way, and each ought to bring his separate action.
94 S.C. at 319-20, 77 S.E. at 1026. The dissent's treatment of the suit as a class action
led to its overlooking the trust relationship, or prior legal bond, in the case. Without the
element of a prior bond, the action could not withstand a permissive joinder test. Thus,
the dissent's opinion illustrates the significance of having the court initially recognize a
prior legal bond in this type of case.
38. The common fund is a substitute for the prior bond requirement of the previous
category. Not only has the common fund rationale been suggested as a basis for class
certification, more recently, it has been employed by federal district courts to circumvent
the Snyder and Zahn policy against liberal aggregation. Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern
Pub. Serv. Co., 63 F.R.D. 35 (D.S.D. 1974) (Plaintiffs were found to have a joint and
common undivided interest in a fund comprised of excessive rate charges by defendants).
Compare Matthews v. Massell, 356 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. Ga. 1973) and Yanez v. Jones, 361
F. Supp. 701 (D. Utah 1973) with Houck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.
Pa. 1973) and Banks v. Travelers Ins. Co., 60 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
39. The term has escaped clarity of definition. "We have found no case, or definition,
which defines the term 'common fund'. . . . [W]e think 'common fund' would be a fund
which is owned by more than one person so that each person would own or have an interest
in the entire fund." Fisher v. Superior Oil Co. of California, 390 P.2d 521, 526 (Okla. 1964).
The common fund rationale has acquired critics. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1774, at 15 (1972).
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either beneficially or detrimentally, it affects the policyholders as
a group.4"
In South Carolina, the precursor to the common fund class
action was the more narrowly defined representative creditor's
suit. In Terry v. Calnan,4 , the court refused the plaintiff creditor's
suit against the receivers and stockholders without joinder of the
other creditors of the insolvent banking corporation in at least a
representative fashion. Categorizing the action as one for equitable relief, the court based its holding on the policy of avoiding
future litigation, a multiplicity of suits, and injustice to present
and absent parties.4 2 On the other hand, the court in Warren v.
Raymond 3 found that a suit by a creditor against his debtor's heir
could not be conducted in class form since the assets were not
marshalled as they would have been in a creditor's bill:
There are cases where the very right under which the plaintiff
claims implies that he is entitled to its enjoyment only in conjunction with other persons. There are cases where no such implication necessarily arises from the nature of the right, but yet
it may be shown by the pleadings or proofs that other persons
have in fact a community of interest with the plaintiff. There
40. South Carolina insurance fund cases: Powell v. Gary, 200 S.C. 154, 20 S.E.2d 391
(1942); Ex parte Rowley, 200 S.C. 174, 20 S.E.2d 383 (1942). See also Stemmermann v.
Lilienthal, 54 S.C. 440, 32 S.E. 535 (1899), a class suit by several members of an unincorporated association against its treasurer to recover entrusted funds. California flirted with
the common fund rationale, Price v. Communication Workers of America Local 9503, 167
Cal. App. 2d 524, 334 P.2d 632 (1959), but soundly rejected it in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,
67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). See notes 114-16 and accompanying
text infra.
A common fund has other unifying factors: (1) Maintenance of the fund is in a single
state, perhaps organized under the laws of that state. (2) The state which is the situs of
the fund may be the only forum capable of producing a uniform judgment for all class
members. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1915). But see Chance v.
Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1962). See generally
Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 100-01, discussing FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(A)
& (B); Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 16, at 377-78. (3) Strong state interest in
adjudication of the common fund may be evidenced by comprehensive state legislation,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Banking & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (trusts);
Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307 (1937), aff'd sub nom. Neblett v.
Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938) (insurance). See Trowell v. Blue Cross of South Carolina,
Civ. No. 4078 (C.P., Richland County, S.C., June 8, 1971), a recent case held to be a
proper suit on the basis of some prior bond or common fund, discussed at notes 67-71 and
accompanying text infra.
41. 4 S.C. 508 (1873).
42. Id. at 513.
43. 17 S.C. 163 (1882).
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are other cases still in which the claim set up by the plaintiff is
in its nature exclusive of otherpersons.4
The court determined that the particular right sued upon was "in
its nature exclusive of other persons." 5 Thus each creditor could
sue the defendant "according to the diligence he might exhibit in
obtaining priority."46 The court attached no legal significance to
the possible exhaustion of the defendant's resources. That result
would not prejudice the nonappearing creditors since there was
47
no common fund which belonged to all of the creditors equally.
Finally, in Parker v. Carolina Savings Bank, 4 a representative action by several creditors against the assignee and stockholders of an insolvent bank for an accounting and enforcement
of statutory liability, the court noted that "[e]very creditor has
an interest in the liability of every stockholder. Thus a common
fund is created in which all the creditors are interested. The
natural and appropriate remedy is in equity, to realize and distribute this common fund."49
Earle v. Webb,50 a suit brought by mortgage payers in response to a liquidation action commenced by the conservator of
an insolvent building and loan association, is a sharp contrast to
the creditor suits previously discussed. The conservator had
commenced an action against certain individuals alleged to represent every class of stockholder, since the number of stockholders was too large to make it practicable to make each a party to
the suit. In addition to his request for directions from the court
on questions arising out of the liquidation of the association, the
conservator had asked the court to enjoin all creditors, stockholders and other persons from instituting suits against the associa44. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 203.
47. It is not at all clear that denial of class status is justifiable on the basis of the
early equity and legal practices. "As a single creditor may sue for his demand out of the
personal assets, it is rather a matter of convenience, than indulgence, to permit a suit by
a few on behalf of all the creditors." L. MITFORD, EQUrrY PLEADINGS 193 (1849). This
language suggests that the court, in its own discretion, could have allowed the suit to
proceed in class form though none of the predicates of the common fund were present.
Compare Eameston v. Lyde, 1 Paige 637 (N.Y. 1829) with Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C.
29, 65 S.E. 953 (1909), and Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C. 220 (1881), referring to the Mitford
distinctions, but not necessarily drawing the correct conclusions.
48. 53 S.C. 583, 31 S.E. 673 (1898).
49. Id. at 589, 31 S.E. at 674.
50. 182 S.C. 175, 188 S.E. 798 (1936).
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tion or the conservator, to compel all creditors to the association
to be called into this particular action, and to allow all other
persons to intervene. The plaintiffs were mortgage payers of the
association who alleged that they had overpaid their mortgages
and thereby had become creditors of the association. The plaintiffs justified their intervention on behalf of all others who had
made similar overpayments on the basis that the questions involved were of common or general interest to many persons who
were ignorant of their rights and of how to redress them. The
reasons given by the court in denying class certification support
the proposition that consumer class suits cannot be maintained
in South Carolina and demonstrate the fears of the court in allowing such suits.
It is not known that there are any others claiming to be in like
situation with the [plaintiffs] and in order to ascertain if there
are others, it would require that a great number of mortgages
and the books of the Association, be gone over painstakingly, the
cost of the clerical work alone being almost prohibitive, and may
easily result in that which a court of Equity seeks to prevent, a
multiplicity of suits; because, necessarily each case must stand
on its own bottom. To permit the [intervenors] to go over the
books and papers of the Association to ascertain if there are
others who might claim to be creditors of the same class . . .
would far exceed the ordinary Bill of Discovery, the purpose of
which is to enable one who is asserting a right or claim to determine the exact nature of such claim and the extent thereof. In
the instant case appellants are seeking the aid of this Court to
determine if others have claims which they could assert and to
further determine who are the "others," and appellants are
claiming the right to represent these others as a class. The
[intervenors] have not presented any reasons why it is necessary for the protection of their rights, that other claimants be
brought in as a class but on the contrary, it appears that each
of the [intervenors] has a complete and adequate remedy; nor
from the standpoint of other claimants (if there be such) does
it appear necessary that the [intervenors] should represent
them as a class. If there are such claimants, each of them has
his adequate remedy by filing his claim with the Master.
• . . There is no claim made by the [intervenors] that it
is necessary that they be allowed to represent a "class" of complainants in order to enable them to recover to the extent of any
claims they may have. In fact, the Association being insolvent,
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it is possible that [intervenors'] interest could be affected to
their detriment."
The Earle v. Webb opinion is a classical statement of state
court resistance to consumer class litigation:
(1) The court looked askance at the extensive Bill of Discovery, allowing discovery of other members of the class, which
would have involved it in a continuing administration of the suit.
In consumer litigation such an extensive Bill of Discovery is often
necessary to determine the identity of class members so that they
may be notified of the pending action or of their participation in
2
the damage distribution.
(2) The court's stated reason for noncertification was a fear
of "a multiplicity of suits;" it was actually concerned about the
expansion of the present litigation to a class level. This concern
is inconsistent with the previously discussed practice of expanding individual creditor suits when necessary to protect the interests of present and absent parties.53 The policies underlying creditor class actions would seem to be applicable here although the
court remarked that plaintiffs' interests would have been detrimentally affected if the members of the class were ascertained
and permitted to assert their claims. Clearly, Earle v. Webb exhibited a strong interest in protecting present parties by condoning a race to the courthouse, but under traditional analysis one
of the court's obligations was the protection of absent parties'
interests which stood on an equal footing with the interests of
appearing class members.54
(3) Finding that each member of the class had an adequate
remedy by filing an individual claim, the court concluded there
was no reason to allow the class suit. This is most misleading. The
other members of the class were not likely to seek this remedy if
51. Id. at 184-85, 186, 188 S.E. at 802.

52. Close court administration is provided for in FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c) & (d). The
South Carolina Masters provisions, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1401 et seq. (1962), could
alleviate many administrative problems, and the Circuit Court Rules of Discovery, S.C.
CIR. CT. R. 87-90, in fact, allow the requests for discovery condemned in Earle v. Webb.
See Long v. Seabrook, 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973), in which the discovery process
resulted in a partial remedy plaintiffs had been seeking. See discussion of the use of
masters in class litigation at notes 273-79 and accompanying text infra.
53. Powell v. Gary, 200 S.C. 154, 20 S.E.2d 391 (1942); Terry v. Calnan, 4 S.C. 508
(1873). Contra, Warren v. Raymond, 17 S.C. 163 (1882).
54. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 101. See also Society Milion Athena,
Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 N.E.2d 374 (1939), discussed in
Homburger, supra note 10, at 617-19.
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they were unaware of the overpayment on their mortgages. Their
failing to file claims could not have been construed as an intelligent waiver of filing rights but as complete ignorance of those
rights. This unawareness is quite prevalent in consumer situations where the average class member lacks the educational background and familiarity with the rather specific commercial law on
usury, warranty-disclaimer, and credit regulation necessary to
actively pursue an individual remedy.55 One outraged consumer
willing to pursue class litigation with the assistance of counsel
should not be frustrated by the myth that his fellow class members know what is going on and refuse to sue or are busily preparing their own claims. This view is consonant with the old equity
policy of providing flexible remedies for class wrongs not redressable at law.
(4) Earle v. Webb resorted to the old concept of jural relationship" in observing that "[tihe intervenors have not presented . . . any reasons why it is necessary for the protection of
55. A New York court has dealt a death blow to class enforcement of statutory
violations. Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d
281 (1970). Accord, Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 219 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1974).
Implicit in the concept of "other adequate remedy" through individual claim filing
is aggrieved party control. This concept was recognized quite early in South Carolina.
Bannister v. Bull, 16 S.C. 220 (1881).
We know of no rule of law which authorizes the court to make parties sue for
what may be supposed to be their rights, or to withhold their rights from those
who do sue, only for the reason that others having similar interests in the same
property do not join. They had the right to refuse to sue. . . .[o]r they may
not intend to set up their rights at all.
Id. at 229-30. In class litigation this concept must give way to representative control in
order to accomodate the class action policies of economy and efficiency. The absent
members are passive participants unless they exclude themselves or actively participate
through intervention. The aggrieved party control concept should defeat the action only
when there is evidence that other members of the class are actively pursuing an alternative
remedy. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 104, discussing factors (A)-(D) of
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3):
The court is to consider the interests of individual members of the class in
controlling their own litigation and carrying them on as they see fit. . . .The
court should inform itself of any litigation actually pending by or against the
individuals. The interests of individuals in conducting separate law suits may
be so strong as to call for denial of a class action. On the other hand, these
interests may be theoretic rather than practical: the class may have a high
degree of cohesion and prosecution of the action through representatives would
be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for individuals may be so
small that separate suits would be impracticable. The burden that separate
suits would impose on the party opposing the class, or upon the court calendars
may also fairly be considered.
56. See notes 16-17 supra.
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their rights, that other claimants be brought in as a class. . .. "I'
To the contrary, class certification is necessary where the claims
are so small that individual actions are not feasible.
(5) The court's observation that administrative costs might
be prohibitively high is perhaps the same fear expressed by the
Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin:55
The fact that the cost of obtaining proofs of claim by individual
members of the class and processing such claims was such as to
make it clear that the amounts payable to individual claimants
would be so low as to be negligible also should have
been enough
59
of itself to warrant dismissal as a class action.
The fear is real, but there must be evidence that the burdens will
swallow the benefits. The fear alone does not warrant dismissal.
An examination of a jurisdiction that employs the common
fund concept even in cases where there is no "common fund" will
illuminate the concept's shortcomings. Illinois has no statute providing for class actions but has developed the class suit through
the old equity practices. Perhaps because the class action as an
equity practice was first widely used in creditor suits which naturally involved a limited fund, the Illinois courts felt constrained
by the common fund framework. After Hansberry v. Lee"0 cautioned the Illinois state courts to examine closely the adequacy
of representation before giving binding effect to class actions, the
state courts overreacted with rigid conservatism."' Eventually,
the court in Smyth v. KasparAmerican State Bank, 2 an action
for injunction by owners of certificates of beneficial interest in the
defendant's bank, broke with the conservative approach. The
court found class status proper although some of the plaintiff
class members sought rescissions for fraud in surrender of their
certificates while others sought monetary damages: "Each certificate holder would share pro rata with the other holders and all
57. 182 S.C. at 185, 188 S.E. at 802.
58. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).

59. Id. at 1017. See notes 267-340 and accompanying text infra.
60. 311 U.S. 32 (1941), rev'g 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939). Although Illinois has

no statute or court rule permitting class suits, there is a court protection provision, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 52.1 (1965): "An action brought on behalf of a class shall rxot be
compromised or dismissed except with the approval of the court and, unless excused for
good cause shown, upon notice as the court may direct."
61. Newberry Library v. Board of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944); Peoples
Stores of Roseland v. McKibben, 379 Ill.
148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
62. 9 Ill.
2d 27, 113 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
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certificates are payable only out of the common fund." 3 Thus,
Illinois liberalized its earlier rigid class action approach by employing a common fund fiction. The ultimate development of the
common fund fiction came in Perlman v. FirstNational Bank of
Chicago,4 a borrowers' class action requesting an accounting of
interest illegally charged and collected by the defendant bank.
The court, though asserting that there need not be an identifiable
fund, allowed class recovery of excessive interest rates. If a fund
were needed, the mere fact that the defendant was found liable
in charging excessive interest rates on its loans would create a
fund.65 The theoretical and practical weaknesses of this approach
are apparent. The court is drawing the correct conclusions but for
the wrong reasons, and in another situation appropriate for class
certification, the court may fall short in its search for a common
fund."6
Perhaps the strongest, as well as the most recent, statement
of the common fund in South Carolina is Trowell v. Blue Cross
of South Carolina." The plaintiff sought an accounting by defendants for a five million (later to be amended to twelve million)
dollar "fund" alleged to have been improperly retained by the
defendants. The class represented by the plaintiff consisted of
several thousand residents who were subscribers to the hospitali63. Id. at 45, 113 N.E.2d at 805.
64. 15 Ill. App. 3d 784, 305 N.E.2d 236 (1974). Accord, Kruse v. Streamwood Util.
Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962).
65. 305 N.E.2d at 250 (Ill. App. 1974).
66. That the common fund fiction is beginning to break down is evidenced by Gaffney
v. Shell Oil Co., 19 1ll. App. 3d 987, 312 N.E.2d 753 (1974). In Gaffney, service station
operators were alleged to have unlawfully computed state taxes on products they sold at
a higher rate. This was a perfect situation for application of a common fund, yet the term
was not used once in the opinion. The appellate court in Hagerty v. General Motors Corp.,
14 Ill. App. 3d 33, 302 N.E.2d 678 (1973), determined that wrongfully charged tax monies
no longer in defendant's possession could be impressed with a constructive trust. The
court argued that the retained monies, to the extent they exceeded the amount of use tax
authorized to be collected, was the res of the constructive trust. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, reversed, choosing to emphasize the fact that the retailers' occupation tax
on the individual sales depended on whether the various transactions were "retail or sale
of service." Hagerty v. General Motors Corp., 59 Ill. 2d 52, 319 N.E.2d 5 (1974). Cf.
Reardon v. Ford Motors Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 344-45, 287 N.E.2d 519, 524 (1972).
67. Civ. No. 4078 (C.P., Richland County, S.C., June 8, 1971). After denial of defendant's demurrer, the action was referred to a master. Master proceedings are still pending.
Similar actions questioning the appropriation and use of accumulated funds have
been conducted in other jurisdictions: Christiansen v. National Sav. & Trust Co., Civ. No.
1833-70 (D.D.C. 1972); McDonald v. Medical Mut. of Cleveland, Inc., Civ. No. 921449
(C.P., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1973) (settled February 13, 1974); Brose v. Blue Cross &
Shield of Southwest Ohio, Civ. No. 747669 (C.P., Hamilton County, Ohio, 1974).
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zation plan operated by the defendant Blue Cross, were eligible
for hospitalization insurance benefits under the federal "Health
Insurance for the Aged Act"6 (Medicare), and were actually hospitalized between the effective date of the Act and the time of the
suit. The plaintiffs alleged that when the defendant received a
Medicare payment to be applied to part of its subscriber's hospital bill, it withheld payment of its obligation under the hospitalization plan; or, when the defendant had made full payment before receiving the Medicare payment, it requested refund from
the hospital. The plaintiff sought an equitable accounting by the
defendant to determine the extent of the withheld funds and the
pro rata shares of each class member. Additionally, plaintiff requested the court to impress the funds with a constructive trust.69
The court found that the common question, of "whether the excess of Medicare or Blue Cross benefits payable and received or
retained by the defendant, over the actual cost of the hospital
services, is the property of Blue Cross or of the patients,""0 was
identical in every class member's claim. Furthermore, because of
the very detailed and explicit records kept by the defendants, the
court concluded that determining and distributing damages appeared to require "only one more bookkeeping step." The common fund, however, played a central role in the ultimate certification of the action in class form. The complaint was couched in
terms of a "fund held by the defendant," "pro rata shares," and
"constructive trust," and the fact that Judge Grimball acknowledged the accuracy of employing the "common fund" rationale
is evidenced by his having cited several insurance fund cases."
Why has the South Carolina court been receptive to class
actions when there was a specific fund before the court in which
all of the members of the class have a specific and easily ascertainable interest and the members of the class were likewise easily ascertainable? To ask the question is to at least partially answer it. The court in Earle v. Webb did not wish to become
involved in the difficult administration of a class action, and the
common fund in most cases, at least in the mind of the court,
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1970).
69. Complaint at 5, Trowell v. Blue Cross of South Carolina, Civ. No. 4078 (C.P.,
Richland County, S.C., June 8, 1971).

70. Court Order at 6.
71. Court Order at 7, citing Powell v. Gary, 200 S.C. 154, 20 S.E.2d 391 (1942); Ex
parte Rowley, 200 S.C. 174, 20 S.E.2d 383 (1942); Gary v. Atkinson, 200 S.C. 166, 20
S.E.2d 388 (1942).
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simplified the class action. The court could also have been concerned with the adequacy of the representation of the class and
saw that fear assuaged by the presence of the fund. The presence
of the fund, and the fact that members of the class were known
or easily ascertainable, insured that the monies would be distributed to the class according to each member's interest with minimal danger of the class representative acting against the class
interest. The due process concepts of notice and opportunity to
be heard may also have operated in the common fund actions.
Since the class members' identities were easily discoverable, notice and opportunity to prove individual claims, or to withdraw
without prejudice, were easily obtainable."2
What is the effect of the requirement of a common fund on
the consumer class action? Recognizing that the element of a
"common fund" is a fictional device in consumer class actions,
the court would probably not allow a "common fund" class action. Additionally, the court would probably be unfavorably influenced by some of the concerns discussed above. The court,
however, might entertain a consumer class action if it could be
convinced that the problems discussed in this section could be
adequately resolved. It is at least worth the attempt.
D. Common Relief
Common relief suits are those in which the plaintiffs seek
either declaratory or injunctive relief.7 3 Pomeroy, in his work,
Equity Jurisprudence, noted that
[t]he jurisdiction may and should be exercised .

.

. although

there is no "common title," nor "community of right" nor...
"interest in the subject matter," among these individuals, but
where there is and because there is a community of interest
among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the
72. For a discussion of the due process problems of the common fund suits see Starrs,
supra note 17, at 431-44.

The fear was that the court could not constitutionally affect the rights of absent
class members unless some res (the common fund) was within the control of the
court. Thus the adjudication was felt to relate more to the res over which the
court had jurisdiction than to the absentees over which the court believed it
might not. But this analysis of jurisdictional due process has long been discarded. It is now time to renounce the unreasoned fear of due process infringements that has long crippled the development of the Field Code and other kinds
of class actions.
Id. at 443.
73. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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general controversy, or in the kind or form of the relief demanded and obtained by or against each member of the numerous body."
The fact that an interest in the relief demanded is one of the
conditions for permissive joinder arguably supports the common
relief cases in South Carolina, since the court looks to the permissive joinder statute for the availability of class actions generally.
Moreover, in common relief suits, the class members' interests
are coextensive, and thus the class itself is more cohesive,, so that
there are strong assurances that the named representatives will
adequately represent unnamed and absent class members.7 5
An example of the common relief concept in South Carolina
is Wright v. Proffitt,7" in which a taxpayer, representing all other
taxpayers in a particular sewage district, challenged the constitutionality of a statute which authorized the issuance of bonds by
the district. The question of the constitutionality of the statute
was common to all the plaintiffs, and the court allowed the class
action to be maintained without discussing the issue of the propriety of the class suit.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, has balked at
allowing the injunctive or declaratory relief class suit when the
representative has also asked for class damages. This gives rise
again to the proposition that the court does not want to get involved in administering the recovery of individual claims once
the class has established its right to recovery. This must be the
explanation for Wilder v. South Carolina State Highway
7 7 in which
Department,
the plaintiff sued the highway department on behalf of all who had paid the postage fees for their
license plates despite having purchased their plates in person.
The plaintiff asked that the postage be returned to the class. The
court explained its refusal to allow the suit to be maintained as
a class action in terms of an adequate administrative remedy, the
individuals' filing separate claims with the department."
74. EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 19, § 269.
75. This view is reflected in the notice requirements of FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2)
(injunctive and declaratory relief suits). Absent members need not be notified of a pending
action.
76. 261 S.C. 68, 198 S.E.2d 275 (1973).
77. 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955).
78. The court stipulated that it did not reach the question of whether a class action
was proper. In finding adequacy in the filing of individual claims, however, the court, in
essence, projected the myth of adequate remedies (Earlev. Webb), although the question
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Possible administrative problems for the court does not ex-

plain Hellams v. Switzer,79 a joint action by 10 property owners
whose lands were damaged by defendant's dam. The plaintiffs
sought a permanent injunction and damages. In dismissing the
action, by finding a defect in the joinder of parties, the court said:
In order that a joint action may be possible, there must be some
prior bond of legal union between the persons injured such as a
partnership relation, of such a nature that the tort interferes
with it, and by virtue of that interference produces a wrong and
consequent damage to all.8"
There were no administrative problems in determining the damages to the various landowners since the group was of a manageable size. Moreover, since the damages were sufficient to justify
individual suits, all 10 claimants would probably have asserted
their rights in 10 separate actions-a multiplicity of suits, one of
the main justifications for the class action. What was disturb-

ing to the court was the theoretical inconsistency of allowing individual damage claims to be asserted in a joint action without one
of the previously discussed requisites: prior legal or organizational bond, an interest in a common fund, or common relief.
Hellams has since been cited as authority for dismissing class
actions in which the plaintiff class has sought damages. For example, in Long v. Seabrook' the plaintiff sued on behalf of all

taxpayers of Charleston County for equitable relief against members of the county board of tax assessment control and for damages in tort for defendants' refusal to permit plaintiff to obtain
of the superiority of the class suit to other procedural devices and remedial avenues was
the proper inquiry. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Judge Oxner in his closing remarks stated
that he did not hesitate in saying that a class action "of this nature" could not be
maintained. He, of course, cited Earle v. Webb, 228 S.C. at 457, 90 S.E.2d at 639. For a
clear and lucid opinion shattering the myth of the adequacy of claim filing, see Addington
v. Industrial Indem. Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 802, 101 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1972). Finally, if the
court had found that the individual class members had suffered only de minimis injury
and that the cost of damage distribution would have been overwhelming, it might have
adopted a credit policy by which plate costs would have been lowered the following year
by the amount of the overcharge.
79. 24 S.C. 39 (1885).
80. Id. at 47.
81. 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1973). The historical reliability of the "separate
interests" test in equity is questionable. Justice Story's third exception to the equity rule
of compulsory joinder stated that "where the parties are very numerous, and though they
have, or may have, separate and distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court," a representative suit could be maintained. J. STORY, EQurrY PLEAING at 77 (emphasis added).
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copies of the tax assessment rolls. During discovery the court had
granted the plaintiff equitable relief so that the only question
before it was damages. The court rejected, with no discussion, the
damage claim as to the class, stating, "In tort actions it is improper for several plaintiffs to sue jointly unless they have suffered
joint injuries resulting in damages in solido."' 2 Cited as authority
3
for the holding were Hellams and Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co.
Although there are South Carolina permissive joinder decisions denying both injunctive relief and damages, there are no
class action cases in which the court was faced with either accepting or rejecting both forms of relief.84 It is a well known equitable
principle that once equity has taken jurisdiction over a matter it
will adjudicate that matter entirely, even to the extent of awarding damages. If the complaint can be couched in terms of equitable relief and the action can be considered primarily equitable in
nature, perhaps damage claims may be adjudicated as ancillary
to the main action." Hellams was a joint action, but since joinder
and class actions are used interchangeably in South Carolina it
is likely that the court would avoid applying this equitable
maxim, as in Hellams, by not asserting equitable jurisdiction in
the first instance. Further evidence of the court's aversion to
82. 260 S.C. at 568, 197 S.E.2d at 662.
83. See notes 20-30, 36 and accompanying text supra.
84. Several federal courts have had few problems with damages ancillary to injunctive relief under FED.R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 410
F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); Welmake v. W.T. Grant Co., 368 F. Supp. 531, 552-54 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); Alexander v. Weaver, 345 F. Supp. 666, 676 (N.D. Il.
1972). J. MooRE, supra
note 18,
23.45[1], at 23-708,-709. But see Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n,
Local 550 v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973); Branham v. General
Elec. Co., 63 F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv.
2d 650 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 1974).
85. This solution is particularly appropriate when the damages are merely incidental

and the main action is equitable in nature, Ross Tin Mine v. Cherokee Tin Mining Co.,
103 S.C. 243, 88 S.E. 8 (1916), although the damages are more than nominal, e.g., compensatory. Alderman v. Cooper, 257 S.C. 304, 185 S.E.2d 809 (1971). The bases for this
approach are the equitable policies of avoidance of a multiplicity of suits or inconsistent
judgments as well as judicial economy and efficiency. Thus, once equity jurisdiction
obtains, the court administers complete relief even if that includes establishing purely
legal rights which are otherwise beyond the scope of its authority. Parker Peanut Co. v.
Felder, 207 S.C. 63, 34 S.E.2d 488 (1945); Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 203 S.C. 59,

26 S.E.2d 175 (1943); Morison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C. 25, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940). The damage
claims, however, must be within the scope of the pleadings setting out the prayer for
equitable relief. Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956). See C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1775, at 22 n.31.
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damage class actions are Kelly v. Tiner 6 and Sons v. Federal
Land Bank of Columbia.-7 In Kelly the court allowed a suit to
enjoin the defendant from destroying graves of plaintiff-class'
relatives to be maintained as a class action. On the other hand,
in Sons, another cemetery case in which the plaintiffs sought,
under permissive joinder, an injunction and damages, the court
dismissed the suit, distinguishing Kelly on the basis of the damage issue. Damages could not be sought in a multiparty action
since the damage to each plaintiff would be separate and distinct
from that suffered by any other; i.e., each plaintiff had a different
relative in each grave!
More recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court has had
occasion to clarify joinder situations where both injunctive relief
and damages were contemplated. In a 1974 case, Pate v.
Thomas,m the plaintiff landowner brought suit against 10 named
defendants to enjoin trespass as well as to recover nominal damages and costs. The lower court granted severance, having determined that none of the defendants participated in a joint trespass. On review, the action was considered equitable in nature,
justifying a more liberal joinder practice.
While at common-law joinder of defendants is restricted to persons whose liability is joint, in equity there may be a joinder of
defendants where there is a community of interests in questions
of law and fact. Thus, greater liberality is shown in permitting
joinder of tortfeasors in suits to enjoin or restrain their wrongful
acts than in actions against them at law for damages .... 1
Of course Pate concerned joinder of defendants, not plaintiffs
or a plaintiff class, but the court did recognize the general rule
in equity that "all persons interested in the subject matter of the
litigation should be made parties either plaintiff or defendant."9
An expansive reading of "subject matter" should aid consumer
class suits in South Carolina.
Pate may also be significant in the future treatment of damages in class actions since the court allowed joinder without criticizing the plaintiff's stand on the damage issue. The Pate ap86. 91 S.C. 41, 74 S.E. 30 (1912).
87. 170 S.C. 548, 171 S.E. 35 (1933).
88. 262 S.C. 365, 204 S.E.2d 571 (1974).
89. Id. at 367-68, 204 S.E.2d at 572, quoting 59 Am. JuR. 2d Parties § 115, at 527
(1972).
90. Id., citing Neely v. Anderson, 2 Strob. Eq. 262 (S.C. 1848).
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proach to damages is consistent with past equity practices of
granting incidental damages, 9 ' or compensatory damages,9 2 when
ancillary to an action characterized as equitable. One disadvantage of the equity practice in South Carolina, however, has been
the denial of punitive damages. 3 One could argue that with the
merger of law and equity in one court, the former rule against
punitive damages in actions previously characterized as equitable
ought to give way. One might also resort to a concept of ancillary
jurisdiction which equity has employed to maintain jurisdiction
over accompanying legal causes; once jurisdiction attached for
one purpose, it was retained to resolve the entire controversy.
Actions attacking tax schemes and requesting return of collected taxes have fared no better than other class actions for
injunctive relief and damages. Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission95 is representative of taxpayer actions
brought to contest the validity of a sales tax and to have that tax
returned if the court determined it was invalidly levied. Since
there was an administrative remedy which could have been pursued to recover the tax, the court rejected the class action, stating:
Under well settled rules of law, the plaintiff has no standing to
prosecute this as a class action. The record does not show the
existence of a class of taxpayers that have submitted applications to the defendant for the refund of a tax paid upon the lease
or rental of tangible personal property and the denial of such
claims by the defendant which are constituted conditions precedent by Section 65-2684 for the right to institute such an
action against the defendant.
91. Ross Tin Mine v. Cherokee Tin Mining Co., 103 S.C. 243, 88 S.E. 8 (1916).
92. Alderman v. Cooper, 257 S.C. 304, 185 S.E.2d 809 (1971).
93. Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, 156 S.C. 203, 154 S.E. 878 (1930).
94. Bramlett v. Young, 229 S.C. 519, 93 S.E.2d 873 (1956).
95. 256 S.C. 350, 182 S.E.2d 713 (1971). See also Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins,
259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d 503 (1972).
96. 256 S.C. at 353, 182 S.E.2d at 714. This statement can be read as an exhaustion
of administrative remedies requirement. What the court failed to ask was whether any
members of the class had filed claims and had been denied relief. If the denial was
sufficiently clear to preclude the class in its entirety from receiving relief through a sequence of claim filings, why should every member of the class have had to engage in a futile
and burdensome exercise? The exhaustion doctrine is fulfilled when one claim is filed,
giving the agency an opportunity to learn of claimant grievances and to remedy those
grievances. Once the agency has denied a claim in such terms as to be a general denial of
similar claims, the claimant should be able to petition the court for class relief. Cf. Diaz
v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1969). See notes 146-63 and
accompanying text infra.
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One could possibly infer from the court's remarks that if plaintiff's counsel had presented convincing proof that there. was a
class of individuals which had attempted an administrative
remedy and had been thwarted, or that the agency's denial was
in such strong terms as to create a well-defined class, then perhaps the action would have been maintainable. The court, however, went on to say that "[iut is equally apparent that the plaintiff has no financial interest in taxes paid by other persons upon
the proceeds from the rental or lease of tangible personal property, [and] in the absence of such interest, may not prosecute
this action for their benefit."9 7 Thus the court reverted to the old
separate interest analysis requiring a jural relationship among
members of the class before an action for recovery of taxes could
be maintained. Most damage class actions, as observed earlier,
would fail under the separate interest analysis; yet, it is the
analysis itself which is most troubling. What purpose or policy is
served by denying a class plaintiff the opportunity to protect his
and other class members' interests? The adequacy of representation can be insured by close court scrutiny of the named plaintiff's resources and capabilities and of the direction of the action.
The court may also wish to ask some hard questions on administrative costs and burdens. Any inquiry which falls short in analysis jeopardizes the integrity of the judicial system.
E.

Summary

Unless there is a prior legal or organizational bond among the
members of the class, a common fund in which all of the members
of the class are interested, or a common relief sought by the class,
class actions will probably not be permitted in South Carolina.
Since consumer class actions for damages can only artifically
be made to fit within these categories, perhaps the South Carolina courts should refrain from any attempt to do so. On the other
hand, the court is then faced with the uncomfortable enterprise
of either rejecting a consumer action with strong substantive
claims-with the result that aggrieved plaintiffs will most likely
remain remediless-or permitting the action to continue and facing administrative problems as they arise.
As will be seen in Part IfI's discussion of the California approach, there is nothing inherent in the Field Code class action
97. 256 S.C. at 354, 182 S.E.2d at 714.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1975

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

provision which precludes consumer class actions. Since the class
action area is not well-developed and the South Carolina statute
does not provide helpful guidelines, the judges are extremely suspicious of new variations in the class action theme. These fears
can only be alleviated by attorneys convincing the court of the
manageability, and fairness to all parties, of the class action
form. By introducing the California approach to the court, an
imaginative advocate may be able to allay any fears the court
might have of cosumer class actions.
Ill.

A.

CALIFORNIA'S CLASS ACTION EXPERIENCE

Introduction

What follows is a presentation of an approach to class litigation employed by another jurisdiction governed by the basic Field
Code class action provision. 8 The California approach is contrasted with that of South Carolina to demonstrate that there is
nothing within the framework of the Field Code provision necessarily precluding consumer class actions and to identify those
significant features which set it apart from the method employed
in South Carolina.9

B.

The Basic Framework-The Complaint

In California, the court-formulated requisites for a maintainable class action are (1) an ascertainable class,ss and (2) a welldefined community of interests in the questions of law or fact
affecting the parties to be represented. ' The language of the
formula is no more helpful than the wording of the Field Code
provision; "in the welter of decisions, bandying such terms.
98. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (1973).
99. In fact, historical analysis of the cases demonstrates a basic similarity to the pre-

1966 approach in both California and South Carolina. Comment, The ProgressiveTransformation of Class Actions in California,12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 186, 186-95 (1974).
100. "Ascertainable class" must be distinguished from the process of identifying the
individual class members. "If the existence of an ascertainable class has been shown, there
is no need to identify its individual members in order to bind all members by the judgment. The fact that the class members are unidentified at this point will not preclude a
complete determination of the issues affecting the class." Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.
2d 695, 706, 433 P.2d 732, 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 732 (1967). For a South Carolina case

briefly mentioning the ascertainable class requirement, see Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 256 S.C. 350, 351, 182 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1971).
101. Chance v..Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1963);

Hebbard v. Colgrove, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1017, 105 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1972).
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no coherent principle of decision can be found. ' 10 2 Moreover, even
in the context of a particular case, the two requirements cannot
be kept separate and distinct; the conditions blend together so
that there is really one "community of interests" which must
exist within a class before a class action may be allowed.
Although the formula has its basic theoretical problems, the
California approach has provided most encouraging results from
the policy of not foreclosing the action because of the nature of
the plaintiff class' rights or of the relief requested. In Daar v.
Yellow Cab Co.,1 13 the court allowed a class action on behalf of
all taxicab customers to recover excessive charges by the cab
company for cab service over a four-year period. The questionable
viability of such an action in South Carolina is demonstrated by
Wilder v. South Carolina State Highway Department."4 Even
though the court dismissed the case on finding specific statutory
language providing an exclusive administrative remedy, °' thus
making unnecessary a determination of the propriety of class
relief, the court did state that it would not have allowed the
action in class form in any event.0 0 One could limit the negative
aspects of Wilder to actions against the state where issues of
governmental immunity are present.0 7 If the courts, however,
read the case as implying some defect in the structure of the
class-an absence of the requisite jural relationship-actions like
Daar would likely fail in South Carolina.
Perhaps Daarwould likewise have failed in California in the
absence of a detailed complaint containing those common questions of law and fact which persuaded the court of the feasibility
of the class action. The plaintiff set out the common facts as to
the use of script or cash in procuring taxicab service, common use
of taxicabs over a four-year period, and common loss sustained
by each member. The plaintiff also informed the court of the
relative ease in determining the identity of the class members-an important feature in alleviating administrative prob102. D. LoUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 718
(1962). The formula does have some indirect benefit in pointing the court in the right
direction. Instead of looking at the jural relationships of the class members, court inquiry
focuses on the issues of law and fact and administrative manageability of the action.
103. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
104. 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955).
105. Id. at 455, 90 S.E.2d at 638.
106. Id. at 457, 90 S.E.2d at 639.
107. For a discussion of the possibility of class claims against the government, see
notes 136-63 and accompanying text infra.
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lems and one of added importance if the court had required that
notice be sent out to plaintiff class members at an early stage in
the action. Anticipating the defendant's attempts to demonstrate
the separate nature of the wrongs, thereby requiring individual
proof, the plaintiff wisely noted that proof of his claim would, in
fact, establish a right of each member of the class of cab users to
recover damages and that the percentage rate of overcharge to
each class member was identical and uniform at all times. The
plaintiff not only established predominating common questions
of law and fact but also relegated individual issues to a subordinate role in the proof of individual claims.' 5
Besides alleging a large number of parties and impracticability of joinder (express conditions of the statute), the complaint
might also indicate the superiority of the class device to other
available means. ' Though not an express condition of the Field
Code provision, this latter feature aids the court in balancing the
relative merits of allowing the suit in class form. In Daar, the
choice was between allowing the suit as a class action and no
action at all, a factor which should be brought to the court's
attention."' Nevertheless, alleging this factor may have limited
value in certain circumstances. For example, in Vasquez v. Superior Court,"I a consumer action for fraud seeking rescission of
installment contracts, the defendants attempted to distinguish
Daar by showing that potential individual recovery was large
108. The feature of "predominating common questions" is found within the damage
class actions of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), but is not expressed in CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
382 (1973). Nevertheless, since Daar approved the amended Federal Rule 23 and found
federal criteria for class actions to be in substantial coincidence with the California approach, arguing predominating common questions is advisable. Since Daar,the California
legislature has enacted the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750 et seq.
(1973), which includes a section setting out conditions for the maintenance of class suits.
Id. § 1781(b). The California statutes contain no classifications of actions as does Federal
Rule 23; thus there may be greater flexibility in the California approach. Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 809 (1971), recommended the use of both the federal rule and § 1781 in analyzing all class actions beyond
the purview of § 1780 deceptive sales practices. The advantages are obvious.
[H]aving eliminated types of class actions and distinctions between prerequisite and maintainability provisions, [California statutes] provide less complicated administration and application by courts, allow greater flexibility in dealing with class actions, and eliminate many unnecessary court determinations.
Note, California:A Flexible Scheme, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 1024, 1026 (1974).
109. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 702 n.6, 433 P.2d 732, 737 n.6, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 n.6.
110. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
111. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
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enough to justify separate individual actions.' The court stated
that, although the impracticability of bringing an individual action for a comparatively small potential recovery was a consideration in favor of allowing a class action, "it cannot be said that a
potential recovery for each class member larger than a nominal
sum necessarily militates against maintenance of such a suit."''
The role of the complaint in class litigation cannot be overemphasized, especially in jurisdictions prone to throwing out
class complaints at an early stage. South Carolina has that tendency, while California exhibits a "wait-and-see" attitude. Regardless of the setting, the manner in which a class plaintiff structures his complaint may go far toward lessening the fears of the
court that it is dealing with a "Frankenstein monster."
In Daar, the court might have referred to the overcharges
held by the defendant taxicab company as a common fund,
thereby alluding to the California court's earlier use of that rationale."' In addition to arguing the absence of common recovery
and the existence of separate and distinct claims of the plaintiff
class and of separate transactions, the defendant was sufficiently
concerned about the possible finding of a common fund to argue
that there was none. In handling these defenses, the Daar court
indicated that calling the court's attention to the nature of class
claims as separate and distinct was useless without also arguing
conflict of interests or inadequacy of the representation; the court
noted that the defendant was not making any of those
objections."' The court dealt quite bluntly with the criticism that
the action involved separate transactions, remarking that it was
the "law in California" that separate transactions did not preclude the existence of the requisite community of interests. The
absence of a common fund or common relief received equally
abbreviated treatment. A common fund, as the court noted, was
merely one way of satisfying the community of interests requirement, but not the only way. The former Federal Rule 23(a)(3),
requiring that "common relief" be sought, had been revised to
eliminate that requirement and "as a practical matter [had] no
compelling importance and its absence [presented] no insuper112. Id. at 816, 484 P.2d at 974, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
113. Id.
114. See Price v. Communications Workers of America Local 9503, 107 Cal. App. 2d
524, 334 P.2d 632 (1959).
115. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 707 n.10, 433 P.2d 732, 741 n.10, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 733 n.10.
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The Daarcourt might have also added that the absence of a
common fund does not give rise to class conflict or inadequacy of
representation. For example, a class representative, requesting
injunctive relief in a situation where there is no common fund,
may be in perfect harmony with all the other members of the
class. Similarly, there is nothing inherently suspect in a suit for
damages which suggests that representative plaintiffs asking for
damages cannot adequately represent each and every member of
the class. Any artificial preclusion of damage suits is merely
adherence to form without a case-by-case analysis of whether
there is adequate representation. Furthermore, the suggestion
that all suits involving common relief are easier to administer is
easily rebuffed by reference to the desegregation cases requiring
continued reworking of the court-ordered injunction. Certain
damage class actions, moreover, are similar to common trust
fund cases, with regard to determining the various interests of
the absent parties. At any rate, determination of the individual
interests occurs only after common issues have been resolved at
a final stage of litigation. By that time the community of interests
requirement has served its purpose of judicial economy and
efficiency so that determining individual interests may become
a mechanical procedure.' 7
C. Mass Accidents, Fraud,Products Liability and Government
Claims
In Part II, the concepts of separate rights and injuries were
observed at times to have defeated class recovery. On a theoretical level, separateness of rights is a dubious criticism of class
suits. Separateness of transactions, however, may have validity
as a limitation on class treatment when that separateness generates a variety of individual questions sufficient in number and
complexity to suggest that class treatment is unwise. This notion
is reflected in the federal rule prerequisites of "predominating
common question" and "superiority" of the class device." ' What
follows is an examination of cases in which one would anticipate
116. Id. at 708-09, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
117. A related problem arises as to whether proof of individual claims requires the
appearance of each class member. See a discussion of this topic at notes 290-98 and accompanying text infra.
118. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3).
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the presence of individual questions conceivably overwhelming
the common questions. How courts handle these situations is a
measure of the maturity of the court's class action rationale.
1. Mass Accidents
In Petition of Gabel'19 plaintiffs moved to consolidate three
present actions and to represent all interested parties in a suit
against the federal government to determine liability for the
death of passengers in a collision between a commerical airliner
and a military jet. The court allowed certification of the liability
question since all the parties had to rely on the same operative
set of facts and since separate actions created a risk of inconsistent verdicts. Thus, a single extensive trial (presumably no longer
than the determination of liability in an individual suit) 2 ' replaced a sequence of long, involved trials. The merits of class
treatment did not extend to the damage determinations since
litigating each claim might have tied up individual claims of the
class in one massive trial, but in subsequent trials on damage
claims, each plaintiff could have taken advantage of the res judicata effect of the previously determined liability issue without
relitigation.
Six passengers in Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward 2' attempted class certification of a suit in admiralty to recover damages allegedly due to illness from exposure to contaminated food
or water on the defendant's ship. The plaintiffs pressed claims for
breach of contract, implied warranty of fitness, and negligence.
The court noted that certification would be granted if it produced
"economy of effort, uniformity of result, without imposing undue
debilitation of procedural or substantive safeguards for the plaintiffs or the defendant; avoidance of multiplicity of suits and inconsistent adjudications.' 12 The court felt that before issues
could be certified for class treatment they had to be subject to
119. 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972). The court felt that the action could have been
certified pursuant to either rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), because of the risk of inconsistent
verdicts on the issue of government liability if individual trials took place in different
districts and because of the government's refusal to act on claims within a 6-month period
after the accident.
There are only a few mass accident tort cases besides Gabel. See Note, Products
Liability Class Suit, supra note 3, at 238 n.31.
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) (limited issue certification).
121. 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
122. Id. at 559.
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clear determinations of manageability. On the issue of defendant's negligence in preparing drinking water or food, the uniformity criterion was fulfilled and thus class treatment was proper.12 The issues of proximate cause, contract liability, adequacy
of medical treatment, damages, and possible individual defenses,
however, were all unique in nature, incapable of being treated as
common questions.
2. Fraud
One particular area in which the courts have not been receptive to class treatment is consumer fraud. Expressive of such
recalcitrance is the statement in a 1938 annotation of American
Law Reports that "[c]lass or representative suits to obtain the
rescission of transactions based on similar frauds practiced by one
defendant upon various, and commonly numerous, persons have
doubt
so often been held not maintainable that one may well
124
whether under any circumstances such a suit will lie.

That pronouncement has not withstood attack in California.
In Vasquez v. Superior Court,'25 the supreme court held the class
device proper in a consumer fraud suit. Installment purchasers of
frozen food and freezers brought a class action for rescission and
damages against the sellers and assignee finance companies. Besides reaffirming the basic groundwork set out in Daar, Vasquez
added to the arsenal of consumer class actions a method of han23.45[3], at 23-811 n.35 (1969); C. WRIGHT & A.
123. J. MOORE, supra note 18,
MILLER, supra note 39, § 1783, at 117; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 72, at 313 (1970); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 969. But see Harrington v. United
States, 63 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Cf. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at
103.
124. Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1015, 1016 (1938). In 1966 the Advisory Committee echoed
this statement again but with less certainty: "Although having some common core, a fraud
case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in
the representations or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they are
addressed." Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 103.
125. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). See also Collins v. Rocha,
7 Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972); Barquis v. Merchant's Collection Ass'n
of Oakland, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). But see Slakey Bros.
Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1968), in which the
court disallowed the class action because of divergent misrepresentations but remarked
in a perceptive footnote that "[c]onceivably collective reliance by all members of a group
could be proved circumstantially, through evidence that its members responded collectively to a directly communicated falsehood." Id. at 209 n.3, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 273 n.3.
Vasquez has generated substantial activity in California. See, e.g., Jensen v. United
Ins. Co. of America, Civ. No. 976740 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal., 1973). See
Appendix B for the complaint in that action.
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dling the problem of individual issues and of minimizing their
effect on class litigation. The defendants asserted that false representations made with knowledge of falsity to induce reasonable
reliance and damage suffered as a result of that reliance (elements necessary to prove fraud) could not be proved by the class
device. Each plaintiff, according to the defendants, entered into
a separate transaction at a different time, and proof as to named
plaintiffs would not have supplied proof of necessary elements as
to absent members.' 6 Nevertheless, the complaint stated that
named plaintiffs could prove that identical representations were
made to each class member without resort to individual testimony-an inference from the fact that each salesman employed
a memorized uniform sales recitation. As for the falsity of representations and the reasonableness of reliance, they too, according
to the plaintiffs, could be proved on a common basis. The court
determined that, at least at that early stage of litigation, the
plaintiffs should have been afforded an opportunity to show that
the allegations of fraud had a common basis. Additionally, the
court noted that the standard form contract raised a "rebuttable
implication" that there might also have been uniformity in the
representations and in the falsity of those representations. Finally, the court noted that if named plaintiffs could have established representations and their falsity, without individual testimony of absent class members, there would have been no great
task in proving reliance as a common element.1 2 In a single party
trial, reliance could be inferred from circumstances attending the
transaction. Thus, could not proof of reliance by the named class
members, together with proof of uniformity in misrepresentation
and proof of the unnamed plaintiffs' entering into the contracts,
which could be construed as reliance on misrepresentation, have
afforded strong evidence that absent class members also relied on
those false representations? "It is sufficient for our present purposes to hold that if the trial court finds material misrepresentations were made to the class members, at least an inference of
reliance would arise as to the entire class." '28 If it were clear from
the factual context that misrepresentation induced the plaintiffs'
action, the presumption of reliance would be established. Because of the similarity of the evidence for the class, the only
126. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 811, 484 P.2d 964, 970, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802 (1971).
127. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 972-73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
128. Id. at 809, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
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question remaining was whether the evidence was legally sufficient for recovery.
The Vasquez approach, though new to consumer -,lass actions, can be compared to federal cases in which stockholders
have alleged fraud on the basis of printed misrepresentations in
a corporate prospectus and courts have not required individual
proof of reliance. 29 Would such an approach be acceptable in
South Carolina? In Black v. Simpson,3 ' a stockholders' action
against the corporate manager for damages caused by his fraudulent misrepresentations by which he was able to purchase stock
at less than actual value, the court said:
The manager entered upon a scheme to control the corporation
... . Each separate purchase of the shares of a stockholder was
but one step in the general scheme to defraud the stockholders
as a class . . . . [I]t seems to us not only illogical but most
inconvenient and unjust to require each stockholder to allege
and prove the fraudulent scheme and the breach of trust in a
separate action. 3'
If the requirement of "prior bond" of the various class members
can be set aside, this language does suggest the desirability of
class treatment for fraud in consumer class suits. A qualifying
remark is necessary because not all collective fraud will be susceptible to class treatment. For example, there might be a common scheme to defraud and yet misrepresentations of great variety, on some of which no reasonable man would rely. If so, the
Black court fell short in its analysis and perhaps deprived the
defendant of the use of a valid defense against individual claimants. Where, however, there is a common scheme expressed as an
129. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). If
the original stock purchase is a reaction to market prices and not defendant's statements,
proof of reliance may be dispensed with. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 419 F.2d 789,
797 (2d Cir. 1969).
Another approach is to statutorily eliminate reliance from the proof requirements.
E.g., deceptive trade practice statutes, MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (1972); Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (Supp. IV 1969). Other courts have subjected reliance
and proof of damage to severance and treatment in a separate proceeding. See, e.g.,
Vernon J. Rockier &Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335 (D. Minn. 1971); Fogel
v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Crasto v. Kaskel, 63 F.R.D. 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Edelman v. Lee
Optical Co., Inc., 320 N.E.2d 517 (Ill. App. 1974).
130. 94 S.C. 312, 77 S.E. 1023 (1913).
131. Id. at 314, 77 S.E. at 1025.
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organized repetition of substantially identical misrepresentations, such as a memorized sales pitch, class treatment is in
order.
3.

The ProductsLiability Class Suit

The Vasquez approach to fraud may be useful in the products liability area. The potential is great for particularized issues,
such as contributory negligence, product misuse or assumption of
the risk, to predominate. Nevertheless, there still remains a
healthy core concept concerning the nature of the defect which
may produce the requisite common question with accompanying
economies of court and litigant time. Distinctions must be made,
however, between defects in design, or inadequacy of warnings,
and defects in installation or assembly-the former conducive to
class treatment, the latter capable of generating a multitude of
individual questions. In California, the certification of products
liability suits as class actions has met with moderate success.'
Although the theories of recovery have not yet been tested to
determine which can or cannot be waged in class form, the California cases suggest that several approaches are foreclosed. For
example, one should not attempt a class action based on warranty
under the UCC if the warranty is for a particular purpose; otherwise, inquiries into reliance and party knowledge will be necessary.' One should avoid bringing a class action for either personal injuries or property damage-issues which create problems
of proof thereby offsetting the value of the class suit. Instead, one
should phrase the demand for relief in terms of an injunction,
replacement, repair or reimbursement.'34 The relief requested together with the nature of the defect may foreclose inquiry into the
particular issues alluded to earlier. If the defect is in product
design and the only relief requested is replacement, repair or
reimbursement, there need be no inquiry into each consumer's
use of the product and maintenance record. Phrasing the relief in
132. See Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254
(1973); Metowski v. Triad Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1972), discussed
in Note, Products Liability Class Suit, supra note 3.
133. Metowski v. Triad Corp., 28 Cal. App. 3d 332, 104 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1972). Different liability theories would generate particularized inquiries: misrepresentationreliance; express warranties-whether the representation was part of the bargain in fact;
strict liability and implied warranties-consumer expectations.
134. See Note, Products Liability Class Suit, supra note 3, at 240 n.39. But see notes
119-23 and accompanying text supra and notes 268-72 and accompanying text infra.
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such terms obviates litigation of issues such as proximate cause,
since the "injury" flows out of the "defect" and accompanying
breach of duty, and a personal appearance by each aggrieved
customer is unnecessary. Thus, the litigation on liability would
be similar to that of the mass tort actions but without the necessary separate trials for damage determinations. 35'
4.

Class Actions and the Government Agency

The kinds of problems encountered by courts in overseeing
private litigation may explain their resistance to certification of
class actions. The general feeling of the judiciary is that the proper avenue of relief for classes of consumers with small claims is
not through private litigation, but through the attorney general's
action for injunctive or restitutionary relief'3 6 or other federal and
state agency action. 37
It is true that the administrative apparatus can readily react
to the changing needs of classes of consumers without unduly
restricting commercial development; flexible rulemaking procedures point to this adaptability.1 3 Furthermore, the consumer
agency can press legal questions which otherwise would never get
before a court because of the distrust and hesitancy of many low
income consumers. The result is the injection of new consumer
values into systems of commercial law which not too long ago
focused almost exclusively on interrelationships among merchants. On the other hand, government remedial measures may
provide inadequate relief for an aggrieved consumer class, depending as they do on factors beyond consumer control-the commitment of the agency to adjudicatory concerns,1 39 manpower
135. See notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra.
136. See, e.g., the statutes cited in note 8 supra. In some states, attorneys general
may wage restitutionary actions as well. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 267 (SmithHurd Supp. 1973). Several other jurisdictions offer restitution and damages. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 501.207(1)(c) (1973); N.J. REv. STAT. § 56:8-14 (1971). But not all courts are willing
to find restitution or damages implicit in the statutory language allowing attorney general
suits. See State ex rel. Turner v. Younkers Bros., Inc., 210 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1973). Contra, People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); Kuglar v. Romain, 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144 (Ch. Div. 1970).
137. Hearingson S. 3201 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., at 88-110 (1970).
138. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556 (1970).
139. A broad debate on a theoretical level has been waged on the proper response of
agencies to consumer complaints. Compare Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory
Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869 (1971), with Elman, Administrative Reform of the FederalTrade
Commission, 59 GEo. L.J. 177 (1971).
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available to process complaints,"'4 and the flexibility of statutory
relief.' Nevertheless, despite their shortcomings, administrative
bodies do possess certain attributes, in addition to expertise,
which indicate that an agency setting may be the place for a class
action which otherwise would be stricken because of insurmountable manageability problems.
For example, the United States Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin' held that absent identifiable class members in damage actions must be provided with individual notice.
Whether Eisen is read as a due process requirement or an amendable statutory construction of Federal Rule 23, the practical and
immediate effect is the preclusion of large class actions by individuals with small claims. In response to this particular type of
problem, the Puerto Rican legislature, employing the concept of
"conditional" escheat, established a special fund for damages
recovered by consumers in class suits. At the end of the year, the
administrator of the fund earmarks unclaimed damages for use
in future prosecutions of other consumer complaints to cover the
costs for notice and administration of damages."' This response
to a serious class action problem demonstrates what can be
accomplished in a quasi-agency context. Agency channels can be
used to process voluminous quantities of materials, such as proof
of claim forms.' Moreover, the agencies themselves can be given
broad fact-finding powers in evidentiary presentations to
courts.'4 5
If the potential for agency class relief is great, the case law,
especially of South Carolina, treating the conjunction of agency
proceedings and the class suit, indicates otherwise. In Wilder v.
South CarolinaHighway Department,'4 the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of class certification, finding an adequate remedy in the Highway Department
claim filing provisions.'4 7 An individual claim filing for purposes
140. See Note, Products Liability Class Suit, supra note 3, at 229 n.1.
141. Id.
142. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
143. Puerto Rico Legislature, Act 110, Laws 1973, S. 45 (effective June 1973), cited
in 2 CCH CONS. PROD. SAFETY GUmE 41.101 (1974).
144. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 16. See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1401 et seq.
(1962) (provisions on references to masters). See notes 273-89 and accompanying text
infra.
145. See notes 273-98 and accompanying text infra.
146. 228 S.C. 448, 90 S.E.2d 635 (1955) (dictum).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-50 (1952). The Attorney General did admit that the Depart-
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of rectifying class wrongs, however, is far from adequate. Only the
most observant, well-informed consumer will be able to discover
the overcharge, and only by further inquiry will he learn of the
claim filing remedy. Thus, the class as a whole will remain ignorant of the overcharge, or of an avenue of relief, unless someone
is willing to make an active effort to reach them.14 8 South Carolina
courts also adhere to the doctrine that each member of the class
must exhaust his administrative remedies before the class can
petition the court for relief. In Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,'49 the court stated that "[t]he record does
not show the existence of a class of taxpayers that have submitted
applications to the defendant for the refund of a tax paid upon
the lease or rental of tangible personal property.""'5 The court felt
that the submission of claims, and their denial, were necessary
conditions for a class suit against the tax commission.
ment was willing to refund postage improperly collected, but only on timely individual
applications under the claim filing provision. No effort would be made to reach the
affected class via some type of published notice. Id. at 451, 90 S.E.2d at 636-37.
Wilder is representative of several tax cases denying taxpayer class actions on finding
adequate claim filing remedies. Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins, 259 S.C. 7, 190 S.E.2d
503 (1972); Edisto Fleets, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 256 S.C. 350, 182 S.E.2d
713 (1971).
Georgia has a similar approach. In Anderson v. Blackmon, 232 Ga. 4, 205 S.E.2d 250
(1974), the court rejected a rebate program, although it certified the suit as a class action
to invalidate the excessive tax schedule. The lower court would have allowed each plaintiff
with a claim for excessive assessment to apply to the tax commissioner for relief within
40 days-a scheme similar to that in Wilder. Despite a vigorous dissent suggesting that
the whole class should benefit from the tax invalidation through a refund, reassessment
or credit on future tax bills, the majority of the supreme court disallowed recovery of any
payments, providing relief only to those who had not yet paid and would now pay under
the lower assessment. 232 Ga. at 6, 205 S.E.2d at 251-52.
148. On the other hand, one would hope that a single claim filed might spur uniform
refunds by the Highway Department on its own initiative, just as claims for injunctive
relief by a single plaintiff may benefit a class or as an individual consumer's petitioning
state public utility commissions will result in class rebates. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-41
(1962) (suits for refunds if electrical utility rates are disapproved and the utility company
fails to voluntarily refund overcharges). Section 24-41 states that "[any number of
persons, corporations or municipalities entitled to any such refund may join as plaintiffs
and recover their several claims in a single action in which the court shall render a
judgment severally for each plaintiff as his interest may appear." This language can be
construed narrowly as approving permissive joinder only, or more broadly, as approving
the class rebate suit. See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 58-134 (gas refunds), -408 (telephone
refunds).
149. 256 S.C. 350, 182 S.E.2d 713 (1971).
150. Id. at 353, 182 S.E.2d at 714. Accord, Newberry Mills, Inc. v. Dawkins, 259 S.C.
7, 190 S.E.2d 503 (1972). See also State ex rel. Devlin v. Dickinson, 305 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
App. 1975); Henderson v. Carter, 229 Ga. 876, 195 S.E.2d 4 (1972). But see Javor v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 527 P.2d 1153, 117 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1974).
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Edisto Fleets should be compared with California's treatment of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In
Friendsof Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 5 ,
the plaintiffs requested a writ of administrative mandamus attacking the validity of a grant of a use permit by the board of
supervisors. In response to the defendant's argument that not all
the plaintiffs had exhausted their administrative remedies, the
court replied that since unnamed but represented plaintiffs had
previously appeared before the board, the underlying policies of
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies had been fulfilled. Furthermore, citing Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,'2 the court pointed out

that notwithstanding the defendant's assertion that by not exhausting their administrative remedies the class lacked cohesivness, exhaustion of remedies did not necessarily provide the welldefined community of interests required in class litigation.'53
California courts have also questioned the adequacy of claim
filings as a class remedy. In Bozaich v. State,"4 an extensive
plaintiff class attempted to recover moving and relocation expenses for all individuals whose property had been taken by the state
through eminent domain. Although the court found common interests in questions of law, an overabundance of dissimilar factual
settings peculiar to individual recoveries offset the judicial benefits of the class suit. Commenting, however, on the claim filing
requirement, which is set up to give the state notice and an opportunity to investigate promptly the merits of each claim, the
Bozaich court did note that when individual claims from each
claimant would serve no useful purpose, they could be dispensed
with through the filing of a substitute class claim."'
The Bozaich court might have made a stronger comment on
the merits of claim filing requirements in light of an earlier case,
Addington v. IndustrialIndemnity Co."' In Addington, several
named plaintiffs brought different class suits to collect interest
which their employers' insurers omitted from workmen's compensation awards. While Addington's interest claim amounted to
only $20.90, the sum owed to the class he represented exceeded
$250,000. Under section 5806 of the California Labor Code, a
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
8 Cal. 3d at 267, 502 P.2d at 1062, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
32 Cal. App. 3d 688, 108 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973).
Id. at 699 n.5, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 399 n.5.
24 Cal. App. 3d 802, 101 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1972).
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superior court judgment on a workmen's compensation award, or
in this case on the unpaid interest, was final only upon the filing
of a certified copy of the original award."' 7 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that compliance with the code was economically
unfeasible and requested that the requirement of filing individual
copies of the awards be dispensed with."'8
After the plaintiff had filed his class complaint with the superior court, he applied to the compensation board, as ancillary
relief, for the preparation of a single award against the defendant
and for the establishment of the identities of the various class
members, the dates, and the amounts of awards. Both the hearing
examiner and the full appeals board, on review, denied the class
claim filing or compilation of a single award. The examiner concluded that plaintiff's petition was inconsistent with the California Administrative Code 59 which required that each petition contain the title and number of each case. Failing to reach the question of whether the board was authorized to grant class petitions,
the examiner held "that before one could even try to petition the
board for class relief, separate petitions for each member of the
class had to be filed."' 0 Although the appeals board found that
it had the authority to entertain class actions, it perceived no
substantial benefits in allowing plaintiff's petition to retain its
class form. Each class member could seek an order requiring the
defendant to show cause why the award had not been paid;'
compliance with plaintiff's petition would consume a large
amount of board time; and a class proceeding would entail intermeddling with thousands of existing attorney-client relationships in ongoing compensation proceedings. Finding that the rulings of the workmen's compensation appeals board had a res
judicata effect, the superior court awarded summary judgment to
the defendant.
157. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5806 (1971).
158. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 805, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 279. Under § 5806, the cost of obtaining
a certified copy of one page was $1.50 with a $.75 per each additional page. As noted by
Superior Court Judge Kenny, individual claims ranged from $.35 to $20.90. Id. at 805 n.4,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.4. Excluding attorney's fees, claims below $1.50 did not even
warrant a filing.
159. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 10450 (1971).

160. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 807 n.5, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 280 n.5.
161. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 10832 (1971):
The Appeals Board or referee may, upon the request of a complaining party,
issue an order to show cause directing the employer or insurance carrier to

appear and show cause why there has not been compliance with the order,
decision, or award of the Appeals Board.
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The appellate court overruled the superior court's finding of
res judicata and remanded the case for a determination of the
propriety of a class claim. In addition, the appellate court, by
dicta, disagreed with the workmen's compensation board's disapproval of the class claim in an agency setting. First, the appellate
court said that the order to show cause was hardly adequate since
that rarely used procedure, designed to compel the furnishing of
other than cash benefits, required an application by each party
and a subsequent appearance by the insurer. The economics of
the small claim made the procedure impracticable. Moreover,
even if all claimants applied for a show cause order, many more
working days of the board would be consumed in the review of
each order than in the preparation of a class award. In addition,
the court said that the plaintiff's petition would not necessitate
interfering with existing attorney-client relationships since many
attorneys had abandoned their clients after adjudication of the
main award.
The appellate court, however, did remark that noncompliance with the claim filing provision of the Labor Code might
ultimately prove fatal.' 2 Whether or not noncompliance with a
filing provision will in fact defeat the claim, as in the South
Carolina cases of Wilder and Edisto Fleets, may depend upon the
purpose of the filing. If the state needs the filing to investigate
claims, as in Bozaich, compliance with the filing provision may
be strictly enforced. On the other hand, if the claim filing serves
essentially an administrative purpose, as in Addington, compliance may not be required. An additional consideration concerning the appropriateness of a class filing is whether or not a single
filing will conflict with the purposes behind the exhaustion doctrine and thereby jeopardize the administrative structure of the
agency. 63' Perhaps, as in Friends of Mammoth, filing by only
162. Those remarks are to be tempered by the observation that the plaintiff will at
some point have to identify members of the class, but this task could be accomplished
through lower court efforts without the cooperation of the appeals board that the plaintiff
had requested earlier.
163. More recently, the California Supreme Court in City of San Jose v. Supreme
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525 P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974), erased any doubts about
the propriety of the government class claim. In San Jose, several landowners brought an
action for nuisance and inverse condemnation resulting from airplane overflights. Relying
on Bozaich, the defendants argued that the claims statutes prohibited maintenance of a
class suit. The plaintiffs, however, asserted that
the class claim filed here satisfied the claims statutes because the city had been
provided with notice and information regarding the rights asserted against it,
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some members of the class whose claims are typical will enable
the agency to litigate every possible factual and legal issue of the
class as a whole. A final consideration is whether or not a third
party, such as the insurer in Addington, will lose some valuable
individual defense through a class filing. When a government
agency or a court construes agency remedies as precluding class

relief without considering the above questions, it is hiding behind
the myth of the adequacy of administrative remedies which may
prove to be as deficient as those in Addington and in the South
Carolina cases of Wilder and Edisto Fleets.
IV.

A.

CONDUCT OF LITIGATION

Introduction

As California's experience with class actions demonstrates,
there are acceptable solutions to problems that might arise in the
initial certification stage. Therefore, the legal profession should
now focus its attention upon an area of class actions presenting
many problems to which the state courts have not provided defin-

itive solutions-the conduct of litigation. Part IV of this note
examines some of those problems and suggests possible solutions
to them.
B.

PreliminaryHearings-EarlyDeterminations

Since class suits usually entail large expenditures of counsel
and court time, early determinations of the maintainability of the
inasmuch as "a number of individuals potentially within the class had filed
claims against the city in the past few years." Hence, the city could not sustain
a claim of surprise.
Id. at 455, 525 P.2d at 706, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 802. Although this position was consistent
with analysis of Friends of Mammoth, the court found the position lacking because the
main purpose of the claims statutes was not to eliminate surprise to the public entity but
to give the entity enough information to investigate and possibly settle claims without
litigation. To determine whether the quantity of information provided in a class claim
fulfilled that purpose, the court asked: (1) whether there was some compliance with all
the statutory requirements; and (2) if so, whether the compliance was sufficient to constitute substantial compliance. The court felt there were additional policy considerations,
observing that to require the information requested by defendant from each class member
would severely restrict the maintenance of appropriate class actions contrary to recognized
state policies favoring them. It is interesting to note that the two-pronged test is satisfied
by the representative plaintiff's providing the statutorily required information about himself, as well as enough additional information to identify an ascertainable class. These
requirements are no more burdensome than the requirements of a private class action. See
notes 100-02 and accompanying text supra.
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suit as a class action are desirable. Federal Rule 23 provides that
"[as soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained."'64 Courts, however, should
approach these early determinations with a caution against early
dismissal, thereby foreclosing a valid class action. "California's
judicial policy of allowing potential class action plaintiffs to have
their action measured on its merits is to determine whether trying
their suit as a class action would bestow the requisite benefits
upon the litigants and the judicial process to justify class action
litigation." ' 5 If at all possible, the court should allow the plaintiff's complaint to survive the pleading stage. If a determination
of class action is the balancing of benefits and burdens, a judge
should become more intimate with the character of the action to
make a more precise and intelligent balancing. Thus, he should
exercise restraint in granting demurrers at an early stage in the
litigation. Moreover, the court should treat class certification as
a continuing question throughout the litigation process.
The early federal decisions reflect a concern about early dismissal. In Tober v. Charnita,Inc.' 6 and Hoffman v. Charnita,
Inc.,'67 the plaintiffs, purchasers of lots and of a common interest
in a golf and swimming club, claimed damages for not being
informed that there was no central sewage system and that the
soil was unsuitable for the establishment of individual septic
tanks. One of the major problems with the action was that not
all purchasers were seeking the same remedy; some sought rescission, others damages. The defendant said that this created a
conflict of interests since wide-scale rescission would have an
adverse effect on the value of land held by those who wished to
retain possession, and those who sought rescission might be opposed to land retention and a large monetary settlement. In response, the court said:
[W]e are not prepared to deny class action status at this time
upon the prospect of a conflict which may or may not arise in
the future. It may later become apparent that only a small
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.40 (1973). But
see California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(c) (1973), which
permits determinations of class appropriateness to be made only on the motion of a party.
165. Beckstead v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 780, 783, 98 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781
(1971).
166. 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
167. 58 F.R.D. 86 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
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number of the class may successfully seek recision. Recision is
not a remedy which is automatically granted but must be sought
within a reasonable time after discovery of the grounds upon
which the remedy is sought. . .. And too, any adverse interest
may later be avoided by establishing subclasses .... "I
The defendant also claimed that the representations made to
purchasers were oral, thus creating separate issues of fact as to
each class member. This problem was sidestepped:
[Tihe court at this point interprets plaintiffs' claim . . . as
alleging reliance . . . upon the defendants' failure to disclose
material facts concerning the adequacy of the land for on-lot
sewage disposal. Proof of this omission alone may be sufficient
to establish defendants' liability.16 9
The court concluded that if discovery disclosed that the plaintiffs' case was really based on dissimilar representations, the class
action would be discontinued.
Vasquez v. Superior Court,7 0 in which the court rejected an
early dismissal because of a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff would be able to make a "class maintenance showing," can
be read as requiring some type of hearing before class maintainability is considered. At that hearing, the court should determine
whether there is an ascertainable class with a well-defined community of interests. Several California courts have added a third
inquiry of whether the action is devoid of merit. This last inquiry,
of course, is not one of procedure but one concerning the merits,
which is justifiable in order that court and party expenses in
litigating totally frivolous claims will be avoided.171 There is, however, a possibility of abuse in these kinds of determinations if the
propriety of the class suit is confused with the more general re168. 58 F.R.D. at 80.
169. Id. at 82.
170. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
171. In Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 3d 193, 112
Cal. Rptr. 144 (1974), the court required that the plaintiff present proof of the possibility
of establishing a conspiracy among defendant lending institutions in anaction in which
plaintiff alleged the existence of a conspiracy among associations to misuse "impounded
funds" paid by borrowers. In another decision, Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal.
App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1973), the court found the minimal showing in the federal
vehicle safety administrator's determination that the disc wheels were both defective and
potentially harmful. See generally Newberg, Burdens of Proof for Class Issues, 3 CLAss
AcrION REP. 103 (1974). See also Appendix E infra.
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quirement of stating a cause of action.12 There should be only a
minimal demonstration that the claim is sincere-more than frivolous or speculative." 3 A hearing that delves too deeply, and too
early, into the merits would be a "fact-finding procedure
[depriving] the plaintiff and the class of the right to a jury
17 4
trial."
Although some federal courts' 5 have experimented with
hearings for early determinations on the merits, the Supreme
Court in Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin7 found "nothing in either
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court authority to
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order
77
to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.'"
The court said that rule 23(c)(1) language, "as soon as practicable
after the commencement of [the] action," meant exactly that
and no more.'7 The court observed that preliminary determinations on the merits posed the danger of substantial prejudice
to a defendant since the hearing might not be accompanied by
traditional safeguards of a civil trial. 7 9 Several lower federal
courts have suggested that if an early determination of the
merits is desirable, the proper device is a summary judgment
proceeding.'8 ' This suggestion is consistent with the Eisen directive that determinations on the merits not be conducted in conjunction with class certification.
172. Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970).
173. J. MOORE, supra note 18, 23.45[3].
174. Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74, 85 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Sunrise Toyoto Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); City of
Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 61 (D.N.J. 1971); Berland v. Mack, 48
F.R.D. 121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Note, Hearing on Maintainabilityof ClassAction Suit
Should Not Determine Ultimate Merits of Individual Claim, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 732
(1974).
175. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
176. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
177. Id. at 177, citing Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
cases cited in note 174 supra.
178. 417 U.S. at 178.
179. Id.
180. Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Dorfman v.
First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466 (E.D. Pa. 1974). The appropriateness of the use of
summary judgment arises out of the fact that a suit may be a proper class action conforming to rule 23 and still be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Kahan v.
Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1970). Accord, Miller v. Mackey Int'l, 452 F.2d 424
(5th Cir. 1971).
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The Eisen rejection of preliminary merit determinations
should not inhibit state courts that are not constrained by the
language of Federal Rule 23. California, well aware of the dangers
of a general use of early determinations on the merits, 8 ' has experimented in this area with procedures which are flexible both
in timing and in depth of inquiry. For example, the Los Angeles
Manual for the Conduct of Pretrial Hearings on Class Action
Issues, 8 discussing the issue of the necessity for, and content of,
notice, directs that each party will submit
[d]ocuments, including declarations, if a party desires, of
whether the action has great or little merit. (These documents
will be considered only as they are relevant to the issues of
whether notice should be given, at what time, and imposition
of the expense of giving of notice .... )'1
This limited use of early merit determinations does not prejudice
any of the parties.
C. Notice in State Courts
Before the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"4 most observers
thought the case would be the definitive statement on consumer
class actions. After the case had shuttled between the district and
appellate courts for almost 10 years,"' however, the Supreme
Court only concluded that
the Court of Appeals . . .had jurisdiction to review fully the
District Court's resolution of the class action notice problems in
this case ....
• . . [As] to the merits of the case, . . . the District
Court's resolution of the notice problems was erroneous in two
181. Beckstead v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 780, 98 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1971). See
also Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 485 (Cal. App. 1974),
discussed at notes 214-18 and accompanying text infra.
182. D. THOMAS, Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT MANUAL FOR CONuCT OF PRETRIAL
PROCEEDINGS ON CLASS ACTION ISSUES (1973) [hereinafter CLAss ACTION MANUAL]. See
Appendix E infra.
183. Id. § 427.6(a). See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(c)(3) (1973).
184. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
185. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded,
370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967); 391 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1968)
(reversing district court dismissal); 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 54 F.R.D. 565
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156
(1974).
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respects. First, it failed to comply with the notice requirements
of Rule 23(c) (2), and second, it imposed part of the cost of notice
on [the defendants].'"0

Thus, the definitive statement never materialized.' 7 Consumer
advocates, nevertheless, could complain that the Court's holding
had set back the consumer class action. The district court had
determined, on the basis of a preliminary merits hearing, that the
plaintiffs would probably succeed on the merits and that the
defendants should bear 90 percent of the cost of a perfunctory
form of notice.' 8 In affirming the Second Circuit's disapproval of
the notice employed, the Supreme Court held the mandatory
language of rule 23(c) (2)'89 meant that individual notice must be
sent to all class members whose names and addresses could be
ascertained through reasonable efforts.'90
The Eisen statutory construction of rule 23 notice was "reinforced" by the statement of the Advisory Committee' 9 ' that the
notice provision of subdivision (c)(2) was "designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is
of course subject.' 9 2 Because the parties in Eisen acknowledged
186. 417 U.S. at 172-73.
187. The narrowness of the Eisen court holding is indicated in footnote 10:
[W]e find the notice requirements of Rule 23 to be dispositive of petitioner's
attempt to maintain the class action as presently defined. We therefore have no
occasion to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issues
of manageability and fluid-class recovery, or indeed, whether those issues were
properly before the Court of Appeals under the theory of retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 172 n.10.
Nor has Eisen resolved all the problems that may arise out of the notice aspect of
the suit. Does the fact that the issue of class certification is to be determined as soon as
practicable after commencement of the action put any constraints on the timing of the
notice? "[After certification] fairness to the members of the class requires that the...
notice go out fairly soon ....
." J. MOORE, supra note 18,
23.55, at 23-1159. But see
DuPont v. Perot, 59 F.R.D. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The benefits of delayed notice and its
compatibility with Eisen are discussed in Schuck & Cohen, The Consumer Class Action:
An Endangered Species, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 39, 64-71 (1974). On the other hand, the
cost of a premature notice would be difficult to impose on either party. Yet there are
instances when early feedback from the class may be quite helpful in planning the conduct
of litigation, the structuring of subclasses, and the treatment of common and individual
questions.
188. 52 F.R.D. at 266-69; 54 F.R.D. at 565, 573.
189. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides (in part): "In any class action maintained under
subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."
190. 417 U.S. at 173.
191. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 98.
192. Id. at 106-07.
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that the names and addresses of over two million class members
were ascertainable, the language of rule 23(c)(2) required "the
best notice practicable"-in this case individual notice. If the two
million class members had not been readily ascertainable, the
court would have suggested a different form of notice. 9 '
The Eisen Court had an opportunity to say that due process
required a specific form of notice but instead phrased its notice
holding in terms of statutory construction.'94 Lower federal
courts, nevertheless, are bound to follow Eisen and the decision
may serve as a guideline to state courts which operate under rules
modeled after the federal version. Of course, Field Code states
may find the Eisen.notice requirement a bulwark to the binding
effect of the class judgment." 5
The other aspect of the notice holding stated the "usual
rule:" The plaintiff shall bear the cost of notifying the class when
"the relationship between the parties is truly adversary.""' As a
"usual rule" and not a due process requirement, states may
choose to vary the notice burdens and allocate notice costs."' This
position leaves room for creativity. For example, in an action
requesting rebates from power companies or banks for excessive
interest rates, the plaintiffs might successfully argue for notice to
193. The Second Circuit in Eisen referring to the Antibiotics litigation, West Virginia
v. Charles P. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1091 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971),
stated that "reasonable effort would not have uncovered the names and addresses of the
members of the consumer class of persons who bought the drug or prescription at drug
stores. Therefore, publication as to the consumer was deemed sufficient." 479 F.2d at 1015
n.17.
194. Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 35 N.Y.2d 147, 316 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1974). Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and ProposedAmendments
of FederalRule 23, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 13-16 (1974).

195. 417 U.S. at 176. See Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 105-06. Cf.
Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
196. 417 U.S. at 179. Malby v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 61 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Ohio
1973). The Court alludes to a fairly common exception, a preexisting fiduciary duty
between parties involved in shareholder derivative suits. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1788. The fiduciary duty exception, however, has
its limitations. In Wolfson v. Solomon, 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), a fund was
set up by defendants pursuant to a consent judgment in a securities fraud action brought
by the SEC. The court determined that the fund could not be tapped to pay for class
action notice in a related investor action, conducted for the benefit of less than all parties
who could be construed to have an interest in the fund.
197. The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CiV. CODE § 1781(d) (1973),
directs either party to notify the class and allows notice by publication if personal notification is impracticable or unreasonably expensive. The Eisen Court suggested that the latter
may not be a good reason for adopting a more perfunctory form of notice. 417 U.S. at 175.
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accompany a monthly billing statement."'8
The ramifications of Eisen are not ascertainable at this time;
however, two post-Eisen cases indicate that a flexible notice standard will be enough for some courts. In Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & FinishingCo., 99 an action requesting injunctive relief under
rule 23(b)(2) and monetary damages for alleged civil rights deprivations, the court observed that if the judgment were to have any
res judicata effect, notice would be required pursuant to rule
23(c)(3). 2°1 The court then proceeded to fashion a notice requirement conforming to the particular situation: even though the
class members were readily identifiable, notice by publication
was sufficient to reach the localized 3,000 member class. The
court distinguished Eisen on the basis of the size and nature of
the class. 29 ' In Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 2 2 the California
Court of Appeal seized an opportunity to avoid the restrictive
notice requirement of Eisen. In response to a forum non conveniens objection, the court analyzed the notice requirements of the
alternative forums. Observing that Hawaii, the alternate forum
for the action, operated under the model federal rule and thus
would probably impose expensive notice burdens on the plaintiff,
the court stated that California could employ a more flexible
notice procedure modeled on the notice provision of the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act.29 3 That Act provides that either
party may notify the class by publication if personal notice is
198. Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56, 61 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
199. 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974). The usual rule in a 23(b)(2) injunctive relief suit
is that notice is not required. In Eisen the Court specifically stated that the notice provision (c)(2) was inapplicable to rule 23(b)(2) actions. 417 U.S. at 177 n.14. A reason for
notice under 23(b)(3) is the implementation of the opt-out mechanism. See note 211 and
accompanying text infra. Since (b)(2) actions incorporate no opt-out provision, nor is one
necessary, the action should proceed without notice. Arnold v. Ballard, 18 F.R. Serv. 2d
281 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Notice is also not as crucial in injunction actions since due process
in a (b)(2) action would seem to be satisfied by the adequacy of the representation. C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1786. Several pre-Eisendecisions reach that conclusion. See Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1974); Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053
(4th Cir. 1972); Paddison v. Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Accord, MANuAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.45 (1973).
200. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3) provides (in part): "The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe those the court finds to be members of the class." It is
not at all clear that this section of rule 23 is direct authority for notice. But see FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
201. 64 F.R.D. at 417-18.
202. 117 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. App. 1974).
203. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750 et seq. (1973).
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either impracticable or unreasonably expensive.2 4 Thus, if
Ellison and Archibald are any indication, the damage class action
is not necessarily dead notwithstanding Eisen.
Moreover, the Eisen Court included with its rejection of the
notice ordered by the district court the suggestion that the cumbersome nationwide class might be divisible into more manageable subclasses.2"5 The named plaintiff could tailor the size of the
subclass he represented according to his limited resources, thus
mitigating the harshness of the notice burden he would have to
bear. The power of the district court to create subclasses is apparent in the language of rule 23: "[W]hen appropriate . . . a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.""2 Since the subclass approach was merely
a suggestion, several critical issues remain concerning its propriety. The majority and Justice Douglas disagreed on the role
the district court should play in structuring a subclass for the
named plaintiff to represent. The majority indicated that the
larger action should be dismissed without prejudice, 207 whereas
Justice Douglas implied that the trial court would itself redefine
the action. ' The difference in approaches may produce different
204. Id. § 1781(d). But see Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr.
488 (Cal. App. 1974), in which the court accepted the Eisen Court's argument that the
class action judgment would not be binding until the class members received notice, but
the court did not specify what kind of notice would be employed, thus not ruling out notice
by publication. See notes 214-18 and accompanying text infra.
205. 417 U.S. at 179 n.16. See also Justice Douglas' concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 179-86. For a pre.Eisendecision advising similar treatment, see P.D.Q., Inc. of
Miami v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
The merits of subclass division do not necessarily extend to the state courts in which
actions are typically more regional with less severe notice problems. Subclasses may,
however, still be used to manage conflicts of interest or disagreements over requested
relief. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th
Cir. 1968) (conflict of interests). See also Tober v. Chamita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa.
1973) (differences in remedies requested); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (differences in issues within the class). But see Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 525
P.2d 701, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1974). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39,
§ 1796, at 223; J. MOORE, supra note 18, 23.65; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 1.43
(1972).
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B). See also subdivision (c)(1) giving authority to the
trial court to alter or amend its class action order before decision on the merits. For state
authority, see CLAss AcTION MANUAL, supra note 182, § 427.1(a), found in Appendix E.
207. 417 U.S. at 179 n.161.
208. Id. at 179-81.
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results as to whether the statute of limitations is tolled for the
larger class or only the subclass. 29 Furthermore, Justice Douglas
expressly left open the question regarding the operation of the
collateral estoppel doctrine.2 10 Collateral estoppel problems may
arise when another class (but not subclass) member attempts to
use a favorable merit determination against the defendant in a
subsequent action; or if the subclass lost on the merits, problems
may also arise when others of the larger class argue that they
should not be bound by that judgment because of the lack of full
class notice and opportunity to be heard. Of course, if the subclass is not properly defined a serious traditional estoppel problem arises.
One specific problem which results from the operation of
collateral estoppel, which neither the Eisen majority nor Justice
Douglas discussed, is the return to an aggravated form of one-way
intervention which may be inherent in the creation of subclasses.2 11 Under the old federal rule, judgments of "spurious"
actions, predecessors of rule 23(b)(3) damage suits, were binding
only on appearing parties. If a class member wished to take advantage of a judgment against the party opposing the class, he
had to actually intervene in the action. As a practical matter,
intervention would occur only if the judgment was favorable. If
unfavorable, an absent class member would be free to initiate a
second class action. The resulting inequities to the defendant and
judicial inefficiencies provided part of the impetus for the full
binding effect of judgments of all actions brought under the new
Federal Rule 23. There is but one qualification: in rule 23(b)(3)
actions, class members are allowed to withdraw before liability is
determined and after notice is received apprising them of the
details of the suit and of that right. Under the subclass approach,
an individual of the larger class representing another subclass
might attempt to take advantage of a favorable judgment, or
without mutuality of estoppel, avoid an unfavorable judgment in
a second suit against the defendant. The dangers of such a situation are evidenced by the recent "test-case" approach adopted by
the Third Circuit. In Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,2 2 the court
209. Id. at 181. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). See also
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 761 (3d Cir. 1974).
210. 417 U.S. at 182 & n.3.
211. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 16, at 105. See also Kaplan, Continuing
Work, supra note 16, at 385.
212. 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), reviewed in 88 HARv. L. REv. 825 (1975). Katz
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"postponed" the class determination in favor of a limited individual suit to be concluded as a test case. If the limited suit was
successful, others of the uncertified class could take advantage of
it. If defendant prevailed, others could try again, deterred only
by stare decisis. To a certain extent, the test case, with postponement of certification, is inconsistent with Eisen's rejection of the
preliminary merits determination prior to certification. In Katz,
however, the court did not really postpone certification but rather
employed a full-fledged spurious action as though it were still
good law; all under the guise of avoiding the imposition of possibly futile notice costs to a plaintiff who admitted he could pay
those costs."-3
The California courts have rejected the Katz approach. In
Home Savings & Loan Association v. Superior Court,21 1 the trial
court decided to try the merits of the individual plaintiff's claim
before making determinations on the suitability of the class action, membership of the class, and the form of notice to be given.
Additionally, the trial court adopted 21 5 the one-way intervention
doctrine of Katz, binding the defendant if he lost, but not binding
the other plaintiff class members if the single plaintiff lost. Overturning the trial court, the appellate court argued that class certification should have been litigated first. 2 6 The court said the trial

court decision presented essentially a no-lose situation for the
potential plaintiffs and thus the terror of open-ended lawsuits
that "cannot be defeated, cannot be settled, cannot be fully ad-

judicated. '

21 7

The court concluded that postponing determina-

tion of the suitability of the class action and dispensing with
notice prior to litigation did not protect the defendant's right to
a fair trial and due process.1 '
specifically used as authority several older spurious class action opinions condoning oneway intervention. E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 588-89
(10th Cir. 1961), cert denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963).
213. In Katz, the plaintiff was willing to bear notice costs, thereby surmounting the
Eisen hurdle. He should have been able to activate fully the class mechanism with its
concept of a passive participating class. Instead, the court required "the class" to actively
participate through intervention or initiation of a separate suit. In view of the criticisms
suggested earlier concerning the individual filing as an inadequate administrative remedy,
see notes 146-62 and accompanying text supra, it is likely that if anything has been won
by the consumer, it is pyrrhic in nature.
214. 117 Cal. Rptr. 485 (Cal. App. 1974).
215. Id. at 487.
216. Id. at 488.
217. Id.

218. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4

56

et al.: State Class Actions

1975]

STATE CLASS ACTIONS

D. Discovery in Class Actions
The subject of the permissible scope of discovery in class
actions presents perhaps more problematic questions than any
other area in the conduct of litigation. For example, should a
defendant confronted by a class action be allowed to use discovery against absent members of a class? If so, what are legitimate
requests for information from those unnamed plaintiffs? Even

more important, who should bear the burden of producing plaintiff class members for deposition purposes?

In Southern CaliforniaEdison Co. v. Superior Court,"' the
defendant utility company sought a writ of mandamus from the

California Supreme Court compelling the lower court to vacate
its protective order issued during the course of discovery. The
plaintiffs had brought an action for a class of approximately 1,500
persons whose boats, moored in a particular harbor, allegedly had
been damaged by defendant's discharge of pollutants. The defen-

dant utility company wished to depose members of the plaintiff
class. Under the California statute, when deponents were "per-

sons for whose immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prose-

cuted or defended" 220 the defendant was required, not to serve
notice personally on each deponent, but to serve it on the plain219. 7 Cal. 3d 832, 500 P.2d 621, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1972). See also Coriell v. Superior
Court, 39 Cal. App. 3d 487, 114 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1974).
220. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 2019(a)(4) (Supp. 1975):
In the case of depositions of a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding
or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition is an officer, director or
managing agent of any such party, the service of a subpoena upon any such
deponent is not required if proper notice of the taking of such deposition is given
to the attorney for such party or to the party if he has no attorney. In the case
of depositions of a person for whose immediate benefit an action or proceeding
is prosecuted or defended or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition
is an officer, director or managing agent of any such person, the service of a
subpoena upon any such deponent is not required if proper notice of the taking
of such deposition is given to the attorney of the party prosecuting or defending
the action or proceeding for the immediate benefit of the deponent or to such
party if he has no attorney.
See S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87(A) & (G); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-511 (1962). The language of the
California statute and § 26-511 are, arguably, to be read as referring to institutional
parties and situations when nominal party plaintiffs are presenting the case for another's
benefit. Indeed, the plaintiff in Edison argued that this was the proper interpretation of
Waters v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 885, 377 P.2d 265, 27 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1963). 7 Cal.
3d at 838, 500 P.2d at 624, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 712. This interpretation makes sense because
benefitted persons usually have more information than nominal parties. Analogously, the
same observation applies to named class plaintiffs as opposed to unnamed and absent
members.
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tiff's attorney who bore the burden of compelling attendance of
the deponents. Furthermore, the defendant could move to exclude nonappearing parties.2' When it became apparent that the
defendant company would continue the practice of noticing depositions and moving for exclusion of nonappearing members, the
plaintiffs moved for a protective order under the following statute:
Upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to
be examined ...

for good cause shown, the court in which the

action is pending may make an order that the deposition shall
not be taken.

. .

or the court may make any other order which

justice requires to protect the 2party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression.

2

The plaintiffs had asked that only named parties be compelled
to submit to depositions on written notice to counsel. Acknowledging the unfairness of requiring the class to produce other than
named parties, the trial court quashed defendant's notices and
held that unnamed class members were not within the section
2019(a)(4) "immediate benefit" language. 2 3 The defendant

could, however, renotice depositions if subpoenas were issued in
the usual fashion of personal service processed by the defendant
utility company.
On review, the California Supreme Court determined that,
under the statute, notice served on plaintiff's counsel was clearly
sufficient to subject unnamed plaintiffs to depositions; nevertheless, the court held that it was within the trial court's discretion
221. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 2034(d) (Supp. 1975) (in part):

If a party or a person for whose immediate benefit the action ... is prosecuted
or defended . . . willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after said party or his attorney has been served with a proper notice
in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (a)(4) of Section 2019 . . . the
court on motion and notice may . . . dismiss the action or proceeding or any
party thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, or impose such
other penalties as the court may deem just.
The language of the statute would seem to provide for complete dismissal of the action
on nonappearance of any of the class members. That would be too harsh a penalty against
a plaintiff class; moreover, since the statute seems to grant discretion in the trial judge,
dismissal is not likely to happen. What is perhaps overlooked in the statute and by Edison
is the trial court's discretion in granting a lesser penalty. Even penalties imposed on a
named plaintiff, such as bearing the deposition cost of opposing counsel, might, however,
preclude the suit by most small claimants.
222. CAL. CIV. PRo. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (1975). See also S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87(H)(1).
223. 7 Cal. 3d at 837 n.4, 500 P.2d at 623 n.4, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.4.
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to issue the protective order. 2 4 The Edison court constructed a
good cause test on the propriety of protective orders:
In the exercise of its discretion the court should weigh the relative importance of the information sought against the hardship
which its production might entail, and it must weigh the relative ability of the parties to obtain the information before requiring the adversary to bear the burden or cost of production,
admonition of entering an order
keeping in mind the statutory
2
consistent with justice.

2

The court devised such a test with the recognition that a defendant's use of discovery for his legitimate defense needs should not
extend so far as to discourage the class action.226 Analyzing the
status of the parties in Edison, the court observed that since both
parties had equal abilities to compel attendance, the production
burden should fall on the individual initiating discovery. 27 Because the Edison class was a loosely knit group with a named
plaintiff having insufficient information about absent members
and minimal control over their appearance, the court did not
subject the class to discovery burdens. The court, however, added
that "[its] view concerning the proper allocation of the burden
of discovery might be different if the class alleged were a closely
knit organization, where the members generally knew each other
and participated together in the planning of the law suit. '28 In a
224. Id. at 840, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714. If the court had found that
unnamed plaintiffs were not in the category of persons immediately benefitted, defendants could have been effectively thwarted in legitimately procuring information to wage
an adequate defense. By ruling that unnamed plaintiffs did not come within § 2019(a)
(4) language, the court made it possible for discovery or production burdens to remain on
named plaintiffs in justified situations (when plaintiffs are unable to show good reason
why that burden ought to be shifted).
225. 7 Cal. 3d at 841, 500 P.2d at 626, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 741, quoting Greyhound Corp.
v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 383-84, 364 P.2d 266, 280. 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 104 (1961).
The court referred to the test as an allocation of the burden of discovery test, but since
the burden is on the plaintiff to show good cause why a protective order should issue, the
test can be translated into the protective order context.
226. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
227. Id. at 841, 500 P.2d at 626, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
228. Id. at 841 n.7, 500 P.2d at 626 n.7, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.7. Another factor, the
weight of which is difficult to determine, is the defendant's motive for conducting the
deposition. The Edison court obviously felt that the defendant's illegitimate motive was
to exclude the class members without a real interest in collecting information. If this
motive was not present and the abilities to produce absent members or collect information
from them remained the same, the court would have been faced with a much harder
question.
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well-phrased footnote, the Edison court set forth guidelines for
discovery in a broader context:
Absent some specific showing by the objecting party to justify
a contrary ruling, such as privilege, a representative plaintiff
can be compelled to supply his adversary with the information
about his class which is in his possession or readily available to
him and which is not equally available to an adversary. A representative plaintiff cannot be compelled to supply information
concerning members of his class or their interests in the action
which is neither in his possession nor control, unless the interrogatory is directly related to his own standing to maintain the
action, to the existence of an ascertainable class, or to the existence of that community of interests which is required to sustain
a class action. A representative cannot be compelled to respond
to interrogatories about any class member's separate claim as
distinguished from the common claim of the class which may be
tried with or as a part of the class action." '

The Edison factual context was but a part of this broader framework of discovery.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not dealt with the
problems of Edison; in fact, the state has only recently adopted

liberal discovery provisions modeled on the federal rules. 21 The
new rules, nevertheless, should be examined to predict what
problems might arise in an Edison-type case.
Under rule 87A, "any party may take testimony of any person including a party. . . for purposes of discovery or for use as
evidence."' 1 The language suggests that a defendant, proposing
to depose or serve interrogatories on unnamed class plaintiffs, can
go beyond the question of class worthiness and still stay within
the purview of rule 87. Such an interpretation is consistent with
the general recognition of discretion in the trial judge to manage
all stages of the litigation,2 2 including the discretion to allow
liberal discovery of unnamed plaintiffs. The concept of the trial
judge's broad discretion, however, conflicts with the liberal class
action device of strictly interpreting class provisions to disallow
229. Id., quoting Alpine Mut. Water Co. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. App. 2d 45, 66

Cal. Rptr. 250 (1968) (court's emphasis and citations omitted).
230. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87-90.
231. S.C. Cm. CT.R. 87A. See also S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87B (scope of examination).

232. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). 4A J. MooRE, supra note 18,
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the treatment of absent class members as active parties. 23 This
very broad dispute is a backdrop to the intricacies of the South
Carolina discovery rules and their potential effect on class actions.
In Edison, the procedure for notifying potential deponents
presented difficulties for the class representative since by statute
he bore the production burdens. Section G of rule 87 sets out the
procedure for notifying prospective deponents:
Written notice shall be served upon the adverse party at least
ten days prior to the taking of any deposition. It shall not be
necessary to subpoena an adverse party or an officer, director or
managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership
or association which is a party. In such cases, notice of the
taking of the deposition at a specified place and time and before
one authorized to take the deposition shall be given. If the name
of such officer, director or managing agent is not known to the
party giving notice, he may require the attendance at the deposition of such officer, director or managing agent by title.2 4
This section indicates that notice served on the adverse party
subjects him to a deposition without the necessity of a subpoena.
There is no indication, however, whether the notice provisions
include unnamed as well as named class members. Since notice
of any deposition is to be served on the adverse party, one could
reach the absurd result that each class member is to receive notice of each and every deposition conducted. Nor does section G
233. Several federal courts have given priority to the liberal class action at the expense of trial court discretion to employ discovery mechanisms. In Fischer v. Wolfinbar-

ger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1971), the court observed inconsistencies in demanding
compliance in a discovery proceeding by a class that had been determined to be so
numerous as to preclude alternative procedural devices that depended on individual involvement. "It is not intended that members of the class should be treated as if they were
parties plaintiff, subject to the normal discovery procedures, because if that were permitted, then the reason for [Federal Rule 23] would fail." Id. at 132. Accord, Donson Stores,
Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lamb v. United Security
Life Co., 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa 1973). Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), a treble damage action in which the court again refused to exclude individual
unnamed plaintiffs for noncompliance with interrogatories and orders to produce certain
documents, cited termination of the usefulness of rule 23 if class members were forced to
spend time and perhaps engage counsel to answer detailed interrogatories. Other courts
which have not penalized absent class members for noncompliance have cited the practice
of automatic grant of party status and the absence of mandatory intervention under rule
23. See generally Comment, Developments in the Law of Federal Class Action Litigation-Catch22 and Rule 23, 10 HOUSTON L. REv. 337, 386-92 (1972).
234. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87G.
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of rule 87 indicate who is to bear the burden of notifying the
parties. The last sentence of section A of rule 87 supports somewhat the position that the notice burden is on plaintiff's counsel:
"Notice of the deposing of any party or witness shall be given to
'' 5
each adversary party through counsel as provided in G hereof. s
Thus, the dilemma in Edison, presented by the "immediate benefit" language of the statute examined there, may also arise in a
South Carolina case because of the unclear meaning of "party."' 6
This dilemma is clearly unnecessary. Class representatives
have chosen counsel and thus have indicated sufficient interest
to justify keeping them informed of the discovery process. Keeping unnamed and nonappearing class members updated on the
deposition process, however, serves no legitimate purpose. Thus,
one judicial solution to the dilemma is to interpret "adversary
'3 7
party" in rule 87 to mean only "active litigant.
If the court does not interpret rule 87 that restrictively, there
is yet another solution to the dilemma: the plaintiff representative may shift that burden by resorting to the protective order
process similar to the one employed in Edison and provided for
in rule 87H(1):
After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown,
the Court in which the action is pending may make an Order
235. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87A. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-503 (1962), concerning the examination of adversaries before trial, provides that "notice of at least five days [is to be given]
to the party to be examined and any other adverse party, unless, for good cause shown,
the judge order otherwise." This is a more flexible notice procedure than what the circuit
court rule specifies but makes no mention of who shall bear the financial burden of
producing the witnesses. Cf. Lewis v. Atlanta-Charlotte Airline Ry., 250 S.C. 528, 159
S.E.2d 243 (1968). See also S.C. CODE ANN. 26-706 (1962).
236. Moreover, the "immediate benefit" problem specifically arises in another context. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-511 (1962) provides that "[a] person for whose immediate
benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, though not a party to the action, may be
examined as a witness in the same manner and subject to the same rules of examination
as if he were named as a party." Although no cases have interpreted this statute, the
language suggests that the reference is only to nominal suits. See note 220 supra.
237. This possibility is remote in light of the broad language of several cases: United
States Tire Co. v. Keystone Tire Sales Co., 153 S.C. 56, 150 S.E. 347 (1929), construing
"party" in the former version of S.C. CODE ANN.§ 26-510 (1962) and dealing with when a
party may examine his adversary as a witness, noted that "person" or "party" was sufficiently broad to encompass corporations. "Party" included all persons, natural or legal,
by whom or against whom the suit is brought in law or equity. That definition ought to
include absent class members. See also Perry v. Minit Saver Food Stores of South Carolina, 255 S.C. 42, 177 S.E.2d 4 (1970) (a rule 87 "witness" includes parties).
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that the deposition shall not be taken, . . . or the Court may
make any other Order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.ns

The rule employs the same significant terms in the statutory
language under consideration in Edison: "good cause," "annoyance," "embarrassment" and "oppression." As in Edison, the
interpretation of "good cause" should not be "extraordinary
need;" showing that the class is an ordinary, loosely knit collection of individuals, represented by a plaintiff with no real control
over production of information or deponents, should be a sufficient demonstration of "good cause."
If the trial court refuses to grant a protective order, Edison's
unfortunate result of excluding the noncomplying class members
from relief may also occur under rule 87H(7)(b):
If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to
answer any question after being directed to do so by the Court,
the refusal may be considered a contempt of that Court. If a
party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails
to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after
being served with a proper notice, the Court on motion and
notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof,
or enter a judgment by default against that party.29

The plaintiff class member is subject to penalty only if he
willfully fails to appear. 0 If he does not receive notice because
238. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 87H(1).
239. S.C. CIR. CT.R. 87H(7)(b). These penalties apply also to interrogatories. S.C.
Cm. CT. R. 90F. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-508 (1962): "If a party refuses to attend
and testify. . . he may be punished as for a contempt, and his complaint, answer or reply
may be stricken out."
240. Section 26-508 omits any "willful" language, but since there is reference to
contempt, only willful noncompliance should result in sanctions. Although there is no "on
proper notice" language, § 26-508 must be read with § 26-503, the notice provision. See
note 235 supra. Lastly, the circuit court rule provides for a default judgment as a final
sanction while § 26-508 acknowledges that the complaint or answer may be stricken.
Presumably, under § 26-508, one could begin anew if the striking of the complaint as to a
particular class member was without prejudice. As a practical matter, if one begins with
the presupposition that the plaintiff class member is a passive party, the affected class
member will simply remain mute after his complaint is stricken.
In federal court, exclusion of absent class members for noncompliance with discovery
requests is not a universally accepted sanction. Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62,
71-72 (D.D.C. 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Kom
v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra, Minnesota v. United
States Steel Co., 44 F.R.D. 559, 582 (D. Minn. 1968). Even in cases requiring unnamed
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he cannot be located, or if he receives notice but he is not sufficiently apprised of the ramifications of noncompliance, there is
no willfulness in nonattendance. Such a result is compelled by
the phrase, "after being served with a proper notice." Unfortunately, rule 87 does not define "proper notice." Good sense dictates
that "proper notice" entails informing the absent class member
of the consequences of noncompliance so that he may act intelligently.
Edison did not address the question of what constitutes proper subject matter for a deposition, an interrogatory, or a request
for document production, which is directed to absent class members. " South Carolina Circuit Court Rule 87B has broad language on the scope of examination of deponents:
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."'
Thus, under the provision almost anything is a proper subject
matter for discovery.
The federal decisions have adopted special rules for discovery
in class litigation. These rules do not extend beyond the parameters of present discovery provisions. On the contrary, they are
merely the general provisions which the federal courts have subdued for class action situations. In Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Insurance Co.,' 43 the court justified discovery on the
ground that the information sought related to defenses raised by
Midwestern.
The requests were not designed solely to determine the identity
and amount of the class members' claims, but were also directed
members to take some type of affirmative action, such as the filing of proof of claim forms,

exclusion is usually not imposed as a sanction. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 278, 281-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 449 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1971);
In re Cohen's Will, 51 F.R.D. 167, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
241. 7 Cal. 3d at 842, 500 P.2d at 627, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
242. S.C. CR. CT. R. 87B (emphasis added).
243. 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972).
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at obtaining information relating to certain defences raised by
Midwestern in the principal trial.
• ..Before ordering such discovery, a trial court must be
assured that the requested information is actually needed in
preparation for trial and that discovery devices are not used to
take unfair advantage of absent class members. Moreover, adequate notice must be given so that such persons are fully informed of the discovery order and the possible consequences of
their noncompliance with it. '
Since the language of South Carolina Circuit Rule 87, regarding
the scope of examination, is much too broad a mandate for imposing discovery on absent class members, the court should employ
the Brennan test to restrict it accordingly. The main dispute
regarding what constitutes "need in preparation for trial" is, in
essence, a question of degree to be determined on a case-by-case
basis. One way of settling the question is by inquiring into the
motives of the defendant.245 Usually, the defendant can obtain all
the information needed to defend against the class aspects of the
action from named plaintiffs. If a defendant is requesting from
unnamed plaintiffs the same information available from named
plaintiffs, he should be denied discovery.24
Moreover, although the information sought may arguably be
needed to support a defense, the information may merely aid the
defendant in defending against the particular claim. For example, in a products liability class action, the defendant may ask
plaintiff class members to recount the history of car maintenance
or driving habits to establish an individual defense of product
misuse to defeat single claims. 4 ' Even if such inquiries are legitimate, they should await decisions on the common questions.241 If
244. Id. at 1005, 1006 (emphasis added). If the defendant fails to carry his burden,
the court is likely to deny discovery, stressing, for example, the technical nature of an
interrogatory. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974).
245. Bisgeier v. Fotomat Corp., 62 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Cf. B & B Inv. Club
v. Kleinert's, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also Note, Request for Information
in Class Actions, 83 YALE L.J. 602 (1974).
246. Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 535 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Interests of
economy dictate that repetitive requests not be made of class members. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(d)(1): "The court may make appropriate orders. . . prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition . . . in the presentation of evidence."
247. See Note, Products Liability Class Suit, supra note 3.
248. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A). Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), suggested another valid reason to deny discovery:
Many members of the class may fail to respond merely because they . . . do
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bifurcated trials are to be employed, there is no reason why bifurcated discovery should not also be employed to protect the integ2 49
rity of the litigation of the liability portion of the class action.
E.

Counterclaims

One of the best defensive weapons in the class suit is the
counterclaim. The defendant may employ the counterclaim to
force a showing that the class suit is inferior to other remedies
because of its inherent unmanageability-the same type of fatal
defect considered earlier in the discussion on individual questions. 5 ' Moreover, just as the defendant may use discovery requests to discourage class claims, so may he use the counterclaim.
For example, in a usury class action the defendant loan company
may sift through its files for "uncollectibles" to muster claims for
service or late charges against potential class members. Instead
of arbitrarily refusing to certify the class suit, the court ought to
examine closely the purposes of the action, the nature of the
counterclaim, and the feasibility of using tools of complex litigation, such as bifurcated trials and reference to masters. Unfortunately, courts have not always adopted a modern approach.
In a federal court decision, Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,5 ' the defendant countered plaintiff's claim of antitrust
violations in billing for "prospective" parking tickets with claims
against the plaintiff class for unpaid parking tickets, uninsured
motorist damages and rental bills. The court observed that
[t]he non-frivolous counterclaims asserted by defendants
against an estimated 60,000 individual members of the putative
class, and arising out of the rental transaction forming the basis
of the complaint, pose serious questions of individual liability,
which, at least in their aggregate, threaten to overwhelm the
original claim.12
not have immediately available the essential information. Unless and until
liability to the class is established or seems reasonably certain, therefore, members should not be barred for failure to track down this information, even though
such a requirement might later be a reasonable condition to their participation
in any recovery, assuming liability is established.
See also Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 16, at 397-98. See notes 290-98 and accompanying text infra.
249. Cale v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 F.R.D. 328 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
250. See notes 118-35 and accompanying text supra.
251. 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D.
78 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Malby v. General Elec. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
252. 56 F.R.D. at 552. See also Lah v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F.R.D. 198, 200 (S.D. Ohio
1970).
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The assertion of the counterclaims, if held to be compulsory,,"
would have splintered the class action into a "myriad of separate
trials" and, if held permissive, would have posed administrative
problems and questions of fairness.2 4 The court also said that if
counterclaims exceeded claims, many class members would probably attempt to exclude themselves for fear of a net judgment
against them.255
Some federal courts have not followed the Cotchett approach
for the wrong reasons. Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries
Co. 26 held that absent class members were not "parties" to an
action and therefore not subject to counterclaims. The court
adopted the analogical rationale of those courts25 7 which have
found nonappearing class members immune to various discovery
devices: "Rule 23 contemplates an adversary contest involving
only the representative members of the class, with all other members of the class being permitted passively to await the outcome
of the principal suit."2 8 In determining that absent class mem253. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
254. 56 F.R.D. at 552.
255. Id. at 553. Cotchett raises another problem: if the action is certified, must the
class be notified of the counterclaim? If so, individual class members may want out, and
the defendant may have secured results similar to those obtained from use of detailed
requests for discovery. The court, on the other hand, may decide to define the class to
exclude members against whom counterclaims may be asserted. See notes 264-66 and
accompanying text infra. Even if the action is for injunctive relief, the defendant may
counterclaim for damages and raise the notice problems of Eisen.
Because of the counterclaims and of the resjudicataeffect of any class adjudication, individual notice must be sent to the class members. Although the "best
notice practicable" required by Rule 23(c)(2) does not always mean individual
notice when class members are readily identifiable and potentially liable to
counterclaims asserted by defendants, notice by publication would surely raise
problems of due process.
Id. at 553. The notice problem may be alleviated in the injunctive relief suit by levying
costs on the defendant who introduced the complicating cost factors.
Notice of counterclaims cannot be avoided since it is only with full awareness of the
scope of the litigation that the opt-out right created by rule 23 can be effectively honored.
Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). If
special costs may be imposed by passive participation in the suit, the class should be fully
apprised. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). Even if there is a potential for liability, an affirmative
response should not, however, be required; automatic inclusion, with the possibility of
opting out, should be the rule. Abulaban v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 51 F.R.D. 496, 497
(D.D.C. 1971).
256. 58 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
257. Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Wainwright v. Kraftco
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See note 233 supra.
258. 58 F.R.D. at 489. Cf. Kor v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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bers were not parties for purposes of rule 13(a), 211 the court observed that "the right to counterclaim is readily subject to abuse
as a tactical device to encourage plaintiffs to opt out." 6 ' To avoid
possible prejudice in foreclosing defendant's counterclaims, the
court should handle individual questions such as the counterclaims and damages on a member-by-member basis after the
class action trial.
The more desirable approach concedes that class members
are parties for purposes of rule 13(a), 21 but maintains that a
particular action is not automatically rendered unmanageable by
assertion of a counterclaim. In Weit v. ContinentalIllionis National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago,211 a conspiracy action to
fix interest and discount rates, both sides argued interpretations
of "parties" for rule 13 purposes. The court, however, chose to
analyze the action on the assumption that the counterclaims were
proper.
[The counterclaims] would consist solely of liquidated
amounts owed by class members in their delinquent accounts.
These could best be ascertained from defendant's own records.
Few class members would be expected to contest either the fact
of liability or the amount owed. This court would not be transposed into a vast "collection agency" as defendants suggest,
because if a counterclaim exceeded a class member's damages,
merely be in possession of a judgthe pertinent defendant2would
63
ment for the difference.
Partainv. First NationalBank of Montgomery2 4 adopted an
entirely different approach to counterclaims. Defending a claim
of usury brought by BankAmericard holders, the defendant
259. Donson distinguished Cotchett as not making a definitive statement on whether

"absent members of a class" were within the meaning of "party" in rule 13(a). 58 F.R.D.

at 489 n.6. Cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1004 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). But see Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
260. 58 F.R.D. at 489.
261. Nor is there any merit in the distinction between compulsory and permissive
counterclaims. Notwithstanding the fact that a counterclaim is permissive, defendant has
a strong interest in having it asserted with the main action if initiating separate suits
would be too expensive. But see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.
1974).
262. 60 F.R.D. 5 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Accord, Lennon v. First Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 21
Ariz. App. 306, 518 P.2d 1230 (1974).
263. 60 F.R.D. at 8. The court distinguished Cotchett as encompassing a variety of
counterclaims and nonclass issues. Id.
264. 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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argued that counterclaims, valid against approximately 10 percent of the class, precluded an automatic calculation and distribution of class damages. The court thought otherwise:
The potential assertion of counterclaims against these few members of the proposed class cannot be allowed to defeat an otherwise valid class action when to do so would effectively deprive
thousands of class members of the relief to which they are entitled. 65
Aware that the defendant's legitimate interests needed protection, but hesitant to propose a bifurcated trial, as suggested in
Donson Stores, the court redefined the class
by deleting from the proposed class all those persons previously
having Bank Americard accounts with the bank whose accounts
have been charged off by the bank. . . . As to those accounts
which are presently delinquent but which have not yet been
charged off, the defendant may set off the damages owed in each
case by reducing the balance outstanding on the account by the
amount of damages due.266
F.

Damages

One of the most complex and recurring problems in administering class relief is the proof and distribution of damages. As the
Second Circuit observed in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
The fact that the cost of obtaining proofs of claims by individual members of the class and processing such claims was such
as to make it clear that the amounts payable to individual
claimants would be so low as to be negligible also should have
26 7
been enough of itself to warrant dismissal as a class action.
Thus, the potential damages before distribution must be more
than negligible; additionally, the distribution process itself must
not be so expensive as to make individual recovery de minimis.
1.

Bifurcated Trial

Separate trials are often needed to resolve common and individual questions such as reliance or, in products liability actions,
proximate cause.2 8 Narrowing the issues for class treatment per265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 59.
Id., citing J. MOoRE, supra note 18, 23.45[2], at 23-758 n.29.
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
See note 129 supra. Cf. Note, ProductsLiability Class Suit, supra note 3.
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mits a more efficient trial, perhaps even accelerating the disposition of the case. 6 If the defendant loses on the liability issue,
which is always tried first, he will probably be disposed to settle
the question of damages. 27° Additionally, the court may require
the defendant, whose liability has been determined, to fund the
" '
plaintiffs' processing of claims by way of a partial advance.27
There may also be a bifurcation of discovery between common
and individual questions. Discovery and adjudication of the common liability question may obviate the necessity of discovering
individual issues, thus saving both the court and parties much
272
wasted effort.
2.

Masters

Since the administration of class suits requires continued
overseeing, the use of masters is crucial to free court time for
other business. 23 The court retains jurisdiction after a liability
269. In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1790, at 187; MANUAL FOR ComPLEX LmGATION §
4.12 (1973). In federal courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides the basis for separate trials:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States.
In Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, the defendant tried to argue that the perfunctory method
of proving claims, determining damages separately from the common liability question,
constituted a seventh amendment violation. 333 F. Supp. at 287. The court disagreed
without any analysis except for the observation that the process resulted in no prejudice.
See also Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1973); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11,
amended, 49 F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
270. Ellison v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974), citing
Craig & Redden, Managing the Flow of Civil Cases, Report of the Conference for District
Court Judges, 59 F.R.D. 415, 466 (1973).
271. Shapiro, Processingthe Consumer's Claim, 41 ANTrrRusT L.J. 257, 266 (1972).
272. Cale v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 F.R.D. 328 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See also Pegram, Separate Trials in Patent-Antitrust and Patent-UnenforceabilityLitigation, 64
F.R.D. 185, 196-97 (1974).
273. MANUEL FOR COMPLEX LIGATION §§ 3.20-.21 (1973); Kaplan, A Prefatory Note,
10 B.C. IND. & Cohi. L. REv. 497, 499-500 (1969); Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or
Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973).
Reference to masters has been a successful device in several federal court decisions.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006
(1972); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert.
dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1963); Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1961);
Biechele v. Norfolk & West. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Herbst v. Able, 47
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determination or a common question resolution, appoints a master, and allows class members to file claims with him. This practice is quite common when detailed accountings are necessary.274
Federal Rule 53(b) permits use of masters when the computation
of damages is mechanical or when a master merely has to allocate
damages among the individual class members under an already
formulated method of computation. 5
Under the federal practice, the master's findings in nonjury
trials 21 are to be accepted by the court unless they are "clearly
erroneous," whereas a master's report to a jury 271 is merely admissible as evidence. This dual standard avoids any encroachment
on an individual's right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the seventh amendment. There is no seventh amendment violation in
the appointment of a master to
define and simplify all the issues herein; to take and report
testimony; to audit and state accounts; to make computations;
to make findings on conflicting evidence and to make and file a
report . . . [to be] admitted at the trial before the jury as
prima facie evidence of the evidentiary facts ....2
In South Carolina, master's findings seem to be given a more
conclusive effect. "When the reference is to report the facts the
report shall have the effect of a special verdict."' 5 The statute
makes no distinctions between trial by judge or by jury; the selection process of issues to be referred to a master avoids that problem. A strong argument for the substantial deference accorded to
F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
274. In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, reh. denied, 352 U.S. 1019 (1957),
the Supreme Court held that it was an abdication of judicial function to refer to a master
because of a crowded court calendar or complicated litigation. Complexity of litigation,
however, might justify relying on advice from a master. United States v. Cline, 388 F.2d
294 (4th Cir. 1968). See Note, Masters and Magistratesin the Federal Courts, 88 HARv.
L. Ray. 779, 793-96 (1975).
275. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258 (5th Cir.
1974); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 549 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Foster v. City
of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655, 669 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
276. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
277. Id. 53(e)(3).
278. Irving Trust Co. v. Trust Co. of New Jersey, 75 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1935).
279. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1412 (1962). If a party is dissatisfied with the findings, his
remedy is to make timely exceptions. White v. Livingston, 231 S.C. 301, 98 S.E.2d 534
(1957); Townes v. Alexander, 69 S.C. 23, 48 S.E. 214 (1904). The referee's verdict may be
set aside for any cause for which any verdict may be set aside. Fields v. Hurst, 20 S.C.
282 (1884).
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a master's findings is the nature of South Carolina's court system-limited terms of court and rotating circuit judges."'
A system capable of processing class recoveries must include
provisions on both consensual"' and compulsory reference:
When the parties do not consent the court may, upon application of either or its own motion, direct a reference in the following cases:
(1) In all equitable actions and of equitable issues in actions at law;
(2) When the taking of an account shall be necessary for
the information of the court, before judgment, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect; or
(3) When a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, shall arise, upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of
the action.82
Subsection (2) provides a basis for those long repetitive damage
accountings necessary in the last stages of a damage class action.m One must, however, read subsection (1) as a limitation on
subsection (2) so that reference can only be compulsory "in all
equitable actions and of equitable issues in actions at law." Such
a limitation would preclude the use of masters in a consumer
class action for damages. The union of law and equity, however,
has blurred such distinctions. For example, courts characterize
what could be construed as a traditional action at law as exhibiting features of "equitable cognizance;" that is, the action is so
involved that it would be impracticable for a jury to comprehend
and decide issues correctly.8 4 In such an action, compulsory reference is proper. Furthermore, since the origin of the class action
was in equity, it should be considered equitable for purposes of
reference. Countering that argument are those cases that look to
the type of relief requested as determinative of the propriety of
compulsory reference.m
Like the federal rule on masters, the South Carolina statutory provisions preserve jury trial rights.8 5 The express wording,
280. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1401 et seq. (1962).

281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. § 10-1401.
Id. § 10-1402.
Sumter Hardwood Co. v. Fitchette, 133 S.C. 149, 130 S.E. 881 (1925).
Id. Under FED. R. CIr. P. 53(b), a justification expressed for reference in jury

trials is the complicated nature of the trial.
285. Gore v. Skipper, 255 S.C. 18, 176 S.E.2d 569 (1970); Airfare, Inc. v. Greenville
Airport Comm'n, 249 S.C. 265, 153 S.E.2d 846 (1967).
286. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1403 (1962) provides:
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however, of section 10-1402 on compulsory reference, "in all equitable actions and of all equitable issues in actions at law," somewhat blunts the strong language of those sections. In Jones v.
Barco, Inc., s 7 the defendant's equitable counterclaim (mortgage
foreclosure) did not defeat the plaintiff's right to a jury trial on
the claim of usury. On the other hand, in McLaurin v. Hodges,"'
an action for mortgage foreclosure, the defendant's plea of usury
failed to secure a jury trial on the usury charge; legal defenses
could not defeat plaintiff's right to compulsory reference on all
issues.2s9 Since the master's findings have the effect of a special
The order of reference in an equitable action or of an equitable issue in an action
at law may be general of all issues of both law and fact, or may be so limited as
the court may direct. But this section shall not be construed so as to deprive
any party of a trial by jury of any case or issue upon which he is entitled to a
trial by jury as a matter of right under the practice in effect prior to February
7, 1928.
See also S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 25; S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1056, -1456 (1962); S.C. CIR.

CT.

R. 28, discussed in Note, Joinder of Causes of Action in South Carolina, 26 S.C.L. REV.
592, 593-99 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Joinder of Causes].
287. 250 S.C. 522, 159 S.E.2d 279 (1968).
288. 43 S.C. 187, 20 S.E. 991 (1895). See also Collier v. Green, 244 S.C. 367, 137
S.E.2d 277 (1964). The analysis in these cases is totally unsatisfactory if the South Carolina constitutional provision and statutes preserving jury trial rights are to have more than
superficial value. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See Note,
Joinder of Causes, supra note 286, at 597 n.26.
Although the court in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th
Cir. 1961), found no seventh amendment violation in submitting determinations of
damages of each class member to a special master, other courts have questioned the
feasibility of jury trials in class actions. Schaffner v. Chemical Bank, 339 F. Supp. 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Cotchett v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). But see Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Fogel
v. Wolfgang, 47 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
One way of avoiding a jury trial problem in the resolution of damage questions is to
move for summary judgment on the basis of an affidavit or other record suitable as a basis
for granting summary judgment. Heine v. Degan, 262 Ill. 357, 199 N.E. 832 (1936). 10 C.
WruGHT & A. MMLER, supra note 39, § 2714; 6 J. MOORE, supra note 18,

56.06[2].

Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467, 483 (1958). The court
might have to accept summarily each claim unless the defendant can make an objection
to the claim with some degree of substance behind it. See Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of
Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973); In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F.
Supp. 278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
289. In Jones, the courts noted that the legal counterclaim directly affected the
amount due on the mortgage and had to be tried with the equitable claim of foreclosure.
This has a ring of being "compulsory." If the federal analysis is applied, there is no jury
trial waiver when the counterclaim is asserted in the equitable action. The South Carolina
analysis, however, is inverted: if the legal counterclaim is separable from the equitable
claim, a jury trial may be granted. See Note, Joinder of Causes, supra note 286, at 59698.
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verdict and since reference may include counterclaims legal in
nature, the statutory protection of jury trials on legal issues seems
to have weakened.
3.

Proof of Claim Forms

The individual claimant will find that the useful tools of
bifurcated trials, discovery and reference, are not enough. He
still must find a convenient way to present proof to the master
or to the court. One method is to send proof of claim forms to class
members.9 9 This device in turn presents problems concerning the
collection of the forms, their verification and admissibility into
evidence. 9 '
A solution to the collection problem is to reach possible class
members through the mass media while at the same time mailing
out "responsive coupons."29' 2 After recipients return the coupon,
they receive another, more detailed proof of claim form, drafted
for computer processing.
Verification of the proof of claim forms, necessary to establish their probative value, may be accomplished by simply checking them against the defendant's own records. 9 3 When that
290. The proof of claim form is a simple statement of facts setting up a class member's claim on a furnished form. Several courts have resorted to the use of proof of claim
forms at an early stage to define the class or determine manageability questions, such as
class members' intentions to submit claims. If fraud is alleged, the form may inquire into
misrepresentations; if damages are sought, the form may ask for a statement of the
amount of damages and an intent to prove damages. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda
Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 453, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968). J. MOORE, supra note 18, 23.55, at
23-1161. C. WRIrHT & A. MILLER, supra note 39, § 1787, at 158-61.
If the class is easily defined, counsel should consider alternative means to satisfy the
court's concern, resorting to proof of claim forms in the last stage of litigation to avoid
the financial embarrassment of extra costs to those plaintiffs who lose on the merits. See
In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (disapproval of proof
of claim forms submitted early in the litigation, the purpose of which was not to evaluate
adequacy of representation or to define the community of interests).
291. Shapiro, supra note 271, at 257. See also Furth, Distributing Class Recoveries
via Computer, 3 CLAss ACTION REP. 29 (1974).
292. Shapiro, supra note 271, at 262-66.
293. Personal appearance or another form of individualized proof may be avoided
when the defendant's records supply all the information needed to support a particular
class member's recovery. E.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
The damage proof problem arose in the South Carolina case, Trowell v. Blue Cross
of South Carolina, Civ. No. 4078 (C.P., Richland County, S.C., June 8, 1971):
If the decision is that the patients are entitled to the money, then the varying
amounts of their claims is a matter for determination, which is the very reason
for an equitable accounting action. It may be observed in passing that Blue
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method is unavailable, a more complicated way of verification is
deposing a random sample of claimants to establish a low classwide error factor. 294 Additionally, the plaintiff's attorney should

elicit testimony for court use from the sample formulator and
from investigators to corroborate the finding of a low margin of
error. He should also be prepared to elicit courtroom testimony
from some of the sampled deponents themselves. Although presented with these steps of verification, the court may nevertheless
consider the claim forms themselves to be no more than affidavits
and thus inadmissible as hearsay.9 5 To overcome this problem,
the claimant may be able to invoke the hearsay exception of
"records regularly kept," if his claim incorporates the defendant's
records or those of a third party.29 The claimant may also prevail
upon the court to recognize the recently adopted Federal Rule of
a high degree of
Evidence 803(24), by which evidence having
297
probative value and necessity is admissible.

Cross argues, and its exhibits show, that they know to the penny how much
Medicare money and how much Blue Cross money was paid out on each claim.
Determining the amount of excess in each case would appear to require only one
more bookkeeping step.
Order at 6. Cf. Partain v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
294. Mathematical and statistical methods of sampling to establish characteristics
of a large universe (a class) are reliable and acceptable to determine adjudicative facts in
class actions. Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173, 1181 (1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 619, 629
(2d Cir.), af'd, 402 U.S. 157 (1972).
Before employing a statistical survey one must establish its necessity and trustworthiness. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"[N]ecessity . . . requires a comparison of the probative value of the survey with the
evidence, if any, which as a practical matter could be used if the survey were excluded."
Id. at 683. The survey must be conducted in such a way that it represents the universe it
is intended to reflect. Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, 396 F.2d 10, 27 (10th
Cir. 1966); Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 77 (1st Cir.
1958). See generally Handbook of Recommended Proceduresfor the Trial of Protracted
Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 425-30 (1960); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LMGATON §§ 2.70-.80 (1973).
But see United States v. Eighty-eight Cases, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 861 (1951) (not hearsay at all).
295. Snook v. Blank, 92 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mont. 1950). But see Heine v. Degan, 262
Ill. 359, 199 N.E. 832 (1936).
296. Transport Indem. Co. v. Degan, 262 Ill. 359, 199 N.E. 832 (1936). See also
Comment, Evidence-Admissibility of Computer Business Records as an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 48 N.C.L. REv. 687 (1970); Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1, reported in 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1-38 (1975); FED. R. Ev. 803(6).
297. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1, reported in 12A U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1-38 (1975), FED. R. Ev. 803(24):
[The court may admit a] statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
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A demonstration of the proof of claim forms' low probative

value, for example, a showing of serious discrepancies between
available records and the filed claims, will require personal appearances by all claimants-the death blow to the action. The
expansion of the proof and distribution process to include personal appearances would defeat any small claims class action and
2
reaffirm the fears expressed by the Second Circuit in Eisen. 11
4.

Uniform Statutory Recovery

Many state statutes29 9 which provide consumer remedies in
terms of an easily calculable amount can solve the biggest problem of damage class actions-the expense and difficulty of proving damages. The court may turn the statutory amount of relief
into a class award by simply multiplying it by the number of
parties affected.
State courts, however, have often thwarted damage class actions instituted under these uniform statutory recovery provisions. Some courts have decided that the individual remedies
provided under these statutes were translatable into class recovery."' Other courts have stricken class actions because of the
technical nature of the statutory violations3 1 or because of the
harshness of the gross damage award 3 2 in comparison to the minuteness of the individual damages .1 3 All of these issues have
arisen in litigation surrounding the statutory damage structure of
the Truth in Lending Act. 3 4 Thus, an analysis of the problems
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
Cf. S. RaP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1974). See also Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 1961).
298. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
299. Eg., UCCC, No. 1241 [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2879. See also New York
Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. Pas. PROP. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1962).
300. E.g., McKenna v. Standard Oil Co., 236 Ind. 370, 140 N.E.2d 512 (1957).
301. E.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
302. E.g., Rathburn v. W.T. Grant Co., 219 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1974) (in a usury
action, interest recoverable but not principal).
303. E.g., Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970).
304. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1644 (1970), as amended, Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No.
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raised in damage class actions under that Act, and the congressional response to them, should be helpful in resolving similar
problems in state courts.
The pre-1974 Truth in Lending Act, prescribing uniform
methods of disclosing interest on consumer loans, specified twice
the finance charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1000,
plus attorney's fees and court costs, as damages for statutory
disclosure violations." 5 The drafters thought that the $100 minimum, plus attorney's fees and court costs, would be sufficient to
encourage action by individually aggrieved parties. Individual
incentive to bring separate actions, however, turned out to be
insufficient incentive for creditors to comply with the Truth in
Lending Act. Unfortunately, there was no express statutory language or legislative history even mentioning Truth in Lending
class actions."0 Thus, the courts had the discretion to permit class
suits but did so only when they felt it was fair to proceed in class
form.

307

In Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 318 Judge

Frankel denied class status to a plaintiff complaining of what
could be characterized as a highly technical violation, 39 having
found that the Federal Rule 23(b)(3) suit did not meet the test
of superiority of the class device over the alternative individual
suit. The judicial fairness element was evident in the court's determination that "the proposed recovery.

. .

would be a horren-

dous, possibly annihilating punishment, unrelated to any damage
to the purported class or to any benefit to the defendant, for what
is at most a technical and debatable violation .
,,31
"...
Ratner
93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, reported in 12A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5684 (1974)
[hereinafter Truth in Lending Amendments].
305. Id. § 1640(a).
306. Note, ClassActions Under the Truth-in-LendingAct, 47 NOTRE DAAm LAWYER
1305, 1307 (1972).
307. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Actions and
the Substantive-ProcedureDilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974). See cases cited in
notes 310 and 312 infra.
308. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Note, Consumer Class Actions Under Rule
23, supra note 8,at 272-76.
309. See Note, Consumer Class Actions Under Rule 23, supra note 8, at 274.
310. 54 F.R.D. at 416. See also Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602 (N.D.
Ill.
1973). One other criticism continually raised in Truth in Lending class suits is the
notion that rule 23 as a procedural device cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. . . ," 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), and that allowing those actions somehow would
expand consumer substantive rights under the Truth in Lending Act. Handler, The Shift
From Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in Antitrust Suits, The Twenty-Third AnnualAntitrustReview, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 9 (1971). Fluid-class recovery and the concept
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should not have been construed as a denial of Truth in Lending
actions generally but as a denial of class certification when the
plaintiff could show no actual damages to the class."' The courts,
however, read Ratner broadly as precluding all class suits for
Truth in Lending violations on the assumption that the Congress
recovery, a litigation incentive,
intended the statute's minimum
312
to be an exclusive remedy.
Congress has not left Ratner as the final word on the status
of Truth in Lending class actions. In 1974, President Ford signed
into law an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act 3 which
includes a provision for the recovery of actual damages for injured
classes.314 While the amendment preserves the individual remedies, 35 it allows, as a class remedy, actual damages with no minimum per person. ' A supplemental award is available, but it is
not to exceed $100,000 or one percent of the net worth of the
of gross damages have met the same objection.
Several courts have given some credence to the "annihilating punishment"argument,
but at the same time have recognized the importance of preventing violators from limiting
liability to a few "informed and intrepid individuals." McDermott v. Hollander, 60 F.R.D.
643 (E.D. La. 1973). See also Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 205
(7th Cir. 1974); Beard v. King Appliance, 61 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Va. 1973).
311. 54 F.R.D. at 413, 416 n.7.
312. See, e.g., Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
See also Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Garza v.
Chicago Health Clubs, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 548, 549 (N.D. IIl. 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587, 593 (N.D. M1l.1972).
Such a reading of Ratner ignored the fact that Congress' silence could have been read
either way. The courts could have determined that the notion of crushing damages offsets
the concept of "legalized theft." See cases cited in note 310 supra. Several courts have
refused to follow Ratner's approach to statutory damage actions. Partain v. First Nat'l
Bank of Montgomery, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Cohen v. District of Columbia Nat'l
Bank, 59 F.R.D. 84 (D.D.C. 1973); Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
313. Truth in Lending Amendments. In 1972, the Senate had passed a similar bill,
S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Although that bill failed to receive House Committee
approval, the 1973 version, S. 2101, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was obviously more
successful. See 3 CLAss ACrION REP. 147 (1974). One commentator has described the
passage of the amendments as a reaction to Ratner and to the inadequacy of the preamendment system of individual recovery as a deterrent to creditor disclosure violations.
Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1429-30 (1974).
314. Truth in Lending Amendments cover truth in lending violations in disclosure
and billing practices and has retroactive effect unless prior to the date of enactment of
the amendments defendant's liability has been determined by final judgment and appeal
has not been taken. Id. § 407(e). Additionally, there are new prohibitions against discrimination "on the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction." Id. § 701. The civil class action penalties are specified in § 706.
315. Id. § 408(a)(1) & (2)(A), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970).
316. Id. § 408(a)(1) & (2)(B).
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creditor, whichever is lower. Incorporating a fairness test, the
amendment provides that the additional award amount is dependent on the "amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely
affected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compli' 31 8
ance was intentional.
As meritorious as the amendment's motive is, there are serious drawbacks in its approach to class recovery. If proving actual
damages were either impossible or too costly, any recovery would
be precluded, unless the claim for the supplemental award were
independent of the actual damage claim. 9 As the amendment
now reads, the award of actual damages is an important factor
in determining the appropriateness of the additional award. For
example, if the class recovers a large actual damage award representing a substantial portion of the creditor's net worth, it will be
entitled to little or nothing by way of a supplemental award. If
the plaintiff does not prove damages, the court may determine
either that a supplemental award is not justified since no one was
317. Id. § 408(a)(2)(B) provides:
[I]n the case of a class action, such amount as the court may allow, except that

as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be applicable, and
the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the lesser of $100,000
or one percentum of the net worth of the creditor ....
318. Id. § 408(a).
319. The plaintiff may wish to avoid the proof problems in determining actual damages and attempt to recover only the supplemental award. One way to reach this result is
to have the court define the class as only those individuals who do not suffer and would
not attempt to assert actual damages.
Alternatively, the plaintiff may simply waive his actual damages so that he may sue
directly on the claim for a supplemental award. Waiver of actual damages, by opting in
by silence, is of questionable merit since a plaintiff who does so loses his right to prove
actual damages whether or not the representative plaintiff is successful on the statutory
supplemental claim. Thus, the alternative of waiving actual damages would impose an
extraordinarily heavy notice burden on the plaintiff.
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972), which involved
a waiver of statutory damages, illustrates the problem with the latter alternative. The
bank's failure to send credit card holders a monthly statement resulted in the imposition
of an additional month's interest on over 170,000 card holders. Judge McMillan certified
the class on superiority findings after the plaintiff amended his complaint to sue for only
actual damages. The court avoided the question of whether a named plaintiff could waive
the minimum damages for members of the class by its defining the class as only those
who would waive minimum damages. The court, however, merely postponed the waiver
question as plaintiff would eventually have to determine some method of securing waiver
of statutory remedies.
Both alternatives may also raise a problem with the splitting of causes of action. See
Note, Joinder of Causes, supra note 286, at 591. See also Note, Products Liability Class
Suit, supra note 3, at 244 n.55.
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harmed, or that a large award is in order if the violation was clear
and intentional, notwithstanding an inability to prove actual
damages. It is apparent that the factors involved in the supplemental award and actual damage determinations, the weight of
which are left to the discretion of the court, further complicate
Truth in Lending class actions without necessarily alleviating the
32
original difficulty in bringing and resolving disclosure actions. 1
One commentator has suggested that the individual liquidated damage structure should govern in class actions instead of
the actual damage structure or the complex balancing of the
Act.3" ' The finance charge, as the basic measure of damages presently used in section 1640(a), 322 would be retained with the quali-

fication that recovery could not exceed the lesser of $100,000 or
one percent of the creditor's net worth. If twice the finance charge
did exceed a sum greater than $100,000 or one percent of the
creditor's net worth, there would be a pro rata reduction to meet
the award limitations.3 23 The merits of this approach are obvious.

Early determinations of the superiority of the class suit and of the
damages will enable the court at a very early stage to balance the
administrative costs against the distributable individual shares
of the class claim. Moreover, the approach encourages early settlement of moderate size claims. On the other hand, a defendant
confronted with a large class unable to prove actual damages may
not be willing to settle in light of the limitation of his liability to
the lesser of $100,000 or one percent of his net worth. Also, in
viewing such a situation, the court may decide that the potential
costs of distribution to the large number of class members forecloses a plaintiff's recovery. 24 Thus, the more widespread the
320. See Note, Truth in Lending ClassActions, supra note 313, at 1431. Distribution
of the supplemental award presents additional j roblems not soundly considered in the
bill: (1) Who recovers; those who prove actual damages or all members of the affected
class? (2) How much is received; a proportionate share or a share reflecting one's proven
actual damages? (3) How are the distribution costs spread; are they shared equally or in
proportion to the actual damage award? It should be noted that if they are equally shared,
costs for distribution may preclude certain small claims.
321. Note, Truth in Lending Class Actions, supra note 313, at 1432-33.
322. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
323. Note, Truth in Lending Class Actions, supra note 313, at 1431-32 n.148.
324. De minimis injury, however, would not seem to be a legitimate defense to Truth
in Lending Class Actions, in light of the 1974 amendments. See Truth in Lending
Amendments § 408(a)(2)(B), set out in note 317 supra. On the other hand, to circumvent
the language of § 408(a)(2)(B), the defendant may argue that administration costs of
damage distribution will outweigh any recovery.
To counter this argument, plaintiff might attempt to shift some of the administrative
costs, such as those incurred in sending out notice, to the defendant as an additional "cost
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disclosure violation, regardless of the maliciousness or the extent
of the actual damages suffered but not provable, the more likely
the defendant will escape liability in a private damage suit. 25
The new structure of the Truth in Lending Act may convince
state courts to reexamine their prior positions. This should be
especially true in those jurisdictions which have recently adopted
comprehensive statutory schemes for close scrutiny of credit practices.32 The class action may be an ideal implement for enforcement of the new statutory prohibitions against credit abuses.
Even when the state statutory structure does not explicitly provide for class relief, the courts might employ the same type of
balancing process specified in the recently amended Truth in
Lending Act.
5. Gross Damages
If the injured class is extensive, the plaintiff will make large
outlays in reaching injured parties whose response is not at all
predictable. Without an assurance for reimbursement of the initial costs, no plaintiff, even one with a successful judgment on the
merits, will be willing to subsidize costs of damage distribution. 2 '
One solution to this problem is to tax the losing party with attorney's fees and court costs, as well as with the expenses of sending
proof of claim forms. The drawback to this carte blanche approach is the difficulty in finding a legitimate limit to the charges
imposed on the losing defendant.
An alternative approach is to determine a gross damage computation on the basis of available records, subtract distribution
of the action" not deductible from the class award. Id. § 408(a)(3). Cf. Polston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 18 F. Serv. 2d 1032 (W.D. Ky. 1974). A court does not abuse its
discretion in awarding litigation costs that exceed the amount of the individual damages
recovered. Advance Business Sys. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 70 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
325. Since an early determination may avoid an initial mailing to the class that
would inform members of substantive disclosure violations and of their rights to participate, opt out or actively intervene in the action, very few individual class members would
be aware of or choose the alternative individual action. Thus, an early determination may
very well frustrate the policies of the Truth in Lending Act.
326. No. 1241 [1974] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2879.
327. At one time, it was thought that a government entity, as a monied plaintiff,
could bring the action on behalf of its injured consumer citizens. Comment, Wrongs
Without Remedies: The Concept of ParensPatriaeSuits for TrebleDamamges Under the
AntitrustLaws, 43 S.CAL.L. REv. 570 (1970). The Supreme Court, however, has held that
the government can only represent the class if it has an interest independent of its citizens.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), aff'g 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970).
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costs on a pro rata basis, and begin processing individual
claims.3 28 As the court observed in the Antibiotics Antitrust
Actions, 32 "[i]t is far simpler to prove the amount of damage to
the members of the class by establishing their total damages than
by collecting and aggregating individual damage claims as a sum
to be assessed against the defendants. 33 In jurisdictions with a
sophisticated common fund theory, the concept of gross damages
is not at all foreign. 331 The fund is held by the defendant, but once
his liability is determined, his interest in the fund is limited to
an adequate assurance of the integrity of the distribution process.
If class members do not receive their rightful shares, the defendant should bear no liability provided he convinces the court of
a fairly administered distribution process. In jurisdictions where
the common fund rationale is undeveloped, however, the gross
damage concept may be totally unacceptable. The Second Circuit's opinion in Eisen is perhaps the strongest criticism of the
gross damage concept. The court noted that
[s]ection 4 of the Clayton Act . .. authorized the private
triple-damage antitrust suit to recover damages by a person who
has been "injured in his business or property" by reason of a
violation of the antitrust laws. That the claims of many may not
be treated collectively or as "the class as a whole" is what the
Supreme Court decided in Snyder v. Harris .... 3
328. If gross damages are determined by reference, the computation need not reach
perfection, especially in antitrust litigation.
[P]recise computation of damages can rarely be derived from the complexities
of antitrust litigation .... Therefore, if there was evidence presented to the
master from which he might reasonably infer an amount of damage, then the
jury will be permitted to hear his conclusions ....
Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 50 F.R.D. 140, 143-44 (D. Mass.
1970). See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946): "Where the tort
itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with
certainty. . . [t]he risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead
of upon the injured." Cf. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 563 (1931).
329. In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
330. Id. at 287.
331. Under the old federal rule, the gross damage award was held improper since
members of a spurious class were required to intervene in order to take advantage of
the class judgment. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 257 F.2d 479 (5th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959). Under the 1966 amendments, however, a gross
damage award, based on a class-wide average damage formula, may be appropriate.
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Ellison v. Rock Hill
Printing & Finishing Co., 64 F.R.D. 415 (D.S.C. 1974).
332. 479 F.2d at 1014.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4

82

et al.: State Class Actions

1975]

STATE CLASS ACTIONS

In other words, the "class" is a procedural device and not a legal
entity which can receive damages.33 Nevertheless, without a
gross damage award, even those who could and would want to
prove their loss may be able to do so only if there is an amount
set aside to defray distribution expenses.
6. Fluid-ClassRecovery
The concept of gross damages is only part of a formula for
reaching the passive members of a small class of claimants. In the
typical small claim class action, a residual unclaimed fund will
remain at the end of a specified distribution period. A return of
the residual fund to the defendant would negate the deterrent
effect of the action. The better solution is to adopt some form of
fluid-class recovery-a distribution process that benefits a sub3
stantial number of the original class.

3

As many of the original class as possible should participate
in the fluid-class recovery. Thus, an analysis of the parameters
of the affected class-the market, the geographic area, or the
recurring activity-will determine the propriety of the recovery.
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 3 35 an underlying assumption in the

court-approved settlement may have been the notion that a significant number of cab users were still residing in the Los Angeles
area to take advantage of the fare reduction. Using a similar
analysis, Judge Augelli in Philadelphia v. American Oil Co."'
333. Handler, supra note 310, at 20. But see Puerto Rico Legislature, Act 110, Laws
1973, S. 45 (effective June, 1973), discussed at text accompanying note 143 supra. The
statute would seem to suggest the concept of "conditional escheat." West Virginia v.
Charles P. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Comment, Damage Distributionin Class Actions: The
Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 448 (1972). See also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 64, tit.
A, § 2203d-4.0 (1969). Note, New York City's Alternative to the Consumer ClassAction:
The Government as Robin Hood, 9 HARV. J. LEGIs. 301 (1972). Cf. CLAss ACTMON MANUAL
§ 428.4, Appendix E infra.
334. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Minnesota, CCH UTIL. L. RE.
22,057 (Minn.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (rate refunds); In re General Tel. Co. of the Midwest, 3 P.U.R. 4th 113
(Iowa Commerce Comm'n 1974) (amounts credited to customers); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (lowering the odd-lot differential for a specific
period); West Virginia v. Charles P. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (settlement, spent for the benefit of citizens of state in manner
the court directs); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1967) (settlement, lower cab fare); Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) (lower bus fare); Market St. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875 (1946) (money to go to city for improvement of
railroad facilities).
335. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
336. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
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held that a consumer class action alleging price fixing was improper, although he allowed similar actions on the part of bulk tank
purchasers and government entities. Certification of the consumer class action was improper, argued the court, because nonclass members would receive windfalls while some of the original
highly mobile class of gasoline purchasers would go uncompensated.3 '
Just as it criticized the concept of gross damages, the Second
Circuit in Eisen looked askance at the device of fluid-class recovery, holding that it somehow altered substantive law in violation
of due process of law and the Rules Enabling Act.338 As long as
there is a high correlation between the damaged class and the
class that recovers, however, the argument of substantive change
is ill-founded.33
Despite its deficiencies, fluid-class recovery may be the only
way for an injured class to receive any damages, especially when
administrative costs and difficulties overshadow any individual
recovery. As pointed out above, the device more than adequately
serves the deterrent function of the class suit."' Moreover, a comparison of fluid-class recovery with injunctive relief more than
counters the criticism that the former benefits those beyond the
injured class. Where the defendant is successfully enjoined from
continuing some past activity in a class or a nonrepresentative
suit, some class members may never benefit from the injunction;
others may benefit many times over; and still other nonclass
members may take advantage of the injunction.
V.

CONCLUSION

Soon after the 1966 amendment of the federal class action
statute, a flurry of suits tested the new remedy. Although initial
judicial response was favorable, the federal court reaction must
now be described as mixed-from outright hostility34 ' to guarded
acceptance. 2 State court reaction, however, is more difficult to
337. Id. at 72. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir.
1973).
338. 479 F.2d at 1018. See also In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974);
Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940). The Supreme Court in Eisen did not reach
the propriety of the fluid-class recovery. 417 U.S. at 172 n.10.
339. Jacoby & Cherkasky, The Effects of Eisen IV and Proposed Amendments of
Federal Rule 23, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 22 (1974).
340. See text accompanying note 334 supra.
341. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
342. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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describe, perhaps because that reaction stems from fears of the
unknown, resulting from the insufficient exposure of those courts
to class actions.
One major failing of South Carolina decisional law is a propensity to couch class suit analysis in terms of vague jural relationships among members of the class. Class actions are permitted when rights can be conceptualized as "common" or "jointly"
held by the class and denied when rights are viewed as "separate"
or "distinctly" held.343
At least when not subverted by statute, the words "joint" and
"common" perhaps still have some firm meaning as applied to
real and personal property, connoting undivided interests in the

same thing with varying rights of survivorship, severance, and
the like. "Several" perhaps still has a useful meaning as descriptive of exclusive rights in a particular or severed piece of real or
personal property. But apart from these cores of possible intelligibility, the terms "joint," "common," and "several" have little
or no clear and ascertainable
meaning in or out of the context
3 44
of class actions.

Such dubious characterizations are not limited to the old
South Carolina cases. In an unpublished 1968 Florence county
case, Howell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,3 41 the plaintiff class repre-

sentative alleged that the Sears revolving charge account was
usurious. 3 4 Demurring to the complaint's averment "that the

plaintiffs all have a joint and common interest," defendant discussed the South Carolina cases in terms of whether plaintiffs
were "united in interest" or had "common" interests in the relief
demanded.

47

Thus, the battleground of the demurrer centered on

the nature of the rights asserted by the plaintiff class rather than
on practical considerations making the class suit a superior alternative to individual suits by members of the class. In sustaining
the demurrer, Judge Grimball observed that "[i]t would be improper [to require] this class of people to come in who possibly
do not desire to get involved in a usury suit.

34

Thus, the court

343. Whitaker v. Manson, 84 S.C. 29, 65 S.E. 953 (1909); Faber v. Faber, 76 S.C. 156,
56 S.E. 677 (1907). See notes 16-17 and text accompanying note 20 supra.
344. Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 16, at 380.
345. (C.P., Florence County, S.C., April 10, 1968).
346. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-5 (1962), §§ 10.3-122, 10.9-201 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
347. Defendant's Brief at 1, 3, Howell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (C.P., Florence
County, S.C., April 10, 1968).
348. Order at 1-2.
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seemed to show concern for an individual party's controlling the
remedies for his own grievances-a classical concept of aggrieved
party control." 9 If, however, the court was concerned about potential conflicts of interest in remedies, it could have either tentatively certified the class, or reserved decision on the demurrer,
sent out notices, and then discovered whether there were real
conflicts. Even if the court discovered conflicts, it might have
excluded disagreeing class members from the class or divided the
larger class into subclasses. Denying class status at an early stage
of litigation on the basis of potential and possibly nonexistent
conflicts simply paid homage to procedural phantoms.5 0 Nonappearing class members might have been content with proceeding
in a single class suit, and absent evidence to the contrary or
management problems, the class"suit should have been allowed
to continue.
If the Howell court was not overly concerned with either jural
relationships or procedural deficiencies, perhaps its refusal to
grant class status is attributable to high administrative costs and
other burdens associated with the processing of damage distributions which have frequently overwhelmed the virtues of the class
device." ' Faced with the choice of letting wrongdoers retain fruits
of illegal conduct or of venturing into the problematic areas of
class litigation, courts have, all too often, chosen to avoid the
problems. They have marked such suits as insatiable "Frankenstein monsters" 3 52-as a form of "legalized blackmail," 3 3 entailing a questionable amount of judicial efficiency, encouraging litigation where none previously existed, and only benefitting the
attorneys bringing the suit.
349. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. If there were any problem in Howell
of including in the action those who did not wish to become involved, the court could have
used several mechanisms to solve it: (1) an opt-out procedure similar to the one provided
in FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A); (2) intervention and active participation in the suit, as
under FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2)(C); (3) redefinition of the class to exclude disagreeing class
members, as under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(4); (4) division into subclasses to preserve
differences in the larger class that many plaintiffs may have or to preserve defenses which
the defendant may have against segments of the larger class. (FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (4) (B)).
See notes 205-09 and accompanying text supra.
350. This is not to deny that at times procedural problems, due process violations,
may be very real. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co., 19 Ill.
App. 3d 752, 312 N.E.2d 753 (1974).

351. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1017 (2d Cir. 1973).
352. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 553, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting).

353. Handler, supra note 310, at 9.
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There is another view of class actions, which is perhaps more
consistent with the historical policies of equity-that group
wrongs are not to be suffered without remedies and that all parties interested in the subject of the suit ought to be before the
court. 54 This view also recognizes the class action as an effective
method to counteract the basic shortcomings of our adversary
system. The adversary system as it is presently structured works
well as long as opponents are equally matched in economic resources, legal skills, and investigative opportunities. It breaks
down if these essential conditions are missing. Class actions,
therefore, serve as a legal aid device for the benefit of similarly
situated small claimants who can only succeed by marshalling
their combined strength.
There is no new, exciting rationale for the class action, other
than "the equitable doctrine of virtual representation which rests
upon considerations of necessity and paramount convenience and
which was adopted to prevent a failure of justice. '35 5 Nor is there
anything in the Field Code which prohibits liberal certification,
as California's experience demonstrates. If South Carolina courts
find themselves on shaky ground in consumer actions, the federal
experience can offer valuable suggestions. Curiously, no South
Carolina class action decision to date even alludes to the existence of the federal treatment under amended rule 23. If class
actions are not that revolutionary in spirit, but are expressive of
a valid contemporary approach to group wrong, perhaps South
Carolina courts should take a longer look at consumer class actions and attempt to overcome manageability problems in administering group relief. "[I]magination and even daring may be
required of counsel and courts in devising abbreviated but fair
procedures leading to hand-tailored relief which may well be
'35
quite novel in form. 6
354. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 157-58; J. MOORE, supra note 18, 23.02, at
23-3411; J. STORY, supra note 10, at 77.
355. Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. 612, 629, 194 P. 1040, 1048 (1921). Similar policies
are expressed in South Carolina class actions. Caine v. Griffin, 232 S.C. 562, 103 S.E.2d
37 (1958); Faber v. Faber, 76 S.C. 156, 56 S.E. 677 (1907).
356. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, supra note 10, at 499-500.
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Appendix A
The plaintiffs in Quelch v. Union Mortgage Co.157 attacked a
particular practice of the defendant loan company: charging excessive penalties for late payments and applying payments to the
late charges before applying them to the outstanding balance. Of
particular importance in this complaint are the well-drafted class
allegations setting out the common interests of fact and law uniting the class. 58
Quelch was subsequently settled in November 1973 for
$544,000 plus 12,000 "certificates for reduction" of loan charges
of an undetermined value. 59
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
TERENCE G. QUELCH, et. al)

No. C 6808

)

Plaintiffs,)

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

VS.

)
)
)
Defendants. )

UNION MORTGAGE CO.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
) (5)

To Declare a penalty void
Declaratory Relief
Injunctive Relief
Reformation and
For Money

Plaintiffs, in behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, for cause of action against defendants and each of them,
allege as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(to declare penalty void)
I
Defendants DOES I through XX, inclusive and CORPORATIONS I through XX, inclusive, are so fictitiously named that
plaintiffs are not aware of their true names and capacities and
plaintiffs upon such lack of information and belief have so named
them. The said fictitiously named defendants are predecessors,
357. This case should be viewed as part of the aftermath of Vasquez v. Superior
Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). See notes 124-31 and accompanying text supra.See also Appendix B infra.
358. See also Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 62 Cal. 2d 695, 701 n.5, 433 P.2d 732, 737 n.5,
63 Cal. Rptr. 724,729 n.5 (1967). See generally notes 100-17 and accompanying text supra.
359. Correspondence with David Daar, November 12, 1974.
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affiliates, alter egos and subsidiary organizations of the other
defendants, and each other. That upon ascertaining their true
names and capacities plaintiffs will seek leave of court to amend
this complaint to state them.
II
Defendant UNION MORTGAGE CO. is a corporation authorized to do business in, and doing business in, the State of
California and doing business under the fictitious name UNION
HOME LOANS.

That Defendants engage in the business of arranging loans
on real property for members of the general public. That defendants advertise and in other ways generally make known to the
public that their services are available to obtain financing on real
property.
IV
That defendants generally engage in the business of arranging second trust deed loans upon real property.
V
That during the-period of four years last past, the defendants
used a common practice and procedure in arranging mortgage
financing for its customers. That a regularly utilized part of said
procedure was the defendant's use of a prepared printed document which would be presented to the borrower. The borrower
was required to execute said printed form, which was an agreement as to the wording that would be used in the promissory note
to be executed as part of the loan transaction being arranged by
defendants.
VI
That said preprinted form provided in part that:
"I promise to pay to your servicing agent his reasonable
expenses incurred by him on any delinquencies in the form of a
late charge for each installment more than five days in arrears
in an amount equal to one percent of the original amount of this
note, but no late charge on any one installment in arrears may
of forty-five dollars."
in excess1975
accrued
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That documents containing such language were used in all
transactions of such type entered into through the defendants.
VII
That said provisions were contained in the fine print of the
body of said preprinted form, and the borrowers had no choice in
the negotiations on this provision and the provision was part of a
contract of adhesion.
VIII
That after the said preprinted agreement was entered into a
trust deed and promissory note was drawn by defendants substantially conforming to the aforesaid provision, and the
mortgagors-borrowers were presented with and did execute promissory notes containing such a provision.
Ix
That the lenders designated defendant UNION MORTGAGE CORPORATION as collector and said Defendant designated defendant WESTERN COMPUTER SERVICES as the
entity to collect the payments from the mortgagors-borrowers and
all payments were made to them.
X
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that defendants WESTERN COMPUTER SERVICES, DOE I and CORPORATION I
are affiliated companies, or subsidiary companies of the other
defendants, and are controlled by said defendants.
XI
That defendants through said collecting companies on a regular basis, generally monthly, billed the mortgagors-borrowers for
payments due on said promissory notes. That the billing procedure established by defendants set out the amount of the monthly
payment due according to the monthly payments called for in the
promissory notes executed for each loan.
XII
That whenever a payment was made late, a late charge was
assessed upon the books of the defendants, by the defendants, in
accordance with the foregoing provision of the preprinted form.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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XmI

That defendants, whenever a late charge could be assessed
against a borrower, so assessed the said borrower and applied any
payment made to the late charge, and then the remaining balance was applied to the payment then due on the note, and defendants accumulated the unpaid portions due on the notes, and
thus the principle amounts of the notes were not reduced in the
full amount by which the payment would ordinarily be credited
against the principle of the notes.
XIV
On or about March 13, 1969, plaintiffs QUELCH executed a
preprinted form concerning such a promissory note in the County
of Los Angeles, State of California, for $4,600.00 with interest
thereon at the rate of 5/6ths of 1%, payable in the County of Los
Angeles. A copy of said preprinted form regarding said note is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. Thereafter a promissory note in such terms was executed by
plaintiffs.
XV
Thereafter during the year 1969 plaintiffs QUELCH also executed a deed of trust as security for the payment of the aforesaid
promissory note.
XVI
Thereafter plaintiffs QUELCH failed to pay some of the installment payments specified in the promissory note they executed within five days of the due date of such installment payments, as did others in the class of plaintiffs before this Court,
as a result of which defendants assessed and collected, by virtue
of terms of the aforesaid Contested Clause a "late charge" in an
amount not over $45.00 and equal to 1% of the face amount of the
promissory note involved.
XVII
Plaintiffs QUELCH failed to pay eighteen promissory note
installments within 5 days of the due dates of said installment
payments, as did others in the class of plaintiffs before this Court,
as a result of which defendants assessed and collected, by virtue
of the terms of the Contested Clause such late charges in the
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amount of $45.00 per late charge, and said late charges accrued
in an amount of approximately $800.00, and the payments being
made by plaintiffs QUELCH upon their note were first applied
to said late charges and plaintiffs QUELCH have paid approximately twenty seven (27) payments of $85.00 each for a total of
$2,295.00 on their original $4,600.00 loan, and according to defendants record because of the application of said late charges, the
principal balance of the plaintiffs QUELCH principal account is
now $4,533 and there therefore has been only $64.95 in principal
paid after in excess of two years of payment and having paid in
$2,295.00.
XVIII
That plaintiffs are informed and believe, and so allege, that
the defendants servicing the loans have reasonable expenses in
connection with an installment which is more than five days in
arrears; that said reasonable expense is in no way related to the
original amount of the note, and in any event the amount of such
reasonable expenses in connection with any particular loan are on
a small fraction of the amount designated under the late charge
formula set out in the aforesaid contested clause in the promissory notes.
XIX
That defendants established the formula for late charges set
forth in said contested clause with knowledge that their reasonable expenses of collection were far less than the formula for late
charges would produce, and said late charge formula in fact produces substantial profits for them, rather than merely serving as
a device to reimburse the defendants for their reasonable expense
incurred for any delinquent payment.
XX
That the aforesaid late charges do not reflect defendant's
actual cost or reasonable expenses in policing and servicing delinquent payments, but were fixed arbitrarily without reference to
the actual costs or reasonable expenses thereof, and said late
charges are illegal and void and are a penalty in violation of
Section 1670 of the Civil Code.
XXI
Each member of plaintiffs' class is a person who within four
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years last past executed a preprinted form of promissory note
supplied by defendants containing the contested clause referred
to heretofore, whereby late charges were set at a formula which
would produce substantial sums in excess of the reasonable expense defendants actually incurred in servicing such delinquent
accounts.
XXII
Plaintiffs within four years last entered into such a transaction as aforesaid and were actually harmed by said transaction
as has been heretofore described. Plaintiffs, representatives of the
class herein, were residents of Los Angeles County at the time the
rights under the claim in this action accrued, and sue in behalf
of themselves and all other persons similarly situated in the State
of California, who like themselves, were customers of defendants,
and who entered into such agreements containing the contested
clause and who were damaged thereby by having been charged
such excessive late charges, or who have had such charges assessed against their accounts, or who in the future may have their
accounts so charged with such excessive late charges.
XXHI
Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all
other persons similarly situated in that it is not generally economically feasible for plaintiffs and the members of plaintiffs class to
each file a separate action in their particular case. As to those
members of the class who have paid monies which were charged
by defendants as herein described, the relative amounts due to
each member of the class are generally small as to each individual
member of the class in that in the vast majority of cases the sum
owing to a particular class member is less than the value of the
time required to be expended in filing an action with this court,
trying the case to judgment, and enforcing and collecting such
sum, and that as to those who may be charged said excessive
amounts in the future, the expense is clearly economically unfeasible, in that they may not be charged more than one such payment, and as to all the question is of common and general interest, and as to many members their right to maintain an action is
unknown.
XXIV
Were each of the members of plaintiffs' class to file a sepa-
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rate action on their case with the clerk of this honorable court,
there would be thousands upon thousands of such actions to be
filed and the court would be flooded with thousands of such documents, when in fact the act of filing such documents would be
unnecessarily burdensome upon the court as well as the individual members of the class, and would be wholly unreasonable and
economically unfeasible under the circumstances of this particular case, in that the amount that is due and owing to each member of the class is based upon the same common facts and law,
to wit, that the defendants have entered into an agreement with
each class member which is subject to identical legal impediment, and have actually or threaten to impose excessive and
unlawful late charges against the class members by virtue of said
contested clause.
XXV
The defendants herein have been pursuing this policy of
charging such late charges on accounts of customers with said
defendants for a substantial number of years, and they continue
to do so to the present date. This policy has been pursued with
the knowledge that the members of plaintiffs class will not, and
cannot pursue these sums due them because of the economic and
practical unfeasibility of pursuing their individual, relatively
small sums due them as aforesaid, and as to others the claim is
unknown. Under the circumstances as they now exist the defendants can be made to cease their policy and practice of withholding these sums if this court will provide the members of this class
with a practical and economically feasible remedy, to wit, to
permit them to enter their judgment as a class and by therein
conducting one single audit of the defendants' books and records,
under the supervision of this court, for the purpose of determining
the exact sum which will be entered as judgment for plaintiffs
and the class.
XXVI
The common interests of fact and law that unite plaintiffs
and all members of the class in whose behalf this action is instituted are:
1) That the members of the class for whom this action is
maintained exceed one thousand persons and they are so numerous that it is impractical to bring them all into this action individually, as parties hereto.
2) That proof of a common or single state of facts and law
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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will establish the right of each member of the class to a remedy
for the improper late charges extracted, or threatened to be extracted, from them.
3) Each member of the plaintiffs' class is a person who has
signed a preprinted form or promissory note which contained the
contested late charge clause or one substantially similar thereto.
4) Each member of plaintiffs' class has paid such late
charges, or had them assessed against their account, or have accounts which may in the future be so charged.
5) Each member of plaintiffs' class has not yet filed their
own individual action to recover on said claim.
6) Each member of plaintiffs' class has a present right to
file such an action.
7) Each individual member of the plaintiffs' class is known
to the defendants in that they have maintained detailed records
of the names and residence addresses of each person who maintains an account with them.
8) Each individual member of plaintiffs class is known and
their identity and residence address can be determined by examination of defendants' records.
9) The sums extracted by defendants were uniform as to all
members of the class, in that the percentage formula set for said
late charges was uniform, and provided for by one policy determination made by defendants as to what would be the late charge
on delinquent payment on such accounts.
10) That in all instances the late charges originally extracted from, or threatened to be so extracted from each class
member was in an amount wholly in excess of the reasonable
expenses of defendants for such purposes.
11) That each member of plaintiffs' class has sustained, or
is threatened with suffering, a common damage by reason of the
common, identical and uniform policy and practice adopted by
the defendants, to wit, the consistent charging of late charges
upon their accounts in excess of the reasonable expenses of the
servicing agent.
XXVII
By virtue of the aforesaid illegal charges, defendants have
been unjustly enriched in a sum in excess of $250,000.00.
XXVII
For plaintiffs and their class there is no plain, speedy, nor
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adequate remedy other than the maintenance of this representative class action; that there would be a failure of justice but for
the maintenance of this class action. But for the maintenance of
this class action, the aforesaid failure of justice could continue
into the indefinite future with the defendants continuing to violate the law. It is necessary and proper to employ attorneys to
prosecute the within action for and on behalf of plaintiffs and
those members of the class for whom this action is maintained;
that attorneys representing plaintiffs and their class in this action
are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, and plaintiffs request
that the court determine such amounts which are reasonable as
and for such attorneys' fees to be paid to them from any sums
awarded to, and recovered by, plaintiffs and their class, and that
said attorneys have a lien for their fees against such sums.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
I
Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference the allegations of
the First Cause of Action, Paragraphs I through X, XXI to
XXVIII.
II
There exists a controversy between the plaintiffs and the
defendants which reasonably requires a judicial declaration of the
rights and liabilities of the parties and calls for the proper exercise of this court's declaratory judgment.

Plaintiffs contend:
1. That the said promissory note and preprinted form containing the contested clause are contracts of adhesion.
2. That said late charge formula produces sums wholly in
excess of the reasonable expenses of servicing said delinquencies
on said accounts and notes.
3. That the imposition of said late charges is a penalty and
forfeiture.
4. That said contested clause is not enforceable against the
plaintiffs and their class.
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IV

Defendants contend:
1. That the provisions aforesaid are valid and enforceable.
2. That defendants may lawfully and legally impose such
late charges.
V
Plaintiffs deny defendants' contentions and defendants deny
plaintiffs' contentions.
VI
That a justiciable controversy exists between plaintiffs and
defendants as aforesaid as to which a declaratory judgment of this
court may properly be rendered to resolve the controversy between the parties and in order to permit the parties to properly
conduct their affairs in the future in this matter.
THIRD CA USE OFACTION
(Injunction)
I
Plaintiffs repeat and reallege and incorporate by this reference the First Cause of Action Paragraphs I thru XIX, XXI to
XXII.
]I

That in all events the class members are required to clear any
claimed balance on said note at the due date.
'I
That plaintiffs QUELCH and all members of the class are
required to pay off the entire balance of their account on said due
dates, which balances are materially effected by the excessive
late charges. That plaintiffs QUELCH have a balloon payment
which, but for late charges, would have left a balloon payment of
approximately $2,780.00 to be paid at maturity of said note. That
said note is due on the 37th month following March 13, 1969, thus
said note is due in approximately April of 1972. That plaintiffs
are informed and believe that other members of the class have
notes maturing day to day, and are being required to pay their
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balances when due, which balances have been inflated due to the
excessive late charges levied against their accounts.
IV
That unless defendants are enjoined from assessing said late
charges, and maintaining and applying such charges against the
aforesaid loan accounts, the defendants will collect said excessive
late charges by virtue of the unequal and superior position they
hold, and since they are in control of the trust deed notes and
there is a power of sale that is contained in each of said trust
deeds, and that such power of sale can be threatened to be exercised in the event said notes are not paid off.

V
That plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and injunctive relief is reasonably required to work justice between the parties; that unless such relief is afforded irreparable harm will result
to plaintiffs, and the relief requested in this action may be frustrated, and any judgment this court might enter in favor of the
plaintiffs would be rendered meaningless.
VI
That no undue hardship would result to defendants if such
injunctive relief were granted pending the outcome of this action
and permanently thereafter.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Reformation of Instrument)
I
Plaintiffs repeat and reallege and incorporate by this reference the First Cause of Action paragraphs I through XXVIII.
II
That the contested clause of said promissory notes provides
in pertinent part that the borrowers would pay to the servicing
agent, ".

.

. his reasonable expenses incurred by him on any

delinquencies in the form of a late charge for each installment
more than five days in arrears in an amount equal to one percent
of the original amount of this note. .
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That the plaintiffs, and the members of the class, were entitled to rely on the fact that such a charge was the equivalent of
the reasonable expenses incurred upon such a delinquency, and
there was a mistake on the part of the plaintiffs and the members
of the class, which defendants knew or suspected, or should have
so known or suspected, at the time said notes were executed, and
the said written agreement did not fully and truly express the
intention and meaning of said parties as to said clause.
IV
By reason of the mistake of the plaintiffs, said instruments
must be changed in order to express the intent of the parties by
inserting the true amount that represents the reasonable expenses
of the servicing agent upon such a delinquency.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Money)
I
Plaintiffs repeat and reallege herein paragraphs I through
XXVII of the First Cause of Action as if fully set forth herein.
II
That within four years last past defendants became indebted
to plaintiffs and their class in a sum in excess of $250,000.00 for
money had and received for the use and benefit of plaintiffs and
their class, no part of which has been paid.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray judgment for themselves, and
for all persons similarly situated, and that said judgment be entered against the defendants and each of them as follows:
1. That the Court enter its declaratory judgment declaring
the rights and privileges of the parties under the circumstances
and resolving the controversy based upon the aforesaid contentions of the parties;
2. That the Court enter its judgment determining the contested clause to be void as a penalty;
3. That the Court adjudge that Plaintiffs, in behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, as described
in this complaint, are members of the same class and have the
right to enter a single judgment in this action against the defenPublished by Scholar Commons, 1975
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dants and in favor of plaintiffs and their class, ordering the defendants to pay the sum of excessive late charges collected by defendants from the members of the class, based upon the unlawful
late charge provision;
4. That the Court reform the many promissory notes execute [sic] containing such clause to represent the reasonable
expectations of the plaintiffs and the class;
5. That a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction
issue;
6. For damages in the sum of the excessive late charges as
computed under an accounting;
7. For costs of suit and such other relief as seems just.
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID DAAR
By:
DAVID DAAR
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Appendix B
In Jensen v. United Insurance Co. of America, the trial court
allowed a plaintiff to represent a class of California residents who
purchased policies which were not the "lifetime disability insur3 60
ance" as advertised.
The accepted notice of settlement, however, broadened the
class to include approximately 80,000 policyholders in 14 western states. Over 3,500 have applied for the "guaranteed renewable insurance" at reduced rates, and at least 500 of the 5,000
qualified participants are expected to claim their share of the
$1,000,000 settlement fund. The most significant aspect of the
relief secured was the notice to nearly 40,000 existing policyholders that they did not have the type of insurance originally advertised. 61
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)

BERTE M. JENSEN, et al

)

)

NO. 976740

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

vs.

COMPLAINT
FOR
CONSUMER

FRAUD
UNITED INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA

)
)
)

)

(Class Action)

)

Defendants.

)

Plaintiffs allege:
THE DEFENDANTS
I
Defendant UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, is an Illinois corporation, with its principal office in Chicago,
360. Cf. Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 65 Wis. 2d 153, 222 N.W.2d 156 (1974).
361. Correspondence with Zad Leavy, November 11, 1974.
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and has been qualified to conduct business in California since
1946; its principal place of business in California is in the County
of Los Angeles. For more than twenty years said defendant has
been and is now selling what it describes as "lifetime" disability
insurance throughout the United States and in California. Its
insurance policies provide for payment of monthly benefits in the
event of disability. The terms of all its "lifetime" disability policies are identical except for the premium amounts and the benefits payable, which fall into several categories depending upon the
age of the insured and the amount of coverage desired.
II
Defendants SAM JOSEPH and CHARLES JOSEPH, individually, and doing business as UNITED INSURANCE ASSOCIATES and as UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, for more than twenty years have been and are now engaged
in the sales of "lifetime" disability insurance policies of defendant UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, with
their principal office of business being in the County of Los Angeles. Defendants JOSEPH are the general agents for defendant
UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, which has
authorized and employed them to sell its "lifetime" disability
insurance policies throughout thirteen western states, to wit, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming.
II
The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, and defendantship of defendants
DOES ONE through ONE HUNDRED, inclusive, are unknown
to plaintiffs at the time of the filing of this Complaint; plaintiffs
therefore sue said defendants by such fictitious names, and will
ask leave of Court to amend this Complaint to show their true
names and capacities and defendantship when same have been
ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that each of the defendants indicated herein as a DOE acted
in concert and conspiracy with defendants UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, SAM JOSEPH and
CHARLES JOSEPH, to use deceptive and fraudulent trade practices in the sale of said "lifetime" disability insurance policies to
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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the members of the public and the within class of persons in the
manner hereinafter described, and that each said DOES in some
actionable manner was responsible for the events and happenings
referred to herein and thus did proximately cause the damages to
the members of the within class as hereinafter described.
THE PLAINTIFFS AND THE CLASS OF PERSONS FOR
WHOM THIS SUIT IS BRO UGHT; MORE THAN $100,000,000
DAMAGES
IV
Plaintiffs and all other members of the within class, in reliance upon the fraudulent and deceptive trade practices of the
defendants as hereinafter described, have purchased from the
defendants during the last ten years the "lifetime" disability policies of defendant UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA, and have paid premiums to the defendants for the
"lifetime" insurance coverage the defendants promised they
would provide. Plaintiffs and their policy numbers are, respectively: [omitted]
V
Plaintiffs complain for themselves and on behalf of all other
purchasers of said "lifetime" insurance policies from the defendants during the last ten years. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that there are approximately one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) such purchasers residing throughout the said thirteen
western states, the great majority of whom reside in California.
Plaintiffs have not yet determined the names and whereabouts of
all said purchasers who comprise the within class, but defendants
maintain comprehensive files which contain all such names and
addresses.
VI
Plaintiffs and all those persons who purchased said "lifetime" disability insurance policies from the defendants constitute
a definite and ascertainable class of persons. The members of the
class are numerous and it is impractical to bring them all before
the Court. There is a well-defined community of interest in questions of fact and law among and affecting the plaintiffs and all
the members of the class on whose behalf this suit is brought.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
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VII
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the premiums paid
by all said one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) purchasers during the past ten years were in excess of One Hundred Million
Dollars ($100,000,000).
MEMBERS OF CLASS IN AN UNFAIR BARGAINING
POSITION WITH DEFENDANTS
VIII
The overwhelming majority of persons who purchased said
so-called "lifetime" policies from the defendants during the last
ten years were elderly persons, were of low to moderate income,
and were unsophisticated and untrained in the ways of business
and the understanding of insurance contracts. On the other hand,
the defendants, and each of them, were well trained and sophisticated in the drafting of insurance contracts and in the methods,
sales techniques and gimmicks by which members of the public
could be deceived and induced to purchase defendants' said "lifetime" disability insurance policies.
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES: THE DECEPTIVE MAILER AND THE "STANDARD PITCH"
IX
Since the time defendants commenced operating in California, they have not advertised in the mass media, and they do not
so advertise at the present time. They have relied upon contacts
developed by deceptive mass mailings to the public, with followup oral sales pitches made by the defendants and their salesmen.
The mass mailings indicate that if the recipient would like to
receive through the mail a government booklet involving federal
monies available, then the mailer should be returned by mail to
the defendants; upon receipt of the returned mailers the defendants at no time send the government booklet promised, but
instead send their salesmen to see the persons who returned the
mailers, and the salesmen then refer to and exhibit the returned
mailers in an attempt to persuade said persons to allow the salesmen into their homes in order to present the "standard pitch"
described below.
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x
At all times mentioned herein and for more than ten years
before the filing of this Complaint, defendants have developed
and used a standard sales pitch, which has included false statements and deceptive practices, and which they have taught and
do now teach to all the salesmen employed by them in order to
deceive and induce members of the public to purchase their socalled "lifetime" insurance policies. Plaintiffs are informed and
believe that said fraudulent standard sales pitch was presented
in virtually the same manner by the defendants and their salesmen to each and every member of the class on whose behalf this
action is brought.
XI
The standard sales pitch includes the following elements:
A. The word "lifetime" is used and stressed repeatedly by
the defendants and their salesmen;
B. The word "lifetime" is portrayed prominently in large
block type on a "pitch sheet", a sheet of paper containing information which is shown to the prospective purchaser;
C. The prospective purchaser is told that the benefits of
the policy will be paid "for a lifetime" as long as he is unable
to work or is disabled;
D. The prospective purchaser is told that although the
"lifetime" policy is no longer available, it will be sold to him
because he returned the mailer "just in time".
E. The prospective purchaser, specifically and by design,
is not shown the policy;
F. The prospective purchaser is told and/or led to believe
that the policy will not be canceled, and thus provides "lifetime" coverage;
G. The prospective purchaser, specifically and by design,
is not told that defendants may refuse to renew the policy at the
end of the period for which premiums have been paid;
H. When the policy ultimately is received by the purchaser, although it states that the policy may be renewed only
at the option of the company, the word "lifetime" appears
prominently in many places throughout the policy to lead the
policyholder to believe what defendants had represented in the
oral sales pitch, namely, that the "lifetime" disability insurance
coverage in fact was for life and non-cancellable.
I. The defendants and their salesman tell prospective purPublished by Scholar Commons, 1975
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chasers that payments of benefits under the policy are made
upon the request of the insured without delay.
XII
The purpose for which the defendants employed the said
fraudulent standard pitch was to deceive and induce members of
the public to purchase defendants' so-called "lifetime" disability
insurance policies under the belief that they were receiving lifetime protection.
RELIANCE UPON DEFENDANTS' FALSE
REPRESENTATIONS
XI
The plaintiffs and all other members of said class relied upon
defendants' said representations, including the standard pitch, in
purchasing said so-called "lifetime" disability insurance policies
from the defendants, and in paying said One Hundred Million
Dollars ($100,000,000) of premiums to the defendants, and believed that they were receiving "lifetime" insurance coverage and
that their policies would not be cancellable or canceled solely at
the whim of defendants.
THE TRUE FACTS AND INTENTIONS OF DEFENDANTS
XIV
Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that
in truth and in fact the defendants never did and do not now
provide lifetime protection, and the representations made by
them and their salesmen to plaintiffs and the members of the
class were false, and were known by the defendants to be false
each time the standard pitch was presented; the defendants have
not intended to provide lifetime coverage to the plaintiffs or the
class of persons who have purchased defendants' so-called "lifetime" disability policies; the intent of the defendants at all times
has been to give only the illusion of providing lifetime coverage,
but in fact to reserve the right whenever possible to render the
coverage ineffective solely at the will of defendants.
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FRAUDULENT SCHEME AND PRACTICE OF
DEFENDANTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF POLICIES
XV
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that at all times mentioned herein the common scheme and standard practice of the
defendants, with respect to disabled policyholders who have
claimed benefits under their policies, was and is to issue a rider
excluding coverage on the particular disabling ailment or portion
of the body disabled, thus effectively canceling the policy as to
that ailment, or to refuse to renew a so-called "lifetime" disability policy in its entirety when the next renewal premium becomes
due.
XVI
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that at all times mentioned herein the common scheme and practice of the defendants,
when claims were and are made for disability, was and is to delay
the payment of benefits by requiring burdensome applications
and proofs of loss, and to search for and concoct reasons for nonpayment of claims, to the end that policyholders become discouraged and allow their policies to lapse.
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT ACTIONS RESULTED IN
DENIAL OF "LIFETIME" COVERAGE PROMISED
XVII
The result of defendants' said fraudulent and unfair schemes
and practices, which have been applied to the plaintiffs and to
the members of the class, has been the frustration of the reasonable expectations (created by the defendants' deceptive practices)
of the members of the class and the denial of the "lifetime" insurance protection against disability promised by the defendants.
DEFENDANTS' DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND
FRAUDULENT INTENT ONLY RECENTLY
DISCOVERED
XVIII
On or about December 1, 1969, plaintiffs discovered for the
first time the facts heretofore alleged, to wit, the defendants'
deceptive and unfair trade practices, their fraudulent intentions
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and purposes with respect to said standard pitch, and their policy
to deceive and mislead the public into purchasing said so-called
"lifetime" disability insurance policies. At all times mentioned
herein and for more than ten years before the filing of this Complaint, the defendants have carefully maintained their fraudulent
intentions and activities with respect to said facts, policies and
practices, a closely-guarded secret.
DAMAGES IN EXCESS OF $100,000,000
XIX
As the result of defendants' activities set forth above and as
a result of the reliance by plaintiffs and all other members of the
class upon the false representations of the defendants and their
salesmen, plaintiffs and all other members of the class have suffered the following damages:
A. More than One Hundred Million Dollars
($100,000,000) in premiums paid to defendants for policies of the
so-called "lifetime" insurance against disability, which did not
provide the coverage represented by defendants, according to
proof as to the exact amounts;
B. Loss of benefits claimed by plaintiffs and members of
the class for the failure of the defendants to renew said "lifetime" policies and for effectively canceling said "lifetime" policies by issuing restrictive riders, according to proof as to the
exact amounts of such loss of benefits;
C. General damages for the inability of plaintiffs and
members of the class to obtain other health, accident and for
[sic] disability insurance because of having had their insurance
canceled by defendants.
NECESSITY FOR CLASS ACTION
XX
Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the average damges
[sic] of each member of the class are approximately, if not less
than, the sum of One Thousand Dollars (1,000); that most members of the class are financially incapable of prosecuting their
claims herein, and may be unaware that such claims exist. The
high costs and complexity of members of the class bringing separate actions against the defendants would effectively preclude
them from obtaining meaningful relief in the courts, and their
only adequate remedy is to pool their efforts in this class action.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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Otherwise, there is no adequate remedy at law for the members
of the class, who comprise approximately one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) policyholders of defendant UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, located and residing throughout thirteen western states; the only other relief would require a
multitude of lawsuits in inferior courts in many different jurisdictions, and in all such cases the facts with respect to the fraudulent
representations, activities and intentions of the defendants would
be the same.
MALICE OF DEFENDANTS; ACTS AGAINST PUBLIC
INTEREST; PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF $25,000,000
XXI
The defendants, and each of them, have wilfully and knowingly acted with malice and ill will toward the public at large and
all the members of the class, including the plaintiffs, and have
acted in a fraudulent manner so as to benefit themselves economically to the detriment of the members of the class, and in a
manner destructive to the interests of the public.
XXII
Plaintiffs by this action seek to recover a fund of money in
which all policyholders of defendant UNITED INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA, being the members of the class, have
a common claim for the return of premiums paid, for the payment
of lifetime benefits to such policyholders disabled by sickness or
accident, for the payment of general damages and for the payment of punitive damages in an amount up to Twenty Five Million Dollars ($25,000,000) for mass fraud perpetrated on the public and the members of the class, and for attorneys' fees and costs
and expenses incurred herein.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows:
1. That defendants be required to deposit into Court a
sufficient fund of moneys:
A. To allow the return of premiums to plaintiffs and
all members of the class who can be found and who desire
to rescind the "lifetime" disability insurance contract
made with the defendants, together with interest at the
legal rate from the times that premiums were paid;
Published by Scholar Commons, 1975
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B. To pay to plaintiffs and members of the class
those benefits for accident or sickness to which they are
entitled under said "lifetime" insurance policies and defendants' representations in connection therewith, according to proof;
C. Pay to or for the benefit of plaintiffs and the
members of the class punitive damages in the sum of
Twenty Five Million ($25,000,000) Dollars;
D. To pay plaintiffs and members of the class general damages in reasonable amounts for loss of the ability
to obtain insurance because of cancellation of insurance
coverage by defendants;
E. To pay to plaintiffs their costs of suit and expenses incurred in prosecuting this action;
F. For an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to
counsel who have acted on behalf of the members of the
class.
2. That defendants be required to render a just, true, and
full accounting to the plaintiffs of all moneys received from the
members of the class, to provide the names and addresses of all
holders and former holders of defendants' "lifetime" disability
policies for a ten-year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit,
and to give notice of this class action to all such policyholders;
3. That defendants and each of them be enjoined from
making further misrepresentations to members of the public
with respect to the sale of their so-called "lifetime" disability
policies; and
4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems
just and proper.
LEVINSON, ROWEN, KLEIN & LEAVY
By:
ZAD LEAVY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Appendix C
36 is phrased in terms
Trowell v. Blue Cross of South Carolina
of an equitable accounting which may have contributed to its
successful certification by Judge Grimball. Unlike the complaint
in Quelch,363 the complaint in Trowell does not develop the specific common questions of fact and law separately-perhaps attributable to the insufficiency of the guidelines of the Field Code
provision. Nevertheless, the merits of the class suit were apparent
to the court.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

)
)

COUNTY OF RICHLAND
Pretto H. Trowell, et. al

Plaintiff,

vs.

Blue Cross of South Carolina

IN THE COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS

)
)

)
)
)

)
)
) COMPLAINT

)
)
)

)

)
Defendants.

)

)
)

Plaintiff, complaining of Defendants, alleges:
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Colleton County, South Carolina, and brings this action individually and in behalf of all others
similarly situated, as a class; Defendant Blue Cross of South
Carolina, formerly entitled "South Carolina Hospital Service
Plan," is a corporation under the laws of this State, with its
principal office and place of business in Richland County, South
Carolina. Defendant South Carolina Hospital Association is a
corporation under the laws of this State with its principal office
and place of business in Richland County, South Carolina.
362. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text supra.
363. See Appendix A supra.
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2. The question which is the subject matter of this action
is one of common and general interest to several thousand citizens
of this State who are "subscribers" or "members" of a hospitalization insurance "plan" operated by the Defendant Blue Cross of
South Carolina, which persons (including Plaintiff) reached or
exceeded the age of sixty-five years between July 1, 1966 and the
present, were eligible for hospital insurance benefits under the
Federal "Health Insurance for the Aged Act," Title 42, Sections
1395 et seq., United States Code, commonly known as "Medicare," and who became entitled to benefits thereunder and also
under the Blue Cross hospitalization plan coverage by reason of
illness or injury during the period aforesaid; the numbers of which
persons are so great as to be impracticable to bring before the
court, and many of whom are ill or disabled, but are entitled to
their pro rata share of funds wrongfully withheld by the
Defendants as will hereinafter more fully appear, and this action
is brought as a class action in behalf of all similarly situated.
3. Heretofore, prior to July 1, 1966, being the effective date
of availability of Health Insurance for the Aged (Medicare), and
during the period July 1, 1966 to present, Plaintiff and thousands
of others similarly situated became "members" or "subscribers"
to a hospitalization insurance "plan" sold by Defendant Blue
Cross (previously entitled South Carolina Hospital Service Plan);
which plan, in fact, consisted of a promise to pay in behalf of
"members" or "subscribers," whether individually insured or
members of insured "groups," costs of hospitalization during the
term of the plan and for which Plaintiff, and all others similarly
situated, paid premiums of "charges" to the Defendant Blue
Cross. Each member or subscriber to the plan received a numbered certificate describing the benefits to which they were entitled, Plaintiff being the holder of Certificate No. 28-92-08, Group
#E8689415.
4. To carry out the provisions of said hospitalization plan,
paid for by the Plaintiff and the other insured members similarly
situated, the Defendant Blue Cross, commencing at least as early
as April, 1959, and continuing up to the present, entered into a
series of incidental contracts with the hospitals which constitute
the Defendant South Carolina Hospital Association, an elemosenary [sic] corporation under the laws of this State. Under the
provisions of the contract the members of the Defendant Hospital
Association became participants in the plan and received reimbursement for hospitalization costs incurred by the Plaintiff and
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other members or subscribers, as therein provided. Charges or
premiums paid by Plaintiff and other members for this hospitalization coverage were periodically adjusted by the Defendant Blue
Cross as required to provide payments under the plan to the
hospitals members of the Defendant Hospital Association. These
charges or premiums were actuarially determinent [sic] and
adjusted to pay the full coverages provided in the plan, without
reference to possible benefits paid or to be paid to or in behalf
of Plaintiff and other members through Medicare or any other
form of health or hospitalization insurance.
5. Upon the passage by the U.S. Congress of the said
Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare) in 1965, the Defendant Blue Cross (then entitled South Carolina Hospital Service
Plan) at the request of the Defendant Hospital Association,
agreed in accordance with Section 1395h of said Act to act as
receiving and paying agent in the State of South Carolina of
Medicare funds provided or to be provided to Plaintiff and other
beneficiaries of Medicare for costs of hospitalization; and immediately after said effective date of July 1, 1966, Defendant Blue
Cross commenced to receive said Medicare funds and pay out
portions thereof to the Defendant Hospital Association members.
6. Heretofore in April, 1967, while Plaintiff was a member
of the Defendant Blue Cross plan with premiums paid, and also
entitled to the benefits of Medicare as provided by said Act, she
was hospitalized for surgery, and in September, 1967 for treatment of injuries from an automobile accident, for a total of four
occasions on which she was hospitalized in 1967, incurring hospital costs of approximately Two Thousand, ($2,000.00) Dollars,
which were paid by the Defendant Blue Cross either from its
funds received from Plaintiff and other "members" under the
plan, or from Medicare funds paid in behalf of Plaintiff and others similarly situated, to the members of the Defendant South
Carolina Hospital Association providing said hospital services;
plus possibly other payments by Medicare, the exact amounts of
such payments being unknown to Plaintiff and peculiarly in the
knowledge of the Defendants due to their maintenance of an intricate system of bookkeeping and accounting, resulting in such
reports as have been furnished to the Plaintiff and others similarly situated being unintelligible to them, and due to Defendants' further failure to furnish final reports to the Plaintiff and
others similarly situated showing amounts received from Medicare in their behalf and retained by the Defendants.
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7. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at times, and from
time to time, during the period July 1, 1966 to date, the Defendants received from the United States Government payments of
Medicare hospitalization insurance in behalf of herself and others
similarly situated, in amounts unknown to the Plaintiff, and unlawfully took and converted said money to their own use, to the
great loss and damage of Plaintiff and all others similarly situated.
8. Plaintiff is informed and believes that, in violation of the
rights of herself and all others similarly situated, the Defendants
have received, through Medicare, and unlawfully converted to
their own use, sums in excess of actual costs chargeable to Plaintiff and others similarly situated, which costs should have been
paid out of funds in Defendants' "plan," in the amount of more
than One Million ($1,000,000) [later amended to 12 million]
Dollars, to which Plaintiff and the other members of the Defendants' plan similarly situated are entitled, demand for payment
of which has been made by Plaintiff and, on information and
belief, by large numbers of others similarly situated and refused.
9. Plaintiff is informed and believes that on account of said
demands and complaints made by Plaintiff and large numbers of
others similarly situated the Defendant Blue Cross made certain
premium refunds or "charge adjustments" to some members of
the hospitalization plan, and on or about June 27, 1969 obtained
an approval from the S.C. Insurance Commissioner to change the
plan contract and charges to "except" Medicare payments from
plan coverage for some "members" in the future; but meanwhile
Defendants have continued to retain for their own use and failed
to pay over excess funds received as aforesaid for the period July
1, 1966 to the present, which fund is lawfully the property of the
Plaintiff and all others similarly situated.
10. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated have no adequate remedy at law by reason of the fact that amounts due and
payable to them, and each of them and their pro rata shares of
said wrongfully withheld fund cannot be determined until an
accounting is rendered by Defendants to discover the amounts of
funds received and converted by them, including interest, profits
and accretions thereto since receipt, up to and including the date
hereof; and additional interest thereon to which plaintiffs and all
others similarly situated are entitled by reason of said wrongful
taking and conversion of said fund, which is held in trust by
Defendants for the rightful owners, under the laws of this State.
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11. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that she and
others similarly situated are entitled to an order of this Court
referring the matter to a master in equity to determine the extent
and amount of said fund, interest, profits and accretions thereto,
and the several pro rata proportions thereof to which Plaintiff and
all others similarly situated are entitled; an order restraining and
enjoining the Defendants from expending or otherwise disposing
of such fund or any part thereof, pending determination of this
action; a determination that said fund is held in trust by the
Defendants for the benefit of Plaintiff and all others similarly
situated from whom it has been wrongfully withheld; and further
that Plaintiff, in behalf of herself and others similarly situated,
is entitled to have the Court award reasonable attorneys' fees of
one-third of the total amount of the fund recovered hereunder.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and in behalf of all
others similarly situated, prays:
(1) An Order of this Court:
(a) Requiring the Defendants to make an accounting to
this Court of all excess "charges," "premiums," unpaid benefits
and Medicare funds received and withheld from Plaintiff and all
others similarly situated;
(b) Referring this action to a master in equity to receive
the evidence and report findings of fact and conclusions of law
and recommend judgment herein, including the pro rata shares
of the fund to which Plaintiff and all others similarly situated are
entitled; and
(c) Restraining and enjoining Defendants and each of
them, pendente lite, from expending or otherwise disposing of any
funds, together with interest, profits, or accretions thereto, which
are the subject of this action.
(2) Judgment against the Defendants for the full amount of
said fund as determined by said accounting, and estimated at
One Million ($1,000,000.00) Dollars, together with interest, profits and accretions thereto, and interest on the entire amount as
provided by law; and providing an orderly manner by which
Plaintiff and all others entitled thereto may receive their rightful
shares thereof.
(3) Judgment providing reasonable attorneys' fees from the
fund recovered; and
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For such other and further relief as may be just and
BRYAN, BAHNMULLER AND KING
By:
G. Werber Bryan
Attorney at Law
Sumter, S.C.
Frank K. Sloan
Attorney at Law
603 Security Federal Building
Columbia, South Carolina
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Appendix D
The following bill, recently introduced by Representative
Irene Rudnick of the South Carolina House of Representatives,
would replace the old Field Code class action provision 64 Adopting in toto the language of Federal Rule 23, the new provision
would be a significant improvement over the present statute. 6 5 In
light of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,"' however, the bill has its
drawbacks. The suggested deletions (bracketed language) and
additions (italicized language) in the bill, adopted from recommendations3 6 7 of Sidney Jacoby and Michael Cherkasky, would
meet the Eisen Court's directions regarding preliminary hearing
determinations 3 8 and notice. 66
A BILL
TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1962, BY ADDING ARTICLE 1.1 TO CHAPTER 3 OF TITLE
10, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR CLASS ACTIONS IN THIS
STATE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS; TO PROVIDE
CERTAIN PROCEDURES FOR INSTITUTING, MAINTAINING AND DISMISSING CLASS ACTIONS AND TO REPEAL
SECTION 10-205, RELATING TO ALLOWING ONE OR
MORE PARTIES TO SUE OR DEFEND FOR ALL PARTIES
UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina:
SECTION 1. The 1962 Code is amended by adding Article 1.1
to Chapter 3 of Title 10 to read as follows:
Article 1.1
Section 10-220. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members of the
class only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com364. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-205 (1962).

365. See generally Homburger, supra note 10; Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note
16.
366.
367.
368.
369.

417 U.S. 156 (1964). See notes 175-98 and accompanying text supra.
Jacoby & Cherkasky, Effects of Eisen IV, supra note 194.
See notes 175-83 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 183-98 and accompanying text supra.
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mon to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claim or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interest of the class.
Section 10-221. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of Section 10-220 are satisfied and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent
or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters which the court may consider
in determining its findings include: (a) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (b) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
Section 10-222. (1) [As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall
determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.] At an
early stage of the action, upon motion of either party or upon its
own motion, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be maintained as a class action. However, this determination
shall be postponed until after the court has completed any preliminary hearing it may hold in accordance with subsection (2)
section 10-222. An order under this section may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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(2) In any class action maintained under Section 10-221(3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best .notice
practicable under the circumstances, [including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort]. The notice shall advise each member that (a) the court
will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified
date; (b) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusions; and (c) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel. In cases where the expenses of the notice
appear to exceed nominal amounts, the court on the basis of
equitable principles may in a proper case impose the costs in
whole or in parton defendant, but only after a preliminaryhearing in which the court has found (1) that as a matter of law the
complaint will survive motions by the defendant either to dismiss
or for summary judgment and (2) that, on the basis of evidence,
recovery by the members of the class is more than likely.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under Section 10-221(1) or (2), whether or not favorable to the
class, shall include and describe those whom the cour. finds to
be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained
as a class action under Section 10-221 whether or not favorable
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom
the notice provided by this section for such class was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a
class, and the provisions of this article shall then be construed
and applied accordingly.
Section 10-223. In the conduct of actions to which this article
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence
or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of
the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come
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into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative
parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be
amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation
of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5)
dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
Section 10-224. A class action, provided in this article, shall not
be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
SECTION 2.

Section 10-205 of the 1962 Code is repealed.

SECTION 3.
Governor.

Ths act shall take effect upon approval by the
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Appendix E
The Class Action Manual,37 0 prepared by Superior Court
Judge David A. Thomas and adopted by Los Angeles and Santa
Barbara Counties, is a response to the advice of Vasquez v.Superior Court371 that "pragmatic procedural devices will be required
37 2
to amplify the potentially complex [class] litigation.1
Besides comprehensiveness and uniformity, the manual offers a detailed method to facilitate court management of the class
suit-something that neither Federal Rule 23 nor the California
code provisions 37 do. For example, Federal Rule 23 assumes the
use of regular pretrial practices, whereas the manual develops a
sequence of pretrial conferences 34 and hearings 375 to accommodate the special needs of the class suit. What makes the manual
especially significant is its section on class issues, 3 76 which ex377
pands the stark phrases of rule 23 into practicable guidelines.
Furthermore, the manual encourages counsel's arguing for special
forms of relief 31 8-an approach in contrast to the Second Circuit's
treatment of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.39 Finally, the manual
allocates burdens of proof regarding class facts-an enterprise
which Federal Rule 23 does not clearly develop."
MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF PRETRIAL
PROCEEDINGS ON CLASS ACTION ISSUES
INFORMAL CONFERENCE ON CLASS ISSUES
411.
412.

Nature of Conference
Conference on Motion of Named Party

370. D. THOMAS, Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT MANUAL FOR CONDUCT OF PPERIAL
PROCEEDINGS ON CLASS ACTION ISSUES (1973) [excerpts reprinted with permission of the Los

Angeles Daily Journal].
371. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). See notes 125-28 and
accompanying text supra.
372. 4 Cal. 3d at 820, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
373. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (1973); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (1973).
374. CLAss ACTION MANUAL, supra note 370, § 416. See generally Note, PretrialConference Procedure, 26 S.C.L. REv. 481 (1971); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 1.00;
200; 400 (1973).
375. CLASS ACTION MANUAL, supra note 370, §§ 421-29.
376. Id. § 427.
377. Compare § 427.2 ("Common, similar and unique questions of law and fact")
with FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2).
378. CLASS ACTION MANUAL, supra note 370, §§ 428.4 & .5.
379. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
380. CLASS ACTION MANUAL, supra note 370, §§ 426.6, 427.1-.7. See Newberg, supra
note 171, at 103.
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413. Conference on Order of the Court
414. Time for Conference
416. Conference Order
PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON CLASS ISSUES
421. Nature of Hearings
422. Initial Hearing
423. Subsequent Hearing
424. Scheduling Hearing
425. Continuance of Hearing and Submission
426. Conduct of Hearing
427. Issues; Documents for Presentation
428. Orders
429. Stipulations for an Order
EARLY TRIAL OF BIFURCATED ISSUE
441.
442.

Scheduling Early Trial
Order After Early Trial
SETTLEMENT HEARINGS AND JUDGMENTS

461.
462.
463.

Nature of Class Action Settlement Hearings
Scheduling Settlement Hearing
Conduct of Settlement Hearings
INFORMAL CONFERENCE ON CLASS ISSUES

411.

Nature of Conference.

A conference, informal in nature, may be held in chambers
between the court and counsel for every party to the action. At
said conference the parties will discuss the class issues involved,
establishment of precedence of discovery, scheduling of hearings
and other matters concerning the class issues. No evidence will
be presented at the conference, but the court will expect all attorneys in attendance to have sufficient knowledge of the class issues
to discuss proposed stipulations resolving the class issues.
412.

Conference on Motion of Named Party.

The conference may be scheduled through notice given by
the plaintiff or any named party who has submitted an answer
in the action. The notice must be in writing and must designate
those topics which counsel expects to discuss at the conference
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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(e.g., order of discovery, stipulation concerning certain issues,
etc.). The notice may but need not be supported by documents.
The notice will be submitted at least 20 days before the scheduled
time of the conference. Not more than one conference will be held
except upon order of the court. A conference may not be noticed
by a class member who is not specifically named as a party unless
said member earlier has received permission from the court to
appear individually or to become a co-representative (Section
427.7(e) and (f)).
413.

Conference on Order of the Court.

The court may schedule a conference, notice of which will be
served on all parties who have appeared. Said notice must be in
writing and must designate those topics which the court expects
counsel to discuss at the conference. The notice will be submitted
at least 20 days before the scheduled time of the conference.
414.

Time for Conference.

The conference may be held at any time after the at-issue
memorandum has been filed and before the initial hearing has
been held (Section 422). Notice of the conference may be given
although notice of the initial hearing already has been given. If
the at-issue memorandum has not been filed within 60 days after
a defendant has answered, the said defendant then may submit
a notice for conference and said conference will be held at the
time noticed even though the at-issue memorandum has not been
filed. If said notice is given by the plaintiff, it must be served on
all named parties in the action. If notice is given by a defendant
or the court, it will be served on only the parties who have appeared; however, within ten days after receipt of said notice
plaintiff will serve a copy thereof on each named defendant who
has not appeared in the action and will submit a declaration of
said service. In the event that plaintiff is unable to effect service
on any defendant as aforesaid, plaintiff will submit a declaration
stating the reasons for failing to serve the said defendant.
416.

Conference Order.

At the conclusion of the conference the court may make an
order which may embrace the stipulations, if any, of the parties,
set out the precedence of discovery, order early trial of a bifurcated issue, and in other ways expedite the resolution of class
issues (herein designated "conference order"). Until modified or
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terminated by the court, the conference order will be binding on
all parties to the action. The court may order the conduct of an
additional conference upon all or certain of the class issues. The
conference order will not be used to resolve any class issues in
dispute.
PRETRIAL HEARINGS ON CLASS ISSUES
421.

Nature of Hearings.

.1 Content of hearings. In each class action brought under
CCP Sec. 382 or CC Sections 1750 et seq. in which either the
plaintiff or the defendant is a "class", one or more pretrial hearings (herein designated collectively "hearing") on the class issues
(defined in Sections 401 and 427) must be held. These hearings
are:
(a) Initial hearing. The first pretrial hearing to resolve class
issues is herein designated "initial hearing". The time for said
hearing, issues to be presented and resolved therein and other
matters concerning said hearing are discussed in Sections 422,
424-429.
(b) Subsequent hearing. At any time or times after the
initial hearing an additional hearing may be held, which hearing
is herein designated "subsequent hearing". The criteria for scheduling a subsequent hearing, the time for said hearing, the issues
to be presented and resolved therein and other matters concerning said hearing are discussed in Section 423-429.
.2 Policy underlying scheduling and conduct of hearings.
The unique and salutary nature of the class action for adjudication of claims which otherwise would be impracticable for judicial
consideration is recognized in California. (See Vasquez, supra, at
pp. 807-808). Therefore, the scheduling of hearings and the precedence of determination of issues may be varied by the court, in
its discretion, in order that the parties will have a reasonable
opportunity to fully present all relevant evidence and argument
on each class issue. Without a prior order to the contrary, however, that schedule set out herein for the conduct of the hearings
and determination of issues will apply to all class actions.
422.

Initial Hearing.

.1 Nature of hearing. An initial hearing will be held to make
a determination of at least issues 1 through 5 (Section 427). In
said hearing additional issues, if included in the notice of hearing,
may be determined.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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.2 Hearing on motion of a named party. Plaintiff or any
named defendant who has answered may submit notice of an
initial hearing. If the party who has alleged the existence of a
class is the party who notices the hearing, his notice must be
accompanied by declarations on issues 1, 4 and 5 in addition to
documents on all issues to be presented. If the party controverting
the class allegations is the party who notices the hearing, his
motion must be accompanied by documents on all issues presented, except said party need not submit declarations on issues
1, 4 or 5. All facts other than purely rebuttal matter upon which
the moving party will rely at the hearing must be set out in
declarations which accompany the notice of the hearing.
.3 Hearing on order of court. The court may schedule an
initial hearing, notice of which will be served on all parties. Said
notice must direct that the class party submit documents upon
at least issues 1 through 5 on or before a specified date. Responding and rebuttal documents then will be submitted without further order on or before those times set out in Section 424.3, unless
the court orders otherwise. The court is not bound by the 75-day
maximum time set out in Section 424.3.
.4 Time for hearing. Notice of the initial hearing may be
submitted any time after the at-issue memorandum has been
filed except that if an at-issue memorandum has not been filed
within 60 days after a defendant has filed his answer, said defendant then may submit a notice of an initial hearing. If said notice
is given by the plaintiff, it must be served on all named parties
in the action. If said notice is given by a defendant or the court,
it must be served on only those parties who have appeared; however, within ten days after receipt of said notice, plaintiff must
serve a copy thereof on each named defendant who has not appeared in the action and will submit a declaration of said service.
In the event that plaintiff is unable to effect service of any defendant as aforesaid, plaintiff will submit a declaration stating the
reasons for failing to serve the said defendant.
The period of notice of the hearing is set out in Section 424.3.
423.

Subsequent Hearing.

.1 Nature of hearing. A subsequent hearing will be held to
resolve class issues not earlier resolved. It also may be held upon
a sufficient showing of changed factual circumstances having occurred or new evidence having been discovered after the earlier
hearing. See Section 423.5, for the manner and time of presenting
the facts concerning said changed circumstances or new evidence.
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.2 Hearing on motion of a named party. A subsequent hearing noticed by either party must request a determination of issue
6 if this issue was not earlier determined, or may request a redetermination of any issue earlier presented, subject to satisfying
the requirement set out in Section 423.5. The notice of hearing
must be accompanied by all the documents supporting the
party's position on each issue. All facts other than purely rebuttal
matters on which the moving party will rely at the hearing must
be set out in the documents which accompany the notice of the
hearing.
.3 Hearing on order of court. The court may schedule a
subsequent hearing, notice of which will be served on all parties.
Said notice will direct that one of the parties submit moving
documents on issues as directed by the court (even though said
issues were resolved in an earlier hearing) on or before a specified
date. Responding and rebuttal documents then will be submitted
without further order or before those dates set out in Section
424.3. The court is not bound by the 75-day maximum time set
out in Section 424.3.
.4 No hearing after dismissal. No subsequent hearing will
be noticed or held to examine or re-examine class action issues
after an order has been made dismissing the action as one maintainable by, or against, a class.
.5 Re-examination of issues earlier determined. A subsequent hearing will be conducted on issues determined in earlier
hearings only upon a sufficient showing by the moving party that
changed factual circumstances or new evidence make necessary
modification of the earlier order. The changed circumstances or
new evidence must not have been known or reasonably ascertainable at the time of the earlier hearing. The facts constituting the
changed circumstances or newly discovered evidence must be set
out in a declaration accompanying the moving party's notice of
hearing.
The court on its own motion or upon the motion of the responding party may strike the notice of said subsequent hearing
if the declaration in support thereof does not make a sufficient
showing of changed factual circumstances or new evidence.
.6 Time for hearing. A subsequent hearing may be held at
any time prior to the filing of the Certificate of Readiness, or may
be held after the filing of a Certificate of Readiness upon a factual
showing of changed circumstances or the discovery of new evidence which was not known or could not have been reasonably
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ascertained in time to notice a hearing to be held before the
Certificate of Readiness was filed. If said notice is given by the
plaintiff, it must be served on all named parties in the action. If
said notice is given by a defendant or the court, it must be served
on only those parties who have appeared; however, within ten
days after receipt of said notice the plaintiff must serve a copy
thereof on each named defendant who has not appeared in the
action and will submit a declaration of said service. In the event
that plaintiff is unable to effect service on any defendant as aforesaid, plaintiff will submit a declaration stating the reasons for
failing to serve the said defendant.
The period of notice of the hearing is set out in Section 424.3.
.7 Judge presiding at hearing. The judge assigned to the
hearing need not be the same judge who presided in an earlier
hearing even though the subsequent hearing may be for the purpose of modifying or rescinding an order earlier made.
424.

Scheduling Hearing.

.1 Notice of hearing by a named party. Any named plaintiff
or defendant who has submitted an answer may notice a hearing.
The notice must be in writing, must designate those issues which
will be the subject of the hearing and describe the documents
supporting said motion. Issues which must be noticed are set out
in Sections 422.2 and 423.2. Parties to whom notice must be given
are set out in Sections 422.4 and 423.6. A hearing may not be
noticed by a class member who is not specifically named as a
party unless said member earlier has received permission from
the court to appear individually or to become a co-representative
(See Section 427.7 (e) and (f)).
.2 Notice of hearing by the court. The court may notice a
hearing by order served on plaintiff and all defendants who have
answered. The order must designate the issues which will be the
subject of the hearing. (For issues which must be, and may be,
noticed see Sections 422.3 and 423.3).
.3 Period of notice of hearing. The hearing will be noticed
for not less than 60 days or more than 75 days after the serving
of notice thereof. Each responding party may submit documents
on or within 45 days after service upon said party of the notice of
hearing. The moving party may submit rebuttal documents on or,
before five days after service upon him of the responding documents. These rebuttal documents will present no new evidentiary
facts.
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.5 Submission of supporting documents. If the moving
party is the class representative, he will submit with the notice
of hearing documents supporting his position on each issue to be
presented in said hearing. All facts other than purely rebuttal
matters upon which the moving party will rely in the hearing
must be set out in declarations submitted with the notice of hearing.
If the moving party is the non-class party, he will submit
with the notice of hearing documents on all issues to be heard
except that he need not submit declarations on issues 1, 4 or 5;
however, if the non-class moving party has facts on these issues
which he wishes to present, he must present them with his moving papers and not reserve them for inclusion with his rebuttal
documents.
.8 Notice without supporting documents. A notice of hearing unaccompanied by each of the documents required by these
rules will be deemed to have been untimely made and the hearing
may be placed off calendar on the court's motion or that of the
responding party.
.10 Notice to public entity, official, employee class member. When a public entity or a public official or public employee
in his official capacity is an unnamed member of the plaintiff or
defendant class, notice of the pendency of said class action will
be given to said public entity or public official or public employee
before the at-issue memorandum is filed. Said notice will be
served in the same manner as a civil summons is served.
.11 Notice to Attorney General. If the action seeks relief of
any nature, other than solely for money damages, for alleged
pollution or adverse environmental effects which could affect the
public generally, the notice of motion of the hearing and a copy
of all documents relative thereto submitted by any party shall be
served on the Attorney General of the State of California regardless of whether the Attorney General is a named party (CCP Sec.
389.6). The court may direct that notice be given to the Attorney
General in other type actions.
425.

Continuance of Hearing and Submission.

.1 Change in hearing date. Continuance of a hearing may
not be made unilaterally except upon motion noticed and
granted. However, a continuance to a date certain, or removal of
the hearing from calendar, may be made by stipulation. The date
to which the hearing may be continued by stipulation must be
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approved by the court (through advice by the clerk of available
dates) in order to be effective. The parties cannot avoid the necessity of completing all hearings before filing the Certificate of
Readiness through stipulating to a hearing date later than said
filing. However, for good cause the court may order the hearing
continued to a time subsequent to the filing of the Certificate of
Readiness.
.2 Change in time to submit documents. On motion by a
party noticed for hearing before that party's time to submit documents expires, the court may order the documents to be submitted at a time different from that set out herein. Said motion for
change in the time scheduled for submission of documents will be
supported by a declaration setting out evidentiary facts showing
good cause for the change.
426.

Conduct of Hearing.

.1 Use of declarations. Presentation of evidence in the hearing generally will be through declarations submitted and previously discovered evidence. Inasmuch as all counsel generally
will be apprised of all evidence several days before the hearing,
counsel should attempt to resolve by stipulation before hearing
as many class issues as possible (See Section 429.).
.2 Judicially noticed members. Either party in its moving
or responding documents may request that the court take judicial
notice of certain matters pursuant to California Evidence Code
Secs. 451 et seq. It will be the responsibility of the party who
makes the request concerning those items described in California
Evidence Code Sec. 452 to furnish the court with adequate copies
of the matters referred to therein. The court will not undertake
to gather said matters.
.3 Discovered evidence. Either party in its moving or responding documents may request that the court consider particular discovered evidence in the case file (depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, etc.). All references to discovered evidence will be to line and page thereof. It is the duty of the party
who refers to matters in a deposition to lodge the deposition in
court before the hearing. Opposing counsel in responding documents may raise objections, based upon the rules governing admissibility of evidence, to consideration by the court of said evidence. The court will rule on each objection before considering
said requested discovered evidence.
.4 Discovery after notice of hearing. The party who notices
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a hearing must complete all discovery upon which it intends to
rely prior to the submission of the notice of hearing. Said moving
party will not be entitled to conduct discovery during the period
between the notice of hearing and the hearing, except upon leave
of court.
.5 Oral testimony. Oral testimony will not be received in
the hearing except upon leave of the court after counsel has made
an adequate evidentiary showing of his inability to present evidence through declaration or earlier use of discovery procedure
and has presented good cause for consideration by the court of
such oral testimony.
.6 Burden of proof in the hearing. The burden of proof on
all class issues is on the party alleging the existence of a class,
whether the party making said allegations is the moving or responding party in the hearing. All issues of fact will be proved by
a preponderance of the evidence presented in the hearing.
.7 Nature of evidence. The court in its discretion at any
time prior to or during the hearing may order that the evidence
to be presented by the parties will be of a character different from
that provided in Sections 426.1 and 426.5 and other relevant sections of the Manual. (E.g., the court may order cross-examination
upon the evidence in the declarations, production of original documents, oral testimony of certain persons, etc., or a combination
of any of them.) Such order will provide a reasonable time for
preparation of such evidence, including a continuance of the
hearing if necessary.
.8 Issues not noticed will not be heard. The court will not
hear evidence or argument on any issue which was not included
in the notice of motion for hearing.
427.

Issues; Documents for Presentation.

Set out in Section 427.1-.7 are the issues which must be
resolved by order after one or more hearings. Also set out with
each issue are subjects which should be included in the documents submitted in support of each party's position on said issue.
These subjects are not exclusive but do represent the minimum
information which the court deems necessary for presentation by
the parties on each issue.
.1 Issue: Constitution of the class. The party alleging existence of a class will submit one or more declarations which present
facts describing in detail the composition of the class, including
the following:
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(a) The approximate number of persons in the class. If
there are sub-classes, the declaration also should describe each
and set out the approximate number of persons in each sub-class.
(b) The general geographical location (or locations) of the
class members. If the class is not confined to California, the description will include those locations outside California where the
class members are located.
(c) A description of the status of the class members where
relevant to the action (e.g., minors, particular ethnic, occupational, economic, professional or other group).
(d) A description of the members of each sub-class between
whom issues of law or fact must be litigated.
(e) A description of those class members, including an estimate of their number, whose claims must be approved or evidence presented only as to each individual member.
(f) Other facts which describe the class. These other facts
should describe the class with sufficient thoroughness that it
thereafter can be accurately and particularly described.
Further, the class representative will submit a statement
presenting his position concerning:
(g) The practicality of participation in the action by particular class members other than the named representative.
(h) The manner in which and the time when the individual
class members will be identified. If individual identification is
not contemplated, the reasons therefor (e.g., reliance on fluid
class recovery for non-monetary relief).
(i) If a judicial determination will be necessary in order to
ascertain individual class members, a statement of the manner
of determination of each individual class member and an estimate of the court time and personnel which will be involved in
said determination.
(j) Other matters relevant to this issue. The statement specifically will refer (preferably in its opening paragraph) to the
allegations of the existence of the class and its composition which
appear in the pleading. These references should be by description
of the pleading and either by direct quotation from it or by reference to the pages and lines upon which said pleading appears.
If the declarations demonstrate that the class is interstate,
the party maintaining the action will submit, in addition to other
memoranda, a memorandum on the subject of whether this court
has jurisdiction to render a binding judgment in favor of, or
against, non-resident, unserved class members.
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.2 Issue: Common, similar and unique questions of law and
fact.
Each party will submit a statement discussing each of the
following:
(a) Those issues of law which are common to all class members.
(b) Those issues of law which are similar to all class members and, with respect to each such issue, a detailed statement
concerning how said issues may be determined on other than an
individual basis.
(c) Those issues of law which are unique to one or more
class members, but which must be presented in the trial. In the
description of these unique issues of law, the segments of the class
to which they are applicable will be described with a statement
of the number within the class to whom each unique issue applies.
(d) The issues of law which must be litigated between class
members.
(e) Those issues of fact which are common to all class members.
(f) Those issues of fact which are similar to all class members, with a detailed statement concerning how each such issue
can be determined other than on an individual basis.
(g) Those issues of fact which are unique to one or more
class members but which must be presented in the trial. In the
description of these unique issues of fact, the segments of the
class to which they are applicable will be described with a statement of the number within the class to whom each unique issue
applies.
(h) The issues of fact which must be litigated between class
members.
Each party also will discuss whether the issues of law and
fact which are either common to all members of the class or, if
not common, are similar and susceptible to proof by evidence
applicable to all members of the class, predominate over issues
which must be tried on an individual basis. These statements will
set out an estimate of the number of witnesses and the time for
their testimony upon issues provable by evidence applicable to all
class members contrasted to the number of witnesses and the
time for their testimony upon issues which exist only as to individuals or sub-classes (including issues which must be litigated
between class members).
The statement of the party alleging the existence of a class
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will refer (preferably in its opening paragraph) to the allegations
of common questions of law and fact which appear in the pleading. The references should be by description of the pleading, and
either by direct quotation from it or by reference to the pages and
lines upon which said allegations appear.
.3 Issue: Superiority of the class action to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Each party will submit statements concerning:
(a) Procedures alternative to a class action which might
adjudicate the issues involved in the action. These will include
an estimate of the time of trial of each alternative proceeding.
The class representative will include in his statement the number
of witnesses he anticipates calling in presentation of his case in
chief under each proceeding and a brief resume of the testimony
of each prospective witness.
(b) The effectiveness of the remedies available under the
alternatives described compared to those available under the
class action. This should include a discussion of the number of
persons who may receive compensation after each alternative proceeding (whether directly or indirectly by virtue of the judgment)
and the difference, if any, in the amount thereof.
(c) The ability of the court to manage the alternative proceedings in relation to its ability to manage the conduct of the
class action.
(d) The benefit to the public from each alternative proceeding. (E.g., if the action challenges the constitutionality of a statute, is a class action therefor of any greater benefit to the public
than one on behalf of named plaintiffs only?)
(e) The propriety of relief other than money damages. This
should include a discussion of the alternatives of fluid recovery,
injunctive relief without any type of money damages (except attorney's fees and costs), or a combination of several types of relief.
(f) A description of other actions purporting to be brought
on behalf of the same class, raising the same or similar issues, and
a statement of the reasons the instant action should be allowed
to proceed parallel to the others or should be abated or dismissed.
(See Section 427.7(a) for motions to coordinate cases pursuant to
CCP Sec. 404 et seq. in actions filed after January 1, 1974.)
(g) If the action purports to be brought on behalf of a class
which includes residents of states other than California, a statement as to whether (aside from jurisdictional limitations) the
court should limit the class to California residents for reasons of
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public policy and manageability.
.4 Issue: Membership of the class representative in the
class.
The class representative will submit one or more declarations
which present facts describing in detail:
(a) If membership in the class is dependent upon having
participated in a transaction or series thereof, a description of
each particular transaction which evidences when and in what
manner the representative became a member of the class.
(b) If membership in the class is dependent upon ownership of property, membership in an organization of each fact by
which the representative acquired said status which made him a
member of the class. He also will set out facts evidencing that he
continues to have the status of a class member.
(c) Factual differences, if any, in the representative's status
as a class member and those of any other persons within the class.
If there are sub-classes, a factual statement of the sub-class of
which the representative is a member.
He also will submit a statement describing in detail:
(d) Unique factual issues, if any, pertaining to the representative which must be litigated.
(e) Legal differences, if any, in the representative's status
as a class member and those of any other persons within the class.
(f) Unique legal issues, if any, pertaining to the representative which must be litigated.
(g) Any defenses of fact or law which may be asserted
against the representative individually.
.5 Issue: Ability of the class representative to fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
The class representative is a fiduciary of the class members
(LaSala v. American Savings and Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864)
and has a duty at all times during the pendency of the litigation
to make known to the court his relationship to the class members
including those conflicts with, or differences in, their positions.
The class representative will submit one or more declarations
which present facts describing in detail:
(a) The amount of damages which the representative estimates will be awarded to the class and his share thereof or, if the
class is the defendant the total damages which may be suffered
by the class and the representative's share thereof.
(b) Negotiations, if any, after commencement of the action
which the representative has conducted with the adverse party in
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this litigation concerning settlement of the representative's individual claim or (if the class is the defendant) the claim against
him individually without settlement of the claim of the class.
(c) Other class actions to which the representative or his
spouse has been or now is a named party. The description of these
should include case name, court designation and number, the
nature of the controversy, its outcome, and the representative's
(or spouse's) status there as a class representative or merely as a
named party. If there remain an unsatisfied judgment or court
costs against him or his spouse from earlier litigation, the representative should set out the amounts thereof and the reason for
failure to have paid them.
.6 Issue: necessity for and content of notice.
Although as a general rule notice to the class of the pendency
of the action shall be ordered, notice to the class is not necessary
in all actions, and an order may be made, on motion of a party,
dispensing with the requirement that the class be notified of the
action. When a public entity or a public officer or public employee in his official capacity is an unnamed member of the plaintiff or defendant class, notice of the motion to dispense with the
requirement that the class be notified of the action must be
served on said public entity, public officer or employee in the
same manner as a civil summons is served.
When one party submits a motion for an order concerning the
giving of or dispensing with notice, each party will submit a statement on each of the following (E.g., said party will submit a
statement of the proposed contents of the notice (Section 427.6(d)
even though he seeks an order dispensing with notice):
(a) Documents, including declarations, if a party desires, of
whether the action has great or little merit. (These documents
will be considered only as they are relevant to the issues of
whether notice should be given, at what time, and imposition of
the expense of giving of notice [sic].
(b) A statement discussing whether notice should be given
at all.
(c) A statement which assumes that notice will be given
and discusses:
(i) The time when notice should be given.
(ii) The manner in which notice will be given. This will
include a discussion concerning whether said notice should be
published, mailed or otherwise brought to the attention of class
members. If recommended to be published, it will include the
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recommended publication media, including an estimate of the
cost thereof. If recommended to be mailed, it will include a statement of the manner in which addresses of the class members will
be obtained and an estimate of the cost of preparation of the
notice and and [sic] of said mailing. If notice is to be given
through other means, a description of said other means will be
set out in detail including an estimate of the cost. Each estimate
of costs will contain a statement of the factual basis thereof.
Each statement also will include an estimate, with the factual
basis therefor, of the percentage of the class members which the
party believes will receive knowledge of the pending action
through use of each notice media.
(iii) The party who should bear the cost of giving the notice
or the manner in which the cost thereof should be divided between the parties.
(d) A statement setting out the content of the proposed
notice. Each proposed notice will include, at least, a representation concerning each of the following:
(i) Any member who so requests by a specified date may
exclude himself from the class and the action by giving notice
thereof ("opting out").
(ii) Information concerning how class members who desire
to be excluded from the class ("opt out") may give notice thereof.
(iii) The claim of a member who does not request to be
excluded from the class will be terminated by the judgment in the
action under the rule of res judicata.
(iv) Any member who does not request exclusion may move
the court for permission to appear as a named class corepresentative.
(v) The estimated total amount of the recovery, the anticipated fee which will be sought by counsel for the class, the anticipated other expenses and costs to the class which will be paid
from the funds recovered before distribution of the net proceeds
to class members, and the net amount to be recovered by each
member if the action is successful (a formula statement will be
satisfactory).
.7 Additional issues.
Certain issues, although not always unique to class actions,
frequently arise in them and are appropriate for a pretrial order
after hearing (but see Section 451). Among these issues are:
(a) Consolidation, severance or abatement. A motion to
consolidate with, or sever from, one or more other pending achttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss1/4
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tions, to abate the instant action until certain other pending actions have proceeded to judgment and similar motions based on
the similarity of issues with those in other pending actions may
be made. (Motions to coordinate with other pending actions pursuant to CCP Secs. 404, et seq. may be heard concerning all
actions filed after January 1, 1974.)
(b) Bifurcation. A motion to bifurcate trial of the issue of
liability of the defendant from trial on the class issues may be
made (Section 441).
(c) Bond. Government Code Sec. 947 and other sections
provide that when a public entity is a defendant, a bond may be
demanded by said defendant. A motion to excuse or fix the
amount of the bond may be made.
(d) Abuse of class action. A motion to restrict or regulate
contact of the named parties or counsel with the class may be
made.
(e) Intervention. A motion to intervene pursuant to CCP
Sec. 387 by one who earlier has excluded himself from the class
("opted out") may be made.
(f) Joinder of a class member. A motion by any class member that he be made a co-representative may be made; he also
may move that as co-representative he be allowed to associate
additional counsel to represent the class.
(g) Precedence of discovery. A motion to establish a precedence among issues in discovery may be made. (E.g., where discovery on the issue of liability may be expensive and timeconsuming, a motion may be made limiting discovery to only
class issues until an interlocutory order is made concerning those
issues.)
(h) Others. The above are but a few of the additional issues
which may be present in a class action and which properly may
be the subject of a motion in a class hearing.
428.

Orders

.1 Order determining issues. At the conclusion of each hearing the court will make an order upon the issues presented to it
in said hearing. The order will be final if it dismisses the maintainability of the action as a class action. Upon request of counsel
the court will make findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its order dismissing the class. If the order does not
dismiss the maintainability of the action as a class action, it will
be interlocutory in nature and may be rescinded or modified as
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the changed circumstances of the class, its representative or the
particular action otherwise require.
.2 Order requiring additional hearing. Notwithstanding
Section 428.1, at the conclusion of a hearing the court may make
an order expressly deferring determination of the issues presented
to it in said hearing and may order an additional hearing. The
order may direct the nature of the evidence to be presented
therein (e.g., that the evidence consist of oral testimony and particular exhibits) and otherwise direct the character of the presentation in said later hearing.
The court may order that additional discovery be made before said later hearing and, notwithstanding Section 426.4, that
it be presented in said later hearing.
The court may also order that said later hearing be a trial on
a bifurcated issue pursuant to Section 441.
.3 Order upon stipulation. The court generally will approve
stipulations resolving the class issues and make its order thereon
(Section 429). This approval and order thereon will make unnecessary a hearing on said issues.
.4 Order concerning nature of recovery. The court may
order that recovery, if eventually obtained, will be of a nature
other than sought in the complaint. Thus, even though the complaint may seek only money damages, the court may order that
the recovery be of the fluid recovery nature, for injunctive relief
only, or a combination of types of relief.
.5 Order upon other class matters. The court may grant
orders on class issues of a nature not contemplated in this Manual
if equitable considerations make the granting of said orders beneficial to the determination of class issues.
.6 Order upon non-appearance. When one or more of the
parties do not appear at a regularly noticed hearing, the court in
its discretion nevertheless may make an order on the issues presented or may continue the hearing until a later date set by the
court or may place the matter off calendar.
.7 Order superseding pleadings. An interlocutory order
which is inconsistent with a pleading will supersede said pleading, and in trial the evidence will be directed to proof of the issue
as determined by the order rather than the pleading. (E.g., if the
complaint alleges that a class is composed of certain persons but
the order after hearing defines the class to be smaller than that
set out in the complaint, the definition in the order will supersede
the description in the complaint and proof in the trial will be
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concerning the existence of the class as defined in said order.)
.8 Relationship of the interlocutory order to trial of the
class issues. The existence of an interlocutory order (Section
428.1) does not relieve the party who has alleged the existence of
a class from the burden of proving in the trial those issues concerning the class which remain. However, if the interlocutory
order has excluded a portion of the alleged class (by defining the
class to be less extensive than alleged), evidence will not be admitted in the trial concerning that portion of the alleged class
which earlier has been excluded by interlocutory order.
.9 Notice of order. Although the court may direct the clerk
to forward by mail to counsel copies of the order when made, it
will be the responsibility of that counsel who is directed by the
court to give notice of the ruling to give said notice.
429. Stipulations for an Order.
In many actions one or more class issues are uncontroverted.
(E.g., in many class actions constitution of the class may be clear,
thus resolving issue 1.) These uncontroverted issues should be
resolved by written stipulation executed by counsel and filed in
court. Stipulations upon all class issues before hearing make the
hearing unnecessary. Also, counsel are urged to attempt to stipulate to those class issues which are made the subject of an interlocutory order and remain to be tried. (In most instances substantially all the relevant evidence on the issue probably will have
been revealed in the declarations submitted for the hearing.)
All stipulations should recite not only the matters included
therein but make reference to the issues as cataloged in this Manual.
Stipulations may be presented at any time to the clerk of
Department 36 for approval by the judge sitting in said department. Said approval constitutes the order resolving the issues.
EARLY TRIAL OF BIFURCATED ISSUE
441.

Scheduling Early Trial.

.1 Motion for early trial of a bifurcated issue. Any named
party may move, pursuant to CCP Sec. 597, that the court order
an early trial of the class issues which have not been earlier resolved by order or stipulation. The motion must include early
trial of all still unresolved class issues.
Any named party may move, pursuant to CCP Sec. 598, that
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the court order an early trial of the issue of the defendant's liability.
The court on its own motion may order an early trial on
either the class issues or liability.
.2 Procedure for notice and presentation of motion. Those
rules ordinarily followed when making a motion under CCP Secs.
597 and 598 apply concerning the time and manner of noticing
and making a motion for early trial of a bifurcated issue except
that all motions therefor will be noticed for Department 36 (see
Section 441.3) even though the motion is not to be made in conjunction with a hearing on class issues.
.3 Place and hour of hearing. All motions for the early trial
of class issues will be noticed for hearing in Department 36 for the
hour of 9:00 a.m. on any court day. The party making said motion
should first contact the clerk in Department 36 to ascertain the
availability of a particular morning before giving notice of hearing
on the motion.
.4 Time for trial. Except for good cause, the court will not
set the early trial of class issues for any date preceding the making
of an interlocutory order on said issues after the conduct of one
or more hearings thereon.
442.

Order After Early Trial.

At the conclusion of a trial on a bifurcated issue, the court
will make its order establishing the proof (or failure thereof) upon
the issue presented therein, which order will constitute a final
determination of said issue for all trial purposes.
SETTLEMENT HEARINGS AND JUDGMENTS
461. Nature of Class Action Settlement Hearings.
All agreements between the parties which settle the claims
of the class and terminate the action must be approved by the
court after hearing (herein "settlement hearing"), which approval
will be reflected by a judgment. The court's approval is one based
upon its acceptance of the fairness of the proposed settlement, for
which the court will conduct an independent inquiry. The court
after said hearing may refuse to approve the settlement if the
court determines that it is not fair. However, if the parties provide in the settlement agreement that the court may modify the
terms thereof to achieve fairness and the parties agree to be
bound by said modification, the court will modify said settlement, when necessary to achieve fairness.
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Scheduling Settlement Hearing.

.1 Motion for hearing. Any party to a settlement agreement
may submit a written notice of motion for approval of the agreement by the court. The notice of motion should be accompanied
by all documents upon which the party will rely in the hearing
on his motion, including copies of the settlement agreement, proposed notice to the class of settlement hearing and the proposed
judgment.
.2 Place and time of hearing the motion. Notice of motion
for a settlement hearing should be noticed for Department 36 and
set for hearing at 9:00 a.m. on any court day, except that the
period of notice set out in CCP Sec. 1005 must be given. The
party making said motion should ascertain from the clerk in Department 36 the availability of a particular morning before giving
notice of hearing on the motion.
.3 Order for settlement hearing. After hearing the motion,
the court will make its order granting or denying a settlement
hearing. If it grants a settlement hearing, its order will include
the time and place of said settlement hearing, the notice thereof
to be given to the class members, and other matters which it
deems necessary to the proper conduct of a settlement hearing.
463.

Conduct of Settlement Hearings.

.1 Procedure. The court will employ that procedure which
it deems necessary to ascertain the fairness of the proposed settlement. This procedure may involve only a conference in chambers,
may involve both a conference and the examination of documents, or may involve the taking of testimonial and other evidence.
.2 Attorney's fees. All agreements for the payment of fees
to the attorney for the class representative should be included in
the settlement. If the parties to said agreement are unable to
agree to the amount of the fees, the parties should agree that the
court will set a reasonable fee. Regardless of whether the parties
do agree to the amount of a fee, the court will award only that
amount which it determines to be reasonable, which amount may
be less than that to which the parties agree. In every settlement
hearing in which the representative seeks the award of fees to his
attorney, said representative must present evidence to support
his request. Said evidence will include, but is not limited to, the
amount of the recovery, the contingent nature thereof (probability of success when the representation was undertaken), the numPublished by Scholar Commons, 1975
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ber of hours which the attorney has devoted to the matter, his
professional standing, his hourly rate for his office work and court
appearances, his daily rate for office work and court appearances
if said daily rate differs from mere accumulation of hours, and
said attorney's agreement with the class representative concerning its fees. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, 2nd ed., 101 et seq.,
for a list of some of the relevant considerations.) Initial presentation of this evidence will be through a declaration.
464. Judgment.
After the settlement hearing the court will make and enter
judgment pursuant to CCP Sec. 632 and other relevant sections.
Where the judgment of the court requires future acts to be performed by the parties beyond mere payment of a money judgment
by defendant, the judgment will provide for the court's retention
of jurisdiction while satisfaction of the judgment is being effected.
All proposed judgments which are submitted to the court with the
settlement agreement should include a provision for retention of
jurisdiction if said retention is appropriate and should provide in
detail for the terms of said retained jurisdiction.
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